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1.  INTRODUCTION 
MICHAEL EMERSON & EVA GROSS 
Crisis management has become a new frontier for the functions of the 
European Union. It is a vital component of the EU’s European security and 
defence policy (ESDP), which in turn completes the set of policy 
instruments available for the broader concept of the common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP). The potential significance of these developments 
has reached the point that political scientists are now treating the CFSP and 
ESDP as a research domain. Accordingly, this book is devoted to the 
findings of four scholars – Eva Gross, Isabelle Ioannides, Ana E. Juncos and 
Ursula C. Schroeder – who in the context of their PhD researches have been 
analysing the EU’s first crisis-management missions. They look in some 
detail at how these first operations have gone, what lessons are to be 
drawn, and indeed, whether the lessons have been drawn by the EU 
institutions themselves. 
Long preliminaries.  The turn of the century saw the EU perhaps 
finally start to become serious about the remaining major gap in its system 
– the capacity to project power forcefully beyond its frontiers. The 
economic and monetary union was more or less complete, with the single 
market having been in existence since 1992 and the single currency entering 
circulation with the euro banknotes in 2002. The area called ‘freedom, 
security and justice’ had had its hard core established in the Schengen 
provisions since 1990. In the area of climate change, the EU was on track 
towards its emergence as the world pioneer. But the idea of an autonomous 
European military capability had long remained taboo for some member 
states, and so the field had been left reserved for NATO.  
It is quite usual for major systemic developments of the EU to have 
long gestation periods, during which ideas are floated but not quickly 
agreed upon, and token actions are implemented first without real 2 | EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS 
 
operational significance. Yet the question of a European defence capability 
took this evolutionary prudence to exceptional lengths, with the Western 
European Union (WEU) struggling unsuccessfully for half a century, from 
1948 until its demise in 1999, to become much more than an empty gesture.1  
Military affairs began to creep into the EU with the (Maastricht) 
Treaty on European Union of 1992, which included vague wording about 
the EU possibly framing a common defence policy at some future point in 
time. Nonetheless, also in 1992 WEU ministers, in one of their most 
significant meetings in Petersberg near Bonn, defined a certain number of 
missions that the WEU might undertake. These tasks, which came to be 
known as the Petersberg tasks, involved humanitarian, rescue and 
peacekeeping activities, along with the deployment of combat forces in 
crisis management, including peacemaking.2 There followed a further 
incremental advance in the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, which amended 
the Maastricht Treaty with slightly more engaging language (see Box 1.1).  
The real breakthrough for the EU’s role came at the St Malo meeting 
of President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Tony Blair on 4 December 
1998, in which these leaders of the EU’s two most militarily capable 
member states agreed that the EU must acquire a capacity for autonomous 
military action. 
This agreement was rapidly followed up. At the European Council 
meeting of June 1999, Javier Solana was appointed the dual function of 
Secretary General of the Council and High Representative for the CFSP, 
and the WEU was considered (euphemistically) to have ‘completed its 
mandate’, with its assets transferred to the EU. By December 1999, the 
European Council was able to declare the first Headline Goals for a 
deployment capacity of 50,000–60,000 military personnel. 
 
 
 
                                                      
1 For detailed accounts, see W. van Eekelen, From Words to Deeds – The Continuing 
Debate on European Security, CEPS and DCAF, Brussels and Geneva, 2006. 
2 See M.E. Smith, “Implementation: Making the EU’s International Relations 
Work”, in C. Hill and M. Smith, International Relations and the European Union, 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2005. INTRODUCTION| 3 
 
Box 1.1 Steps towards establishing the EU’s crisis management capabilities 
February 1992, Maastricht Treaty: “The common foreign and security policy 
shall include all questions related to the security of the union, including the 
eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a 
common defence” (emphasis added).  
October 1997, Amsterdam Treaty: “The common foreign and security policy 
shall include all questions related to the security of the union, including the 
progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common 
defence” (emphasis added).  
December 1998, St Malo: “[T]he Union must have the capacity for autonomous 
action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (emphasis 
added).* 
December 1999, Helsinki European Council: “Member States must be able, by 
2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of 
up to 50,000–60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks.”** 
June 2000, Feira European Council: “International efforts to strengthen, and 
where necessary re-establish, credible local police forces cannot be fully 
successful if the police are not complemented by a functioning judicial and penal 
system.”*** 
November 2001: Commitments were made by the Council to maintain a capacity 
of 5,000 police officers and other civilian personnel, of which 1,400 were to be 
available at short notice. 
May 2003, General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC): “[T]he EU 
now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited 
and constrained by recognized shortfalls.”† 
June 2004, Brussels European Council: Member states “must be able by 2010 to 
respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to 
the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of 
the European Union.…[Minimum] force packages must be militarily effective, 
credible and coherent and should be broadly based on the Battlegroups concept” 
(Headline Goal 2010).†† 
* Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Joint Declaration issued at the British-French 
Summit in St Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998, London, 4 December 1998. 
** European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council of 10-11 
December, SN 300/1/99, Brussels, 1999. 4 | EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS 
 
Box 1.1, cont. 
*** European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Santa Maria da Feira European 
Council of 19-20 June, SN 200/100, Brussels, 2000. 
†  General Affairs & External Relations Council (GAERC), Council Conclusions of the 
GAERC meeting of 19 May, Brussels, 2003. 
†† European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council of 17–18 
June, SN 10679/2/REV 2, Brussels, 19 July 2004. 
 
In 2000, the issue of civilian crisis management came to the fore with 
the European Council of June, chaired by Portugal in Santa Maria da Feira, 
The new emphasis on civilian crisis management was further supported 
under the Swedish presidency of 2001, with the European Council meeting 
in Göteborg emphasising the rule of law in its conclusions. A ministerial 
conference in November 2001 established commitments to maintain a 
capacity of 5,000 police officers and other civilian personnel, of which 1,400 
were to be available at short notice. In addition, four priority areas for 
civilian action were identified: policing, the rule of law, civilian 
administration and civil protection. 
In May 2004, the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal morphed into the new 
Headline Goal 2010, which calls for member states “to be able by 2010 to 
respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach 
to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the 
Treaty of the European Union”.3 The experience of Operation Artemis in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo was to be the benchmark for the 
development of ‘battlegroups’. Originating in a Franco–British proposal 
and endorsed by Germany in 2004, the first operational battlegroups were 
to be set up by 2007. The new battlegroup concept was designed to provide 
the force packages required to mount a rapid response to a crisis, consisting 
of battalion-size formations of 1,500 soldiers each. The year 2004 also saw 
the endorsement of work towards a Civilian Headline Goal 2008, which is 
 
                                                      
3 See Council of the European Union, Capabilities Improvement Chart I/2006 
(retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/newsWord/en/misc/ 
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currently elaborated under the auspices of the Council.4 Under this 
Headline Goal, civilian ESDP capabilities should be deployable within 30 
days. 
So unfolded the main political steps towards the EU becoming 
operational in ‘crisis management’, now an official term of art for the EU 
institutions. The EU chose to go for a comprehensive and integrated 
concept of crisis management, ranging from peacemaking and 
peacekeeping to establishing the rule of law by the police and judiciary, 
with where necessary a complete military–civilian array of instruments. 
The logic of doing so is widely supported. According to opinion polls, the 
citizens of the EU consider keeping the peace in Europe, setting 
immigration policy and managing the EU’s borders to be the most 
important new tasks that they want the EU to fulfil. Nevertheless, now the 
EU has to face up to the consequences of its chosen political logic. In 
practice, this entails a formidable task of developing and coordinating the 
EU’s complex institutional, legal and administrative structures, as well as 
liaising with NATO.  
A cascade of missions. After the long preliminaries, there followed a 
rapid cascade of missions, starting in 2003 with a first police mission in 
Bosnia and a first military mission in Macedonia. By the end of 2006, a total 
of 16 missions had been launched operationally, of which 6 had been 
completed and 10 remained active. Among these, the greatest concentration 
has been in the Balkans (6), followed by Africa (5), the Middle East (3), the 
South Caucasus (1) and South-East Asia (1). A further major Balkan 
mission, for Kosovo, is at the planning stage and a police mission in 
Afghanistan is currently being launched. 
The initial experience has seen a stronger focus on civilian rather than 
military missions, compared with what seemed to have been expected 
when the ESDP was being launched. The St Malo declaration had 
highlighted the word “military”, and the first Headline Goals had only 
concerned military operations, followed two years later by the smaller 
Headline Goal for police and other civilian exercises. Of the 18 missions 
undertaken or planned, only 4 have been military, with the large majority 
consisting of activities related to policing, the rule of law, political 
monitoring or border management.  
                                                      
4 See G. Lindstrom, The Headline Goal, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2007. 6 | EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS 
 
The Balkan missions have been the most complex, since the EU’s 
commitment to the region’s Europeanisation is by its nature permanent, 
whereas missions elsewhere tend more to be based on an in-and-out model. 
Crisis management is in principle a temporary activity in any given theatre 
of operation. Yet in the post-Yugoslav Balkans, the EU’s involvement in the 
crises of governance – in Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo – is seen 
strategically as leading on through successive stages of Europeanisation to 
full EU membership in the long run. The presumed sequencing is for the 
military component to be required at the beginning to stop violent conflict 
and stabilise the situation, but then to be retired relatively soon; while the 
police component may also be present early on, it leads on to the agendas 
of reform of the judiciary and penal establishments, which may be tasks of 
decades. The political context is assumed to shift sooner or later from that 
of the (quasi-) protectorate to that of the truly sovereign state. This 
development in turn means that the logic of the mission mandates should 
shift from entailing executive responsibilities (i.e. with the right and duty of 
forceful intervention by the EU’s military or police) to advisory, training 
and institution-building roles.  
For the EU institutions, this has implications for all three of the EU’s 
legal pillars of its competences (with pillar I largely relating to economic 
and development affairs, pillar II to foreign and security policy, and pillar 
III to freedom, security and justice). The crisis management operations 
launched under the auspices of the ESDP fall under pillar II, but as the 
transition logic of the Europeanisation of the Balkans unfolds, all three 
pillars have become involved, with a host of complex coordination and 
sequencing issues for the institutions to confront. 
The stabilisation–integration transition. In other words, the 
missions in the Balkans are working with a process of transition from the 
first imperative of stabilisation for ending overt conflict through to the 
long-term objective of integration with the EU. Stabilisation means 
stopping violence and civil war or restoring order in a failing state. In the 
Balkans, the intended model was for the stabilisation phase to give way 
rapidly to the processes of integration with the EU (i.e. ‘Europeanisation’), 
with legislative adoption of EU norms and standards and their obligatory 
implementation.  
This distinction between stabilisation and integration has profound 
operational implications. The former is short-term crisis management for 
which the period of time may be months or a few years, whereas the latter INTRODUCTION| 7 
 
is a longer-term process for which the period of time may be within one or 
more decades. The former is the uncontroversial focus of ESDP operations. 
The latter, however, involves an area broadly termed the ‘rule of law’, 
which covers a range of functions from the police to the judiciary and 
penitentiary, with concerns for the general quality of governance, and 
which in turn is recognised as a crucial factor for economic development. 
This long chain of policy reasoning and of instruments cuts across the EU’s 
complex structure of institutions and legal competences grouped under the 
three pillars. What may begin as a crisis management operation clearly in 
the province of the ESDP ends up as part of the pre-accession process of 
Europeanisation. The former is a mainline responsibility of the Council and 
its Secretariat, whereas the latter is a mainline responsibility of the 
Commission. Yet in practice, the frontiers between the stabilisation and 
integration functions are fuzzy and overlapping at least for a certain period 
of time, meaning a grey area of uncertainty as to where the central 
responsibility should lie.  
Brussels tries to shape its system. In chapter 2, Ursula C. Schroeder 
addresses these issues of the EU’s governance of its crisis management 
functions. She notes that the creation of the EU’s crisis management 
architecture has been “amazingly swift”. This architecture is portrayed as 
having three lines of command and control, through the Council, the 
Council Secretariat headed by the high representative, and the 
Commission. ESDP operations are themselves firmly entrenched under the 
authority of the member states in the Council. Nevertheless, the 
Commission also has crisis management and conflict-prevention interests 
and instruments of action, and there have already arisen issues of whether 
given missions should be Council/ESDP or Commission responsibilities.5 
The Council Secretariat is of course legally subordinated to the Council of 
Ministers, but its growing executive role in ESDP operations makes it a de 
facto actor, especially where matters of inter-institutional relations are 
concerned. 
                                                      
5 For example, the ongoing Border Assistance Mission around Transnistria is a 
Commission mission, whereas the ongoing Border Assistance Mission in Rafah in 
Palestine is an ESDP mission. Both missions could have been allocated to either the 
Commission or the Council’s ESDP. Similarly, the Rule of Law Mission to Georgia 
(EUJUST Themis), which was an ESDP mission, could have well been a 
Commission mission.  8 | EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS 
 
Attempts have been made to rationalise and coordinate the emerging 
system. In November 2000, a crisis-management procedures document was 
submitted by High Representative Javier Solana, subsequently becoming 
the grandly entitled, “Procedures for Coherent, Comprehensive EU Crisis 
Management”. At least this was signalling that the EU institutions were 
aware that they were managing a wide-ranging set of instruments, 
although it largely remained a paper exercise. In 2002, the Danish 
presidency promoted a civil–military coordination (CMCO) process, but 
Ursula C. Schroeder reports one interviewee saying frankly, “the process 
was a total failure”, with the Council and Commission agreeing on the case 
for continuing the informality of contacts among the institutions. The 
Council Secretariat advanced the Crisis Response Coordination Teams 
(CRCTs) as an instrument for planning crisis management operations, but 
again these ad hoc task forces did not become notably effective.  
Ursula C. Schroeder examines these inter-institutional issues through 
the prism of the “negative coordination” paradigm, according to which 
institutions or units try to ensure that any new initiative by another will not 
undermine their own status quo interests. She observes that the ESDP 
initiatives of the Council have led to defensive reactions by the 
Commission, which is what could have been predicted. In theory, the 
Council/ESDP is concerned with crises and emergencies, which should 
mean short-term security, whereas the Commission is concerned with long-
term policies or conflict prevention and institutional development. The 
Council has nonetheless followed an expansionary strategy, giving itself 
mandates to enter the fields of the rule of law, the judiciary and civil 
protection. The Commission’s definition of its competences overlaps 
considerably with those of the Council, wherever the Council goes beyond 
the strictly military sphere. The Council has thus been moving from pillar II 
into pillar I and pillar III areas, and from the short term to the long term. A 
large grey area of competences has emerged, and the result is that in the 
domain of civilian crisis management and peacebuilding the relationship 
between the Council (Secretariat) and the Commission has been at least 
initially tense and competitive. Still, it is said that in the last year or so the 
institutions have resolved to work more smoothly together and learned to 
do so.  
The question of mandates. The crisis management missions have a 
primary divide between the civilian and the military spheres. One might 
suppose that the corresponding mandates would be for the civilian 
exercises to be concerned with the rule of law, and the military operations INTRODUCTION| 9 
 
with keeping the peace and preventing outbreaks of inter-ethnic violence 
or civil war. This supposition has been only approximately true for the 
missions in Bosnia, however. Two factors have meant a less clear divide in 
practice. First, as time went on it became increasingly the case that 
organised crime was the main enemy, with the renewal of inter-ethnic 
violence becoming a more remote prospect. Second, there has been the 
issue of whether there was to be a so-called ‘executive mandate’, meaning 
the authority to intervene forcefully. There are several kinds of executive 
authority powers: arrest, physical intervention to stop outbreaks of 
violence and the dismissal of police officers, judges or other officials on 
grounds of corruption or failure to respect agreed political objectives. The 
initial situation in Bosnia was for the EU police personnel to have only 
advisory, monitoring and mentoring roles, to the exclusion of powers to 
intervene forcefully – e.g. to make arrests – whereas the military had the 
power to intervene. This issue of the existence of an executive mandate, or 
not, is a political litmus test of the relationship between the EU and the 
partner state. Where the mission has an executive mandate the implication 
is that the relationship is one of protector and protectorate. In instances 
where the mission has no executive mandate the relationship is one of 
assisting a sovereign partner state. This issue is thus of the highest political 
sensitivity for states aspiring to full EU membership, with Macedonia 
seeking and in 2005 obtaining membership candidate status. How the 
executive mandate question is decided also effectively defines whether the 
mission is part of the stabilisation function or the integration process.  
As Ana E. Juncos observes in chapter 3, the experience of the Bosnian 
missions has been problematic with regard to the definition of mandates. 
As noted above, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) of 2003-05 did not have an 
executive mandate, while the EU Force (EUFOR) could intervene. This 
approach caused two problems. The relative weakness of the police 
mandate was evident to all, and the mission suffered in terms of reputation 
and motivation from not having the power to do those tasks for which its 
personnel were trained. On the other hand, the military were entrusted 
with police tasks for which they were not trained. Consequently, the 
combined EU civilian and military presence in Bosnia was marked by poor 
coordination and a lack of delineation of tasks or clear hierarchies between 
the civilian and the military operations. With the benefit of hindsight, the 
police mission could at least have had a stronger mandate at the beginning, 
and difficult issues of police–military coordination on the ground could 
have been eased.  10 | EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS 
 
A different manifestation of this issue was seen in Macedonia, where 
the priority of the government to obtain EU candidate status led them to 
push for an early end to the military operation but especially the civilian 
missions that followed EUFOR’s Operation Concordia, which were seen as 
implying protectorate status. Arguably, this resulted in a premature end to 
the ESDP presence and the transfer of responsibility to Commission-led 
police reform.  
A general feature of the police missions has been the objective of 
helping the local police to achieve ‘European standards’. This goal was easy 
enough to write into the mandate documents, but the practical definition of 
what it was to mean and how it might be benchmarked has remained 
elusive. This in turn has meant ambiguity over what the real objective is. It 
has been open to the interpretation that the EU’s ESDP presence has to a 
degree only been symbolic. Indeed, for both police and military missions it 
could be said that the implicit objective has been to have a certain visibility 
of forces in European uniforms, sufficient to discourage outbreaks of 
renewed violence, perhaps under the assumption that potential 
troublemakers would be dissuaded if they believed that stronger forces or 
intervention mandates would be introduced if necessary. Tactically, this 
amounts to signalling the presence of a credible deterrent, which actually 
did not need to be used. But to describe that role in an official mandate 
document would be manifestly awkward politically, so it was decided to 
go ahead with the positive-sounding objective of achieving European 
standards in the local police forces, even when this was only vaguely 
defined and certainly only achievable over a much long period than the 
two- or three-year mission mandates. 
Coordination in an overcrowded field. From an EU institutional 
perspective, the police missions involve a highly complex multi-pillar 
operation, involving the interests of pillar I for long-term development, 
pillar II for short-term security (at least in principle if not in practice, as the 
time span of the EUPM has shown) and pillar III for the combat against 
organised crime and border management. This situation calls for 
operational coordination between the Council Secretariat and the 
Commission, for which the institutions were not initially prepared, as 
evidenced by experts being deployed by the two institutions with similar 
profiles.  
On the ground in Bosnia the tricky issues of coordination among the 
police (EUPM), military (EUFOR) and the political interface (through the INTRODUCTION| 11 
 
EU’s special representative or EUSR) led after some time, by the end of 
2005, to the adoption by the three parties of a set of seven operating 
principles, with the EUSR taking responsibility for overall coordination.  
The first police mission in Macedonia began at the end of 2003, thus 
profiting from the initial Bosnian experience. It was also preceded by the 
EU’s first military mission from March to December 2003, so that in this 
case the logical sequencing of military before civilian missions was 
observed. Still, the same issues of coordination of the EU’s short-term 
stabilisation and long-term development missions arose, with the police 
mission of the ESDP (Proxima) tending to become involved in longer-term 
issues of institutional development and reform, which are central concerns 
of the Commission-led programmes financed through the budget for the 
CARDS6 programme. The EU actors present in Macedonia included the 
EUSR, the EU presidency’s ambassador, the head of the European 
Commission Delegation, the head of the Proxima police mission and the 
Skopje office of the European Agency for Reconstruction. For a time, there 
were notoriously poor communications between some of the parties. In 
November 2005, however, it was decided to combine in one person the 
head of the Commission Delegation and the EUSR, which has worked 
much better. This ‘double-hatting’ initiative is also interesting as an ‘in-the-
field’ decentralised version of what had been intended in the (incompletely 
ratified) European Constitution for the double-hatting in Brussels of the 
high representative for CFSP with the position of vice president of the 
Commission for external relations. Although the double-hatting in Brussels 
raises further issues of institutional coherence between the Council and the 
Commission that go beyond the scope of the present study, there are valid 
operational reasons at the level of planning and executing crisis 
management missions for this double-double-hatting, i.e. both in Brussels 
and in the field.  
Bosnia and Macedonia have seen a further complexity, beyond those 
internal to the EU, with the presence of virtually all the major international 
organisations (NATO, UN agencies, the OSCE, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and the Council of Europe). In chapter 4, 
Isabelle Ioannides labels this frankly as “an over-crowded scene”. In the 
                                                      
6 CARDS refers to Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and 
Stabilisation. 12 | EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS 
 
case of police reform, the Council of Europe and the OSCE were both 
seeking their part of the action in addition to the EU’s several actors. 
Communications between the parties were reportedly less than full and 
transparent, and coordination procedures more formal than effective, with 
tensions surrounding the apparent sidelining of the OSCE. It is evident that 
the international community was not well prepared for the challenges it 
faced in the Western Balkans after the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. 
Diplomats sought ‘improved coordination’ among multiple and 
overlapping agencies. But the great powers were unable to face up to the 
challenge of rationalisation, leaving the field wide open for the paradigm of 
negative coordination already reported for the EU alone. The EU 
proclaimed the leading role for itself, but its own instruments of action are 
still taking time to build up.  
Effectiveness. There has been considerable official use of the word 
‘success’ in relation to various missions. Yet the criteria for success and the 
meaning of such judgments have often been less than clear. Of course, the 
institutions have understandably been concerned that such a seminal 
development of the EU system, with entry into the force projection field, 
should be branded as successful.  
A minimalist standard of success would be of a purely administrative 
nature internal to the EU, namely achieving the deployment of military or 
police forces (or both) with necessary equipment and resources to the 
various theatres of operation. Here the level of achievement has been 
mixed. There have been no deployment disasters, but there have been some 
delays in the deployment of personnel, with significant problems in 
recruiting the required numbers of civilian officers with the requisite skills, 
as well as lags in the procurement of equipment. Although member states 
have substantial experience of military deployment under NATO or UN 
mandates, the scale of the police missions caught the member states 
insufficiently prepared, with complaints about their real level of 
commitment towards fulfilling their obligations. In addition, there has been 
a lack of specific training for each mission. The creation of Civilian 
Response Teams (CRTs) and training manuals have gone some way in 
rectifying this. Delays in procurement have been reported, attributable to 
the intricacies of coordination between the Council and the Commission, 
wherein the Commission has had to do the procurement for Council 
missions, with the well-known heaviness of Commission tendering 
procedures in the interests of financial regularity. Suggestions have been 
made for stocks of pre-prepared equipment to be organised.  INTRODUCTION| 13 
 
The problem of procurement and the broader question of human 
resources and capacity development for ESDP missions remains a 
challenge. While the creation of CRTs represents an important step in 
solving the shortages in appropriately trained personnel, the fact remains 
that police forces as well as judges and judiciary personnel are primarily 
needed, who are educated and developed for domestic rather than 
international needs. The establishment of an adequate pool of really 
qualified personnel is going to require serious investments. Judging also 
from the experience gathered in the EUJUST Themis mission in Georgia, 
the system for the secondment of judges needs to be improved, notably to 
reduce career uncertainties for those participating in ESDP operations.7 The 
deployment of police and military forces has so far been much quicker than 
that of judges and lawyers. This predicament represents an additional 
challenge for future civilian crisis-management missions – particularly the 
one presently planned for Kosovo. 
A more fundamental standard of success is whether the peace has 
been kept and consolidated in theatres of operation previously suffering 
civil war or serious threats of inter-ethnic violence. Indeed the peace has 
b e e n  k e p t  i n  b o t h  B o s n i a  a n d  M a c e donia. In Bosnia, the period of 
convalescence after a major war is proving long and inter-ethnic tensions 
remain serious at the level of government structures. That being said, the 
inter-ethnic violence has stopped, which is illustrated by the switch of focus 
of the missions to combating organised crime. In Macedonia, the threat of 
civil war has receded, following the Ohrid political agreement to 
restructure the country’s constitution, and the switch from stabilisation to 
integration modes has clearly advanced. The strategic sequence of the EU’s 
actions in Macedonia has been logical and positive, from mediating the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement through to military and then police missions, 
leading on to the present situation in which Macedonia is accepted as a 
candidate state. 
A more difficult question is attribution of the credit for these rather 
positive developments, in which the ESDP missions have been components 
of a complex set of international and European operations. In both Bosnia 
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and Macedonia, the EU missions have been follow-on operations, taking 
over from NATO or UN missions. Clearly, the peacemaking breakthrough 
in Bosnia came from the US-led NATO military operations, followed by the 
forging of a constitution at Dayton in 1995 under the leadership of the US 
State Department’s Richard Holbrooke. Only in 2003 did the EU’s police 
mission there take over from the UN and the EU’s military mission take 
over from NATO. Similarly, the EU’s military mission in Macedonia took 
over from NATO. Overall, the EU has followed a cautious, low-risk policy 
for feeling its way into the crisis management field. To a degree, these have 
been institutional training exercises, which is legitimate in itself, but the 
level of ‘success’ should correspondingly not be overestimated.  
There is a further rather subtle standard of effectiveness that may be 
relevant, where the role of uniformed military or police forces (or both) is 
mainly symbolic. The forces are visible to the media and society, and show 
that order is being supervised, with the implication that they could be 
switched to a more forceful role should a renewed outbreak or the need 
arise. As already noted above, for effectiveness in ‘convalescent’ cases the 
symbolic presence and the credibility of possible intervention may be 
sufficient and indeed optimal.  
A more demanding and rigorous standard of effectiveness is that 
now appearing in the mandates of police missions in the Balkans, namely 
of achieving European standards of policing and rule of law. Here the 
experiences in Bosnia and Macedonia both reveal shortcomings. First, the 
operational definition of European standards has been lacking and so the 
benchmark for success has hardly existed. Second, to the extent that an 
informal and common sense view of European standards is assumed, it is 
evident that there is a problem of time horizons. The missions of two or 
three years have been manifestly too short for processes that are going to 
take a decade or so.  
Are the lessons being learned? Given the rapid growth of ESDP and 
particularly civilian crisis-management missions, EU officials themselves 
openly state that the lessons-learned process is a continuing one. Whereas 
the military operations have benefited from better and more established 
structures and processes than the civilian crisis-management missions, the 
number of civilian crisis-management missions makes paramount the 
questions of capacity development, improving human resources and more 
generally that of implementing a lessons-learned process. INTRODUCTION| 15 
 
In light of the ‘growing pains’ documented by the four contributions 
in this volume, the question naturally arises about the extent to which the 
lessons highlighted by the experiences in the Balkans have been learned 
and applied. On some counts, the prognosis is rather promising. On others, 
old dilemmas and problems have either re-emerged or not been sufficiently 
addressed at the start. 
With respect to mandates and the coordination between civilian and 
military instruments, in Bosnia the mandate for the police mission (EUPM) 
has been refocused and given an appropriate lead responsibility in its field 
compared with the military. The seven principles, outlined in more detail 
by Ana E. Juncos, established this lead role. Furthermore, the mandate of 
the EUPM has been strengthened so that it can more effectively fight 
organised crime. The different instruments in place have been streamlined 
and coherence has improved, although it is too early to tell whether this 
will translate into success in practice. 
The dilemma of integration versus stabilisation remains in Bosnia, 
where the need for reform of the justice sector and the police, and the fight 
against organised crime are the biggest problems. The EU has recently been 
reported as moving towards replacing Christian Schwarz-Schilling, the 
current EU Special Representative, who has been considered ‘insufficiently 
tough’.8 This brings the stabilisation–integration dilemma back into focus. 
Mr Schwarz-Schilling’s less top-heavy approach compared with that of his 
predecessor, Paddy Ashdown, was initially seen by many as necessary and 
timely to foster Bosnia’s self-sufficiency and gradual move towards greater 
responsibility. Now there seem to be second thoughts, however, over 
whether this was not premature. Perhaps this is less a question of lessons 
learned, but rather more an enduring dilemma as to the appropriate 
response to regional tensions. 
On shaping the EU’s crisis management system, the need for better 
coordination of instruments – including the call for trained personnel and 
more efficient procurement procedures – has been recognised by both the 
Council and the Commission as a serious problem. In an effort to correct it, 
in the case of the expected Kosovo mission personnel from the Commission 
and the Council have joined together in fact-finding missions at the 
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planning stage. How involvement in the fact-finding missions later 
translates into operational improvements remains to be seen, but the 
mutual recognition of the need for improvement can be taken as a positive 
sign.  
Finally, the increasing public debate and analysis of ESDP missions in 
the member states and in Brussels has served to underline an unresolved 
fundamental weakness remaining at least in second-pillar operations: the 
reluctance on the part of member states to equip the EU with the trained 
personnel needed to fulfil the missions. This issue has most recently been 
made clear by Javier Solana when he stated,  
[M]ember states have not yet fully addressed how to resource 
additional police, prosecutors, judges and penitentiary officials for 
external deployment, when they are usually in short supply at home. If 
we don’t change this, then we have to face up to the fact that supply 
will not meet demand, and ambition will be greater than the capability 
to realise it…we must make sure that we are clear about one thing – 
our willingness and capacity to act, and to act successfully.9 
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2.  GOVERNANCE OF EU CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT 
URSULA C. SCHROEDER
∗ 
Abstract. This chapter assesses the translation of recent European Union crisis-
management concepts into practice. In its quest for a comprehensive crisis-
management policy, has the EU been able to move from strategic concepts to 
coherent planning? Assuming an institutionalist perspective on organisational 
change, the chapter explores the gap between crisis management concepts and the 
organisational realities of everyday and work-level interactions. Through tracing 
the development of crisis management coordination in the EU architecture, the 
chapter takes stock of the successes and failures in the EU’s governance of its 
policies in this area. It contends that the Council and the Commission have 
followed different organisational strategies for implementing comprehensive crisis-
management operations and outlines three general trends in their relationship: 
convergence, coordination and compartmentalisation. 
2.1  Introduction 
The creation of the EU’s crisis management architecture has been an 
amazingly swift process that has considerably enhanced the EU’s options 
for pursuing its external policy goals. In rapid succession, the European 
Council meetings between 1999 and 2001 fleshed out the basic architecture 
of the crisis management capability in the Council Secretariat. By 2003, the 
first ever EU crisis-management mission – the EU police mission (EUPM) – 
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had deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) with the task of 
monitoring, training and inspecting the Bosnian police forces. Between 
2003 and 2006, 16 further missions with military, rule of law, security sector 
reform, police and monitoring mandates were sent to crisis regions across 
the globe.1 At the same time, the European Commission also considerably 
expanded its conflict prevention and civilian crisis-management activities 
within its development and external relations policies. 
Yet, the EU’s new crisis-management actors have been entering a 
complex and already crowded international field. Developed initially 
within the context of the United Nations,2, doctrines and practices of crisis 
management have changed fundamentally since the deployment of the first 
UN peacekeeping mission in 1948. Limited in their early manifestations to 
the interposition of neutral troops into the borderlands between warring 
parties, peacekeeping operations have since moved from their impartial, 
military observer status to multifunctional peacebuilding missions 
deployed by international and regional actors such as the UN, the OSCE 
and the EU. Particularly since the late 1990s, awareness has grown that the 
fostering of stable peace requires not only the provision of military security 
through armed peacekeepers, but also relies on functioning political and 
judicial systems as well as on a societal reconciliation process. Accordingly, 
the new and broader crisis management and peacebuilding operations 
focus on managing the transformation of post-conflict societies towards a 
stable and peaceful order. Thus, to be successful, crisis management now 
incorporates aspects of traditional security provision together with conflict 
prevention, humanitarian relief, institution-building and development 
tasks. This new complexity has led to a convergence of formerly separated 
fields of activity: the task of providing a full range of responses to the 
multiple challenges of civil strife and weak statehood has sometimes forced 
development specialists, humanitarian actors, police and rule of law 
experts as well as military personnel into close proximity. 
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In response, recent concepts of EU crisis management and conflict 
prevention have emphasised comprehensive strategies that focus on 
establishing coherence among the different sets of actors involved. For 
instance, the European security strategy calls for more coherence and 
argues that in complicated crises and responses to failed states, the 
“challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and 
capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European 
Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from member states 
and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and 
on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development”.3 
Earlier, the European Commission had addressed the need to link 
Community activities such as humanitarian relief work and development 
within an “integrated approach towards preventing crises and 
disasters…as well as preventing and resolving conflicts.”4 Additionally, the 
European Commission’s annual report on development aid and external 
assistance promotes an explicitly “holistic approach to governance, peace, 
security and development”.5  
In terms of competences, the EU’s activities in the crisis management 
and peacebuilding sphere are divided into first-pillar Community actions 
and second-pillar civilian and military crisis-management missions.6 While 
the former generally take the shape of longer-term institution-building 
projects, the latter are mostly short- to medium-term military or civilian 
missions aimed at operational capacity-building. Having at its disposal 
both military and civilian instruments (short-term missions as well as 
longer-term projects), the EU is widely seen to be in a unique position to 
provide an integrated approach to peacebuilding. This sentiment is also 
                                                      
3 See Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World, European 
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reflected in its own recent policy statements.7 The following discussion 
takes a closer look at the EU’s success so far. 
Specifically, this chapter is interested in the questions of whether and 
how the EU has translated its concepts into practice: Has the EU been able 
to move from strategic ideas to coordinated planning in its quest for a 
comprehensive crisis-management policy? The chapter traces the ways in 
which the EU coordinates its different crisis-management activities to 
further its goal of developing a coherent crisis-management facility able to 
provide assistance across the full spectrum of peacebuilding in complex 
crises. In contrast to assessments of how its member states have shaped the 
EU’s overall approach to crisis management, it shifts the focus from 
explaining the origins of European security integration towards analysing 
the  development  of the EU’s crisis management capacity itself. The 
development and governance of the EU’s political system, understood as a 
“stable system of transnational governance outside the framework of the 
state”,8 moves into the centre of analysis. Written four years after the very 
first crisis-management mission was deployed under the European security 
and defence policy (ESDP), this chapter is an exercise in taking stock of the 
successes and failures of the EU’s governance of its crisis management 
policies. To pursue this aim, the discussion notes the trends and 
innovations within the EU’s policy-making structures for its crisis 
management functions. It explicitly does not deal with the implementation 
of the EU’s crisis management operations on the ground. 
The following analysis of the EU’s crisis-management planning and 
coordination capabilities also attempts to shed light on the divergence 
between the political consensus on comprehensive crisis management and 
the organisational realities of everyday and work-level interactions. It first 
introduces an institutionalist perspective on organisational development 
and change to explore this gap. The main part of the chapter then follows 
the evolution of both high-level political and work-level organisational 
solutions in the quest for multifaceted crisis management. Here, it first 
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analyses the challenges of implementing political coordination projects and 
then emphasises differences in the Council’s and the Commission’s 
organisational strategies for innovation. Lastly, the chapter highlights three 
general trends in the relationship between the Council and the 
Commission: convergence, coordination and compartmentalisation. 
2.2  Conceptualising innovation and change 
According to Olsen’s (2002)9 characterisation, the process of 
institutionalising the EU follows two intertwined logics of innovation, with 
one being bottom-up and the other top-down. The EU, as Olsen argued, 
has “a history of founding acts and deliberate institution-building, as well 
as informal and gradual evolution where common practices have been 
codified into formal legal institutions”. This chapter makes a similar 
distinction by arguing that the development of the EU’s crisis management 
architecture is characterised by both high-level political decisions to 
establish particular organisational structures and individually pursued 
innovation strategies on the part of different agencies within the EU’s pre-
existing organisational architecture. Both kinds of innovation strategies 
with their respective advantages and drawbacks are discussed in turn. 
Conceptually, the discussion starts from a sociological-institutionalist 
perspective on organisational change in order to explore the gap between 
higher-level political concepts and their realisation within an organisational 
field.10 It is argued that the specific institutional arrangements present 
within a policy field mediate the impact of external incentives for change 
and both enable and constrain processes of organisational adaptation and 
innovation. In contrast to rational theories that predict the success of 
deliberate forms of institutional design, the chosen institutionalist 
framework highlights the likelihood that top-down initiatives for change 
will be filtered through pre-existing organisational structures, potentially 
leading to outcomes unintended by the reformers. In general, 
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institutionalist theories predict that organisational restructuring often 
occurs in an incremental fashion11 and remains inherently conservative.12 
Rapid preference reversals in response to environmental change are seen as 
unlikely.13 The strategies for innovation chosen by organisations are likely 
to involve improvisation with and rearrangement of existing organisational 
resources and units, rather than the demolition of old organisational forms 
and creation of new organisational structures from scratch. 
Drawing on work by March (1991)14 and Genschel (1997),15 one can 
differentiate two specific logics of organisational adaptation to external 
pressures for change: using terminology introduced by March (p. 71), these 
are divided into “the exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation 
of old certainties”. The essence of exploitative adaptation is the “refinement 
and extension of existing competences”, while March characterises 
exploration as a form of organisational adaptation through experimenting 
with new alternatives (ibid., p. 85). These two logics of organisational 
change are mirrored in Genschel’s (1997) distinction between the strategies 
of  patching up and  transposing  organisational structures. The explorative 
strategy of “patching up” (ibid., p. 53) existing competences entails the 
search for solutions to new problems by locally ameliorating inefficiencies 
without centrally changing the overall structure of the organisation. The 
exploitative strategy of innovation “transposes” (ibid., p. 55) existing 
competences into new fields and reappraises earlier arrangements to see 
whether and where they could be re-employed successfully: “the strategy 
of transposition reuses the sunk costs of an old institution for a new 
                                                      
11 See C.E. Lindblom, “The Science of Muddling Through”, Public Administration 
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purpose” (ibid., p. 59). Here, the existence of certain capabilities and fields 
of expertise is converted into an inclination to discover goals these abilities 
might serve.16 This strategy can be characterised as solution- rather than 
problem-driven, since organisational activities are advanced by available 
and not necessarily efficient solutions to observable problems. The 
following argument uses the two strategies of innovation as heuristic tools 
to trace the ways in which the EU has adapted its policies to its 
comprehensive crisis-management concepts. The argument first outlines 
the challenges of political – top-down – projects designed to enhance the 
coordination among the different crisis-management actors. It then moves 
on to the question of how the individual agencies respond to political calls 
for comprehensive crisis management and highlights the strategies of 
patching-up and transposition used by the Council and the Commission. 
2.3  Political solutions: Fostering coordination from above 
In recent years, the EU has formulated several political strategies for 
fostering coordination among its various crisis-management actors. On the 
level of strategic planning analysed here, three of these initiatives have 
been particularly prominent: the process of developing the EU’s crisis 
management procedures (CMPs), the initiative to enhance civil–military 
coordination (CMCO) and the establishment of Crisis Response 
Coordination Teams (CRCTs) at the organisational level. 
Crisis management procedures. The first strategic steps to coordinate 
the EU’s crisis management activities had already been taken before the 
new ESDP architecture was fully institutionalised. In November 2000, 
Secretary General/High Representative Javier Solana presented a report on 
the development of a “reference framework” to facilitate the 
implementation of the EU’s crisis management instruments “in synergy”.17 
Later entitled “Procedures for Coherent, Comprehensive EU Crisis 
Management”, this reference framework establishes formal mechanisms of 
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coordination for civilian and military crisis-management missions. As a 
basic, if preliminary, strategic planning document, it was envisaged to 
“bring together, at least on paper, the whole range of existing and possible 
EU activities…[and] to serve as a basis for the definition of a coherent EU 
response to a given crisis”.18 Being a ‘living document’, the CMPs that it 
elaborated were continuously revised in the time period between the first 
early draft in January 2001 and a last public draft in July 2003. The 
document evolved from its initial focus on military planning towards a 
more encompassing understanding of crisis management that also includes 
police and other civilian planning procedures. In the first draft,19 little 
mention was made of civilian crisis-management options and the 
Commission’s role was noted only in passing. Further revisions expanded 
the scope of Community involvement in EU crisis management: the 
document incorporated a planning and policy advice role for the 
Commission on aspects of civilian crisis management and advocated not 
only close coordination, but also “coordinated advance planning” between 
Council and Commission services and asked for policy analysis input from 
the Commission.20 I n  t h e  l a s t  r o u n d  o f  u p d a t e s , 21 planning elements for 
civilian ESDP missions were included in the document. 
Despite the successive broadening of the crisis management 
procedures into a comprehensive approach, the CMP process remained 
essentially a political project without much impact on the actual 
coordination of the various Council and Community crisis management 
policies. The CMPs in effect did not change the tasking and planning 
procedures of the different bodies involved and remained an exercise in 
documenting  the relationships among available instruments for EU crisis 
management. Nevertheless, if asked about the practicalities of the EU’s 
crisis management coordination, EU actors routinely have pointed to the 
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existence of the EU’s crisis management concept as evidence of full inter-
organisational coordination.22 In practice, however, the EU’s recent crisis-
management exercises and early experiences in the planning and support 
of civilian ESDP missions have shown departures from the “rather 
lengthy”23 document. 
Civil–military coordination.  In 2002, the Danish EU presidency 
promoted a comprehensive approach to crisis management through its 
initiative for CMCO in the context of the ESDP. This initiative addressed a 
perceived need for effective coordination of the actions of all relevant EU 
actors involved in the planning of crisis management missions. Yet, in spite 
of its promising title, the initiative’s outcome fell short of establishing a 
thorough framework for coordination: potential solutions to the problem of 
coordinating civilian and military instruments within the EU institutions 
were limited to fostering a “’culture of co-ordination’…based on continued 
co-operation and shared political objectives”.24 In one of the rare instances 
of inter-institutional consensus, both the Council’s General Secretariat and 
the Commission agreed with this statement, arguing that coordination 
between their services should continue and that it should be maintained at 
a mostly informal level. Accordingly, the Council Secretariat made clear its 
intention to “continue and intensify this practice of early and informal 
contacts”.25 The Commission’s position strengthened this point by holding 
that the formats for interactions between the Council and the Commission 
“should not be set in stone for the time being”,26 because the “informality of 
co-operation and co-ordination procedures among services increases 
transparency and frequency of contacts and promotes adaptation to the 
actual situation”.27 T h e  s u b s e q u e n t  f i n a l  o u t p u t  o f  t h e  C M C O  i n i t i a t i v e  
resulted in a brief report that above all documents the reluctance of both 
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23 Ibid., p. 16. 
24 See Council of the European Union, Civil Military Coordination (CMCO), 
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sides to take on board comprehensive changes in their relationship.28 
Arguing that it would be unwise to “put too much emphasis on detailed 
structures or procedures”,29 the paper works on a ‘lowest common 
denominator’ approach in seeking “to encourage and to ensure the co-
ordination in the actions of all relevant EU actors in all phases of the 
operation”.30 
Overall, the initiative failed to provide practical ways of achieving 
better coordination outside the fostering of a ‘culture of coordination’ and 
did not go into the details of how it would be implemented. Initiated at the 
political level, it relied on the promotion of informal and work-level 
contacts to fix coordination failures within the formal institutions of the 
EU’s crisis management functions. Also, the visibility of the committee-
driven CMCO process remained low at the work level: when asked about 
it, officials from both the Commission and the Council did not attribute 
much relevance to it. Wording used to describe the negotiations included 
comments by interviewees that they “had at some point seen a document 
about it”, that “the process was a total failure” or that “the whole 
procedure was a ploy from the Council to incorporate competences of the 
Commission into its decision-making mechanism”.31  
Crisis Response Coordination Teams. In parallel to the conceptual 
CMCO process, the Council also initiated a more practical instrument to 
enhance Council–Commission coordination. The instrument of CRCTs was 
introduced to address coordination shortfalls among the different EU 
instruments in the immediate planning phase of crisis management 
operations. Generally, CRCTs are tasked with ensuring effective 
coordination among the civilian and military mission components, 
including relevant Commission activities. Aimed at bringing all the 
involved services to the same table to ensure inter-institutional coherence 
during the planning phase, the new instrument was initially hailed as an 
organisational success. Still, the CRCTs were planned as ad hoc and 
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impermanent “vehicles for inter-service coordination in response to a given 
crisis” and “not as standing structures”.32 And in terms of their 
organisational standing, these interdepartmental task forces have only a 
rather limited mandate: the team, to be pulled together when a crisis 
occurs, does not have the status of a Council working group, and “a 
forteriori, it does not take decisions”.33 Similar to the language used in the 
CMCO process, the CRCTs’ terms of reference painstakingly avoided the 
impression that a new formal coordination structure had been put into 
place. 
Assessing the achievements of the new instruments, Council and 
Commission staff found that the added value of the CRCTs was low. For 
instance, an observer of the first EU crisis-management exercise (CME 02) 
noted that while the CRCT had indeed been pulled together from 
Commission and Council Secretariat officials, “its role needed greater 
definition” since “the CRCT was little played”.34 In the case of Operation 
Althea conducted by the EU Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
CRCT meetings were discontinued months before the end of the planning 
stage of the mission. A further assessment limited the practical role of the 
CRCTs to being the “forum where the Commission is informed of what is 
going on”.35 Other assessments welcomed the semi-informal nature of the 
CRCT meetings and emphasised that ‘forced solutions’ for enhancing inter-
institutional relations seldom worked.36  
All three initiatives share the quality that they were initiated at the 
political level with the aim of fostering coordination among the different 
EU crisis-management actors. The tangible effects of these top-down 
initiatives were limited, however: being mostly symbolic in scope, none of 
them established new formal venues for inter-institutional coordination nor 
                                                      
32 Refer to Council of the European Union (2001a), op. cit., p. 19. 
33 See Council of the European Union, Follow-up to the CMCO Action Plan: 
Council Secretariat/Commission outline paper on the CRCT, 14400/2/02, Brussels, 
02.12.2002(c), p. 4. 
34 Refer to House of Lords (2003), evidence, p. 37. 
35 Derived from an interview with an official in the Council General Secretariat in 
February 2004. 
36 Derived from an interview with an official in the Council General Secretariat in 
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did they adapt existing formal chains of command to the necessities of 
comprehensive crisis management. Rather, the results of the brief analyses 
show an across-the-board preference for informal and (in infrastructural 
terms) weak solutions to the challenge of inter-institutional coordination. 
Both the intra-Council CMCO coordination project and the more 
encompassing solutions of the CMPs and CRCTs attempted to strengthen 
the coverage and coherence of the EU’s crisis management activities 
without creating new, formal institutional venues for coordination. 
Informal forms of cooperation were assumed to be the easiest way to 
cooperate substantively across organisational divisions. Yet, these can 
undermine the transparency and accountability of security–political 
decisions. Also, they strongly depend on interpersonal contacts among 
actors in different EU institutions and are therefore difficult to sustain over 
prolonged periods of time. The observed informalisation of coordination in 
EU crisis management thus poses its own problems. 
2.4  Organisational solutions: Diverging strategies of innovation 
The two main institutional actors of EU crisis management, the Council and 
the Commission, have both expanded their competences and activities in 
this field. This section traces their individual organisational strategies for 
incorporating the notion of comprehensive and multi-actor crisis 
management into EU policies and planning. It argues that the EU’s first- 
and second-pillar actors have followed diverging strategies of 
organisational innovation and contrasts the Commission’s exploitative 
trajectory of change with the Council’s explorative strategy. 
Commission: Exploiting existing solutions. The long-standing 
experience of the European Commission in the realms of crisis prevention 
and post-conflict reconstruction is currently nearly eclipsed by the highly 
visible deployment of second-pillar ESDP missions. While for instance 
police missions that have deployed under an ESDP mandate have received 
wide publicity, the Commission’s efforts in training and supporting local 
police forces in, among others, the Palestinian Territories, Guatemala, 
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substantially less attention.37 Moreover, European Commission assistance 
to countries at risk of violent conflict remains the bulk of stabilisation, relief 
and rehabilitation as well as development assistance programmes pursued 
by the Union. In addition to the Community’s traditional long-term 
strategy of preventing conflicts through development, political dialogue 
and trade, the European Commission has considerably expanded its 
activities in the areas of direct conflict prevention and crisis management in 
recent years. Within the Commission’s general remit to develop and 
consolidate democracy, to promote the rule of law and to foster the respect 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in Art. 130 TEU, the 
link to crisis response activities has become particularly prominent: 
measures to promote good governance, the rule of law and democratisation 
are increasingly carried out in the context of preventing conflict and 
dealing with its consequences. And as the Commission’s 2001 conflict 
prevention strategy explicitly expressed, “within the limits of its 
competencies, the Commission intends to play an increasingly active role in 
the security sector area”.38  
The European Commission, having been for most of its existence 
profoundly uninterested in security issues, has subsequently assumed 
competences in the security field that range from security-sector assistance 
programmes to the funding of security- and defence-related research.39 The 
further integration of clearly security-relevant policies into the 
Commission’s external assistance programming progressed by bringing 
conflict prevention concerns into traditional policy domains. The Conflict 
Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, founded in 2001 within the 
Directorate-General for External Relations, aims at doing just that. It 
                                                      
37 See European Commission, Communication on the Financing of Civilian Crisis 
Management Operations, COM(2001) 647 final, Brussels, 28.11.2001(c); see also 
European Commission, Annexes (Commission Staff Working Document, 
SEC(2006) 658) to the Communication on the Concept for European Community 
Support for Security Sector Reform, COM(2006) 253 final, Brussels, 24.05.2006(a). 
38 See European Commission, Communication on Conflict Prevention, COM(2001) 
211 final, Brussels, 11.04.2001(a), p. 14. 
39 See European Commission, Research for a Secure Europe: Report of the Group of 
Personalities in the Field of Security Research, Brussels, 15.03.2004(b); see also 
European Commission, Communication on a Concept for European Community 
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introduces conflict-prevention indicators – a rough ‘checklist’ of root causes 
of conflict – into the Commission’s country and regional strategy papers 
that set the political agenda for further Community involvement in a 
specific region or state. Additionally, the Unit has started to develop 
Community expertise in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, 
and security sector reform. In sum, in a rather quiet process of re-
prioritising its external assistance policies, the scope of Community 
activities has widened to include crisis management competences. Through 
slowly but steadily expanding its range of activities over the past decade, 
the European Commission has a vast number of instruments and funding 
mechanisms in the field of peacebuilding at its disposal today. 
The Commission has pursued an exploitative strategy to reorient 
some of its external assistance away from more traditional developmental 
activities and has expanded its competences mostly through transposing 
established organisational components. For instance, large developmental 
and trade budget lines have been ‘securitised’ by mainstreaming conflict-
prevention indicators into their programming.40 Other projects relevant for 
crisis management and peacebuilding have been set up under cross-cutting 
budget lines, such as the European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights. Also, in contrast to the Council’s construction of a completely new 
crisis-management facility, the Commission has patched up its 
infrastructure through installing new, small-scale organisational task forces 
in order to adapt existing arrangements for peacebuilding. Establishing the 
Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit as the main body tasked 
with streamlining conflict assessment and early warning indicators into the 
work of the Commission is a case in point. Yet, owing to its small number 
of dedicated staff, it has been characterised as being a “focal point more 
than a facilitator”41 and is far too small single-handedly to refocus the 
Commission’s external policies towards peacebuilding. The Unit is 
                                                      
40 One example of this is the Cotonou Agreement. It contains a new political 
dimension specifically meant to address issues previously dealt with outside the 
developmental agenda, including arms and drugs trafficking, excessive military 
expenditure, organised crime and religious or ethnic discrimination (see 
International Crisis Group (ICG), EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited, Europe 
Report No. 160, ICG, Brussels, January 2005, p. 36). 
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therefore generally not seen as very proactive in terms of first-pillar policy 
development in crisis management. Overall, the record of the Commission 
in repositioning its work in a crisis management frame is mixed. 
Council: Exploring new options. In contrast to the Commission, the 
European Council’s General Secretariat constructed a whole new security 
architecture from scratch that today comprises civilian, police and military 
mission support and strategic planning capabilities. Despite serious and 
continuing military-force generation delays and initial lags in building up 
the civilian part of its crisis management infrastructure, the Council 
deployed 16 civilian and military ESDP operations with a wide variety of 
mandates between 2003 and 2006. With mission mandates quickly 
expanding from traditional military stabilisation and police advisory roles 
to the rule of law, security sector reform and civilian monitoring tasks, the 
Council’s new crisis-management architecture has had to rapidly diversify 
and consolidate its organisational base. The Council, faced with the task of 
instituting a completely new function within its structure, has both 
improvised with new structures and quickly exported the resulting 
organisational solutions to new policy fields. During this difficult transition 
from being a ‘political’ body to becoming an ‘operational’ one, the Council 
Secretariat has thus pursued the logics of both exploration and patching-
up. 
Following a first explorative phase in which the Council built up its 
civilian crisis-management architecture and deployed its first police 
missions, it transposed the instrument of civilian short-term crisis-
management missions into a broader range of uses. Starting out with only a 
moderate planning capability for police missions, the Police Unit, the 
Council rapidly expanded the conceptual scope and range of civilian crisis 
management to include a whole new host of civilian ESDP operations. 
These different kinds of Council missions all belong to a single generic 
model of civilian crisis management: they are modelled on the concept of 
short-term advisory and training missions, which first gained ground in 
Europe in the context of, for instance, the early Western European Union’s 
Police Advisory Mission to Albania (MAPE) between 1997 and 2001. In 
subsequent years, this organisational solution of a short-term civilian police 
mission was exported to the fields of civil administration, security sector 
reform, civil protection, monitoring and the rule of law. Sometimes, 
regardless of whether the chosen form of short-term assistance was the 
most suitable instrument at the EU’s disposal for the task at hand, the 
Council took over more and more activities in the realm of post-conflict 32 | EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS 
 
reconstruction. We can therefore argue that the Council both exploratively 
extended the substantive scope of civilian crisis-management missions, and 
at the same time exploited the already time-tested model of civilian police 
missions for this goal. 
This expansion of civilian ESDP missions into the traditional 
competence sphere of the European Commission was first of all made 
possible by the ample discretion built into the major strategic documents 
relevant to the ESDP. Both the Petersberg tasks of 1992 – enshrined in Art. 
17.2 TEU – and the European security strategy left the scope of second-
pillar security policies wide open. While the original Petersberg tasks 
brought humanitarian and rescue missions as well as the whole spectrum 
of peacekeeping and peacemaking activities into the remit of EU crisis 
management, their update in the context of the debate on the European 
Constitution extended these tasks. The proposals of the Working Group on 
Defence during the European Convention mentioned conflict prevention, 
joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance, post-conflict 
stabilisation and support for the authorities of a non-member state in 
combating terrorism as being among the wider Petersberg tasks. The 
European security strategy painted a similarly vague and broad picture for 
the future tasks of the ESDP.42 With both documents open to an inclusive 
interpretation of the ESDP’s mandate, political players in the Council were 
able to fill the expansive, but vague, strategic guidelines with their own 
policy ideas and the Council was subsequently able to take over the series 
of outlined civilian tasks. 
Yet the diversification of civilian roles and the recent increase in 
civilian ESDP missions have not been matched by a similar extension of the 
civilian crisis-management infrastructure in the Council. The EU’s 
operational and planning capabilities in the field of civilian crisis 
management have had problems in keeping up with the enlarging scope of 
civilian crisis-management missions. Not only the recruitment of mission 
personnel, but also the introduction of civilian planning functions has 
lagged behind the EU’s substantive targets. In both cases, the gap between 
the political decision to deploy a specific mission, and the means available 
to pursue this goal, remains large. 
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On the other hand, the evolution of the EU’s military crisis-
management architecture differs from the civilian case in the sense that EU-
level structures have remained confined to advisory roles (the EU Military 
Committee and Military Staff) and intelligence (the EU Situation Centre). 
Operational planning for military crisis management mostly takes place 
outside the EU structures in different national headquarters. One exception 
is the introduction of a Civil–Military Cell as a core, operational planning 
unit within the Council’s EU Military Staff.43 Still, despite the concentration 
of media attention and EU resources on these military aspects of crisis 
management, soon after its initiation the civilian capability of the EU 
outdistanced the emerging military architecture: “[T]he paradox in this is 
that civilian crisis management is the area in which the EU has made fastest 
operational progress.”44 In the brief period of time since its inception, only 
4 of the 16 missions conducted so far have been military operations. 
Overall, the two discussed trajectories of innovation shed light on the 
extent to which the adaptation of policy sectors to new challenges depend 
on the chosen organisational strategy for innovation. First- and second-
pillar actors have chosen different strategies to adapt their organisational 
structures to a changing security environment. While the Commission has 
taken an exploitative approach to transform its traditional relief and 
rehabilitation instruments into a comprehensive peacebuilding capability, 
the Council has followed a mostly explorative path by incrementally 
expanding its new ESDP instruments into the sphere of civilian crisis 
management. Generally, the costs of these explorative policy innovations 
have been lower in the less entrenched and newer structures of the Council 
than in the long-standing and cumbersome architecture of the Commission. 
In the end, the Council Secretariat has been able to increase substantially its 
standing and competence base for civilian crisis management. In contrast, 
regardless of the comparative advantages of resources, experience and 
established organisational structures on the side of the Commission, its   
 
                                                      
43 See Council of the European Union, Civil Military Cell: Terms of Reference, 
10580/1/04, Brussels, 15.06.2004(a). 
44 See R. Dwan, “Civilian tasks and capabilities in EU operations”, Paper prepared 
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activities have received considerably less attention. Observers have 
characterised this process as the “second-pillarization” of EU crisis 
management.45  
2.5  Towards a comprehensive response? 
So far, this chapter has concentrated on the development of the two 
different institutional architectures for crisis management planning that 
currently co-exist within the EU. It has shown that first-pillar Community 
assistance projects and second-pillar Council missions are supported by 
two parallel planning structures with different hierarchies, legislative 
underpinnings and institutional histories. To what extent have these actors 
been able to translate the political calls for comprehensive crisis 
management into their planning arrangements? The exercise of tracing the 
different trajectories of innovation chosen by the Council and the 
Commission at the level of strategic planning highlights three general 
trends in their relationship: convergence, coordination and 
compartmentalisation. 
Convergence. While the Council deals with both civilian and military 
aspects of ESDP crisis management, the Commission pursues civilian crisis-
prevention, management and post-conflict reconstruction policies. In 
theory, the activities of both actors are distinct: they are substantively 
different, since Commission activities generally focus on long-term 
institution-building and Council missions deal with shorter-term 
operational capacity-building. First-pillar activities thus cover conflict 
prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, while second-pillar actions 
deal with short-term crisis-management interventions. Yet, as a result of 
the pursued trajectories of expansive innovation in which pre-existing 
solutions have been converted to new policy fields, the operational areas of 
both actors have converged. The Council’s General Secretariat has followed 
an explorative strategy of expanding its tasks into the sphere of civilian 
crisis management, bringing it rather close to some of the Commission’s 
traditional competences. With this expansion of second-pillar civilian crisis-
                                                      
45 See for instance G. Bono, “The EU’s Military Doctrine: An Assessment”, 
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2004; see also C. Gourlay, “European 
Union Procedures and Resources for Crisis Management”, International 
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management, the demarcation between first- and second-pillar 
peacebuilding and conflict prevention has started to erode. Envisaged as 
complementary to the long-term institution-building and crisis prevention 
policies pursued under Commission competences, civilian crisis-
management missions are shaped as transitional and relatively short-term 
operations. In practice, however, “there is considerable overlap between 
Commission programmes and the ESDP”.46  
Recent compilations of Commission and Council competences 
highlight this overlap. The Presidency Conclusions of the Feira European 
Council identified four second-pillar priorities in civilian crisis 
management that cover the following areas: police assistance, training and 
substitution tasks; the strengthening of the rule of law through judicial and 
penitentiary assistance; civil administration and civil protection. A fifth 
Civilian Headline Goal, the conduct of EU monitoring missions, was added 
more recently.47 The Commission, on the other hand, has declared 
Community instruments in the field of peacebuilding to be civil protection, 
police operations and the rule of law, fact-finding and civilian monitoring 
missions as well as training for crisis management personnel.48 Even at first 
glance, the competences considerably overlap and at the outset of a given 
action for crisis intervention it can be unclear which EU instrument will be 
used. And as for instance in the case of planning civilian administration 
missions, even the Council has acknowledged, “the distinction between 
Civilian Administration and other EU priority areas may not always be 
easy to make”.49 In sum, the encroachment of the second pillar into first-
pillar affairs has led to the emergence of a rather large ‘grey area’ of 
competence overlap for the Council and the Commission. 
Coordination. The convergence of Council and Commission activities 
in the field of civilian crisis management and peacebuilding has led to a 
                                                      
46 Refer to House of Lords (2003), op. cit., p. 9. 
47 See Council of the European Union, Civilian Capabilities Commitment 
Conference: Ministerial Declaration, Brussels, 22.11.2004(b), p. 2. 
48 See European Commission (2001c), op. cit., Annex; see also European 
Commission, Civilian instruments for EU crisis management, Conflict Prevention and 
Crisis Management Unit, Brussels, April 2003. 
49 See Council of the European Union, EU Concept for Crisis Management Missions 
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deterioration of their relationship, rather than to better coordination of their 
work. Particularly the Commission has interpreted the Council’s expansive 
moves as an intrusion in its sphere of competences and has subsequently 
assumed a defensive position towards civilian crisis-management 
operations in an ESDP framework. In the case of the Council’s civilian 
crisis-management Headline Goals, Commission officials have criticised the 
chosen focus of the goals as being “in direct competition to Commission 
goals”.50 Generally, as another Commission official is quoted as saying, 
“the entry on stage of Mr Solana changed a lot for us. It did not make our 
lives in organisational terms easier.”51 The same official took issue with the 
“tendency” in the Council from time to time to “consider the Commission 
as just another secretariat”.52 Consequently, and in contrast to the outlined 
political initiatives to foster interaction among the different EU crisis-
management actors, actual forms of coordination between Council and 
Commission activities have remained limited. Negative coordination, i.e. the 
protection of the status quo interests of an organisation against intrusions, 
has frequently been the default option of choice. The basic goal of negative 
coordination, according to Scharpf (1994),53 is to “ensure that any new 
policy initiative designed by a specialised subunit within the ministerial 
organisation will not interfere with the established policies and the 
interests of other ministerial units”. 
Undoubtedly, the Commission’s recent defensive posture towards 
the Council falls into this category. Arguing that the border delimiting the 
competences of the EU institutions between the first and second pillars has 
been eroded through recent Council actions, the Commission has spent 
considerable time and effort trying to reinstate this separation. A major 
written opinion by the Commission’s Legal Service on the issue of inter-
pillar competence divisions backed the Commission in this defence of the 
integrity of Community competences against encroachments. The Legal 
                                                      
50 D e r i v e d  f r o m  a n  i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  a n  o f f i c i a l  f r o m  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m i s s i o n ,  
March 2005. 
51 Refer to House of Lords (2003), op. cit., evidence, p. 13. 
52 Ibid., p. 11. 
53 See F.W. Scharpf, “Games Real Actors Could Play: Positive and Negative 
Coordination in Embedded Negotiations”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 6, No. 
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Service interpreted the principles of competence division in the Treaty on 
European Union as following first of all the pre-eminence of Community 
interests and it judged the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) to be 
complementary to first-pillar activities. Thus asserting that Community 
interests generally take precedence over second-pillar initiatives, the Legal 
Service contended that some recent second-pillar CFSP actions infringed on 
Community competences.54 Drawing on Art. 47 TEU – which codifies the 
inviolability of Community precedence – the Legal Service underlined that 
if an action is in principle subordinate to Community competences, this 
particular action cannot be executed under CFSP competences, whether the 
Community has taken action in this particular field or not.55  
Based on this legal opinion, the Commission defended Community 
competences by going to court against the Council. In a legal action against 
the Council brought before the European Court of Justice in February 2005 
(Case C-91/05, Commission v Council), the Commission argued that actions 
taken by the Council to combat the spread of small arms56 impinge on 
Community competences under Art. 47 TEU: since they affect Community 
powers in the field of developmental aid, the Council’s actions in this area 
should be annulled owing to lack of competences. Although the outcome of 
this case has not been made public, the case itself is indicative of the 
Commission’s legal culture in trying to roll back the Council’s 
infringements of its competences. 
Compartmentalisation.  Between the Council and the Commission, 
many conflicts remain unresolved and their crisis management structures 
have largely evolved in parallel and in a disjointed and compartmentalised 
                                                      
54 See European Commission Legal Service, Critères généraux pour l’exercice soit 
de la competence communautaire, soit de celle de l’Union européenne au titre de la 
PESC, JUR(99)50931, Brussels, 07.10.1999. 
55 Ibid., p. 3.  
56 See Council of the European Union, Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP of 2 July 2002 
on the EU’s contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread 
of small arms and light weapons, OJ L 91, 12.07.2002(b); see also Council of the 
European Union, Decision 2004/833/CFSP implementing Joint Action 
2002/589/CFSP with a view to an EU contribution to ECOWAS in the framework 
of the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons, OJ L 359, Brussels, 
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manner. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of a coherent decision-
making system for all EU instruments in the field. Gourlay (2006)57 noted in 
this respect that since there is “no unified EU chain of command with 
regard to EU instruments for crisis response, neither the Council nor the 
Commission have this strategic oversight of all EU instruments”. The 
general preference for informal and personal forms of coordination 
observed in both institutions adds t o  t h i s  p r o b l e m .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  
compartmentalised solutions prevail and some civilian crisis-management 
instruments have emerged in duplicate, such as the capacities for civil 
protection, civilian monitoring and training as well as advisory missions 
for police and judicial reform. Additionally challenged by the diverging 
decision-making rules embedded in the pillar structure of the current EU 
treaty base, crisis management remains institutionally divorced under 
Commission and Council policy initiatives. Conflicts and negative 
coordination among the actors are the norm, rather than comprehensive 
forms of coordination. Clearly, this is not a fault that affects the EU alone. 
Inter-institutional turf wars and coordination failures are a common 
occurrence in policy domains in which organisations have to deal with 
complex and cross-cutting issues. The coordination of the fight against 
transnational terrorism – in the EU, but also in the United States – is a case 
in point. Here, for instance, the reports of the National Commission on 
Terror Attacks upon the United States58 narrate similar stories of inter-
institutional competition, failures to exchange information and general 
confusion about competences in the run-up to and aftermath of 9/11. 
Recently, the Council’s General Secretariat initiated structural 
changes within its own crisis management architecture to overcome its 
internal compartmentalisation and to better integrate its civilian and 
military mission components. And although it is too early to assess 
comprehensively their relevance for the overall planning of EU crisis 
management operations, they have been hailed as a step in the direction of 
                                                      
57 See C. Gourlay “Civil–Civil Co-ordination in EU Crisis Management”, in A. 
Nowak (ed.), Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way, Chaillot Paper No. 90, EUISS, 
Paris, 2006, p. 112. 
58 See the website of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States (retrieved from http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/ 
index.htm). GOVERNANCE OF EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT| 39 
 
coordinated EU civil–military responses to crises. Aimed at linking up the 
civilian mission elements with the military component of an ESDP mission, 
the Civil–Military Cell within the EU’s Military Staff is the first promising 
initiative. Although its main task is to undertake general, “strategic 
contingency planning” in situations pertaining to both civilian and military 
actors,59 its ultimate goal is to provide “joint options including civilian and 
military dimensions”.60 The second initiative deals with the better 
integration of the five Headline Goals separately developed for civilian 
crisis-management missions. For this purpose, the Council created the 
Civilian Headline Goal process, tasked with developing multifunctional 
resources for civilian crisis management.61 Its recommendation was to 
deploy “integrated civilian crisis management packages” varying “in size, 
composition and tasks” according to the specific needs of each mission.62 
Later, this notion of multifunctional, civilian crisis-management ‘packages’ 
was further developed into the concept of civilian response teams that 
would in future increase the EU’s rapid reaction capacity.63  
2.6  Conclusions 
In the few years of its existence, the EU’s crisis management architecture 
has made considerable and rapid progress. Despite its awkward 
institutional position between Community and intergovernmental 
decision-making processes, the creation of a crisis-management policy field 
within the EU has become a reality and it is thus a significant policy 
development. Yet, alongside the fact that the EU has quickly been able to 
develop instruments dealing with complex emergencies and crises, the 
initial institutional set-up remains problematic. This analysis has found that 
                                                      
59 See Council of the European Union, European Defence NATO/EU Consultation, 
Planning and Operations, 13990/04, Brussels, 28.01.2005(b), p. 4. 
60 Ibid., p. 5. 
61 See Council of the European Union, Draft Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of 
ESDP, 10307/04, Brussels, 2004(f), p. 3. 
62 See Council of the European Union, Civilian Headline Goal 2008, 15863/04, 
Brussels, 07.12.2004(c), p. 3. 
63 See Council of the European Union, Civilian Headline Goal 2008, 10462/05, 
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in contrast to the EU’s comprehensive political concepts for crisis 
management, the organisational practices of strategic planning within the 
Council and the Commission have remained institutionally divorced. 
Policy innovations have taken place within each pillar, thus leading to the 
convergence and overlap of operational areas of first- and second-pillar 
actors. As a result, negative coordination among different EU actors has 
become the norm. Political attempts to fill the gap between the concepts 
and the organisational realities of EU crisis management have remained 
both inconclusive and limited to fostering informal forms of coordination 
among the different actors. Beyond the achievement of rapidly 
institutionalising the EU’s crisis management architecture, the coherence of 
EU operations in this field can still be improved. 
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Appendix I. EU budget procedures for crisis management 
The EU’s budget procedures for its crisis management and post-conflict 
reconstruction policies are rather complex. At the time of writing, the EU 
had three funding options at its disposal, as outlined below.64 
1)  Operations under a Community instrument,  financed under the 
appropriate Community budget line 
These operations may include civilian emergency assistance, civil 
protection assistance and intervention, institution-building, election 
monitoring, the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, food aid, 
securing the livelihoods and safety of refugees, rehabilitation, 
reconstruction and security-sector reform. The Community budget funds 
these activities among others through the following policy instruments: 
•  Title 19, External Relations 
Chapter 19 04, European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
Chapter 19 06, Crisis Response & Global Threats to Security 
•  Title 22, Enlargement (including transition and pre-accession 
assistance) 
2)    CFSP operations not having military or defence implications, 
financed under the CFSP budget 
The Council decides on a joint action and the budgetary resources to put 
into it, while the Commission commits, contracts and disburses the budget 
allocated to the action.  
•  Administrative and non-military operational CFSP expenditures are 
charged to the European Community budget and implemented by the 
Commission under its auspices, except for costs that arise from 
operations with military or defence implications and cases in which 
the Council unanimously decides otherwise (Art. 28 TEU). In civilian 
missions, the salaries of personnel are borne by the member states.65  
                                                      
64 Refer to European Commission (2001c), op. cit., p. 4. The future funding of 
European Commission crisis-response activities will be delivered through a new 
‘stability instrument’ designed to integrate the European Community’s separate 
financing channels (see Gourlay, 2006, op. cit., pp. 110–12). 
65 Refer to Gourlay (2006), op. cit., p. 109. GOVERNANCE OF EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT| 45 
 
•  The CFSP budget is itemised in the Community budget under Title 
19, External Relations, Chapter 19 03. The 2006 CFSP budget 
amounted to €102.6 million. 
3)    ESDP operations having military or defence implications, which 
fall outside the Community budget 
•  ESDP military operations are funded by the member states according 
to the principle of ‘costs lie where they fall’.  
•  The recently established ATHENA mechanism administers the 
financing of the common costs of EU operations having military or 
defence implications.66  
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66 See Council of the European Union, Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 February 
2004 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of 
European Union operations having military or defence implications, OJ L 63, 
Brussels, 28.2.2004(d). 46 | 
 
 
3.  POLICE MISSION IN BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA 
ANA E. JUNCOS
∗ 
Abstract.  In the last few years, the European Union has used Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) as a ‘laboratory’ to test its crisis management capabilities. In 
2003, the EU launched its first ever Police Mission (EUPM) in BiH. Taking over 
from the UN’s International Police Task Force in Bosnia, the EUPM aimed at 
supporting the reform of the Bosnian police forces in order to establish sustainable 
police arrangements according to best European and international standards. Yet 
two main kinds of obstacles have prevented the EUPM from accomplishing its 
mandate. First are the external factors stemming from the unsettled political 
situation in BiH. Second are the internal factors such as the inexperience of the EU 
in the field of civilian crisis management, the fragmentation of the EU’s presence 
on the ground, the complexity of the EU’s policy-making structures and the lack of 
resources. This contribution examines in detail the coherence and effectiveness of 
the EUPM during the first three years of its mandate. In particular, it analyses 
how the above-mentioned obstacles hindered the implementation of a coherent and 
effective crisis-management policy. It also identifies the main lessons from this 
period and assesses whether or not the EU has actually learnt from them.  
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3.1  Introduction 
The sobering experience of the EU in the Balkans, from the Yugoslav 
conflicts at the beginning of the 1990s to the war in Kosovo, provided the 
EU with a significant number of lessons. The conflict in Kosovo made it 
evident to the EU that it was time to show stronger commitment to the 
region by offering a clear membership prospect as the only recipe to 
promote stability and democracy in the countries of the Western Balkans. 
Therefore, the prospect of membership was endorsed by the European 
Council in Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000 and confirmed by the 
European Council in Thessaloniki in June 2003. Another lesson drawn by 
EU policy-makers was that the EU had to improve its crisis management 
capacities to be able to deal with peacekeeping and crisis management in 
its neighbouring areas. These ambitions gathered momentum with the St 
Malo summit in 1998 and the reforms that followed. 
In the last few years, the EU has also learnt other lessons as a result 
of the implementation of its crisis management operations in the region, 
first in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and then in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). BiH is seen by policy-makers in Brussels 
as one of the main ‘laboratories’ to test its crisis management capabilities. 
The involvement of the EU in the country is one of the most ambitious to 
date and here the Union has gone beyond being a traditional civilian 
power towards a more robust role with the deployment of several 
instruments under the European security and defence policy (ESDP). In 
January 2003, the first ever EU police mission began its operations, and in 
December 2004 the EU launched its largest military mission, EU Force 
(EUFOR) Althea, taking over from the NATO-led Stabilisation Force 
(SFOR).  
This chapter concentrates on the EU’s Police Mission (EUPM) in BiH. 
It examines in detail the performance of the EUPM during its first three 
years of its mandate (2003–05), including the planning phase and the 
transition from the UN’s International Police Task Force in Bosnia (IPTF).1 
                                                      
1  This chapter is based on 35 confidential, face-to-face interviews conducted by the 
author in Brussels, Mons and Sarajevo with EUPM, EUFOR and EUSR officials, 
national representatives to the Council working groups and officials from the 
European Commission and the Council Secretariat in 2005 and 2006. These 
interviews were conducted as part of the author’s PhD research on “Coherence 
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It is argued that two main kinds of obstacles have prevented the EUPM 
from accomplishing its mandate. First are some factors stemming from the 
unsettled political situation in BiH. Second are the internal factors such as 
the inexperience of the EU in the field of civilian crisis management, the 
fragmentation of the EU’s presence on the ground, the complexity of the 
EU’s policy-making structures, and the lack of human and material 
resources. The coherence and effectiveness of the operation are analysed 
below and, in particular, how the above-mentioned obstacles have 
impinged on the implementation of a coherent and effective crisis-
management policy. It concludes by looking at whether or not the EU has 
learnt from the EUPM, i.e. by introducing changes in the new EUPM 
launched in January 2006 or by improving the EU’s overall crisis-
management capabilities.  
3.2  The planning of the mission 
The launch of the EUPM made the EU’s commitment to develop 
autonomous, civilian crisis-management capabilities operational. It was the 
Union’s first ever crisis-management operation within the framework of 
the ESDP. Hence, the planning and implementation of the mission was 
strongly influenced by the need to make credible the EU’s pledge to 
develop its crisis management capabilities as agreed at the Helsinki 
European Council (1999) and further developed at the Feira (2000) and 
Göteborg (2001) European Council meetings. The planning of this mission 
was “an important learning experience for the EU and the first test of its 
crisis management concepts, procedures and instruments”.2 Thus, the 
lessons drawn from its establishment are relevant for not only police 
operations, but also for other civilian and military crisis-management 
operations. 
                                                                                                                                      
and Effectiveness of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (1991–2006)”. The author would like to express her gratitude for the 
kind assistance given by the interviewees during her fieldwork. All of the 
interviewees agreed to be quoted as part of this research; however, for reasons of 
confidentiality neither the names nor the positions are mentioned here. 
2 See Council of the European Union and European Commission (2003), Lessons 
from the planning of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), Autumn 
2001-December 2002, Joint Paper, Brussels, 29.04.2003, p. 1. POLICE MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA | 49 
 
The EUPM officially started on 1 January 2003 with a three-year 
mandate,3 although the Planning Team was preparing the transition from 
the IPTF mission from 2002.4 The Planning Team and the Police Unit 
(within the Council Secretariat) were in charge of the formulation of the 
concept of operations. It has to be noted that the EU did not have any 
‘manual’ for crisis management procedures at that time, but was in the 
process of drafting these procedures.5 It effectively had to ‘learn by doing’ 
the tasks of how to launch an operation from scratch. Fortunately, in this 
case, the EU had plenty of time to plan and set up this operation.6 
Nevertheless, the planning of the EUPM demonstrated the convoluted 
character of the decision-making process surrounding the launch of an EU 
operation, with several bodies involved in Brussels (from the working 
group level to the Council of General Affairs and External Relations). 
Given the ‘crisis’ character of these operations, these procedures need to be 
streamlined, for instance, by enhancing the role of the Council Secretariat 
(particularly the Police Unit) and the head of mission. Yet, the member 
states are still very reluctant to lose their control over the whole process 
and are very suspicious of any autonomous role for the Council 
Secretariat.7 
The launch of an operation is also complicated by two other factors: 
financial arrangements and non-member states’ contributions. As regards 
the first issue, although the financing of the EUPM was agreed among the 
                                                      
3 Regarding its legal basis, EUPM’s provisions were approved by the Council of 
the European Union in the Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP of 11 March 2002 on the 
European Union Police Mission, OJ L 70, 13.03.2002, pp. 1–6. This mission was also 
endorsed by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board and the 
UNSCR 1396 of  5 March 2002. Furthermore, it was launched following an 
invitation by the host state, BiH.  
4 The Planning Team was composed of around 30 persons. It was led by Sven 
Christian Frederiksen, who at that time was also the Head of the Mission of the 
IPTF, to ensure a smooth transition from the IPTF to the EUPM (for problems 
related to this transition, see the next section).  
5 See Council of the European Union, Suggestions for procedures for coherent, 
comprehensive EU crisis management, 7116/03, Brussels, 06.03.2003(a). 
6 The first fact-finding mission was deployed in BiH in November 2001. 
7 Derived from interviews held in Brussels, 2005–06.  50 | EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS 
 
member states without too much trouble,8 some problems arose 
concerning the operational costs of the mission, since the approval of the 
European Parliament was required to increase the common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP) budget for the year 2003 to cover those costs. In 
November 2003, the European Parliament finally agreed to increase the 
CFSP budget by €17.5 million.9 Moreover, in the case of civilian crisis-
management operations, the Community budget involves tough 
procedures regarding procurement, under the Commission’s surveillance, 
which result in a cumbersome process when it comes to the release of 
funds to the missions on the ground. In a similar vein, a national diplomat 
stated that there are “heavy procedures about procurement of material and 
transport, procedures that are justified in terms of the normal EU activities 
in pillar I, but for crisis management activities, it is very slow”.10 The 
EUPM suffered from these constraints, in particular, during the 
deployment phase. Owing to procurement problems, during the first 
months, the mission was under-equipped in terms of computers, cars and 
mobile phones.11 According to one official, “procurement was appalling. 
We didn’t have enough computers for almost a year and a half!”12 A good 
strategy in this respect would be to look at other organisations’ procedures 
(the UN, OSCE and NATO), for example, “creating start-up kits consisting 
                                                      
8 According to Missiroli, from this point of view, it seems much easier to finance a 
police mission (civilian crisis-management operation) than a purely military or a 
mixed one (see A. Missiroli, €uros for ESDP: Financing EU operations, Occasional 
Paper No. 45, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2003). In police missions, the 
member states often do resort to the Community budget, making the whole 
process more transparent. The member states only pay separately for the per diems 
of their seconded personnel. In military operations, which are much more 
sensitive, the member states prefer to pay themselves (on a GDP basis) rather than 
be submitted to any control by the European Parliament. 
9 See A. Nowak, L’Union en action: la mission de police en Bosni, Occasional Paper 
No. 42, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2003, p. 27. 
10 Derived from an interview with a national representative to CIVCOM in 
Brussels, 2006.  
11 Other missions like EUJUST Themis in Georgia or Proxima in Macedonia have 
experienced the same problems.  
12 Derived from an interview with an EUPM official in Sarajevo, 2005.  POLICE MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA | 51 
 
of pre-stocked items needed for mission launch and start-up funds that can 
be rapidly released to pay for essential procurements”.13  
As regards personnel, this operation was staffed with around 500 
police experts from the 25 member states and from 9 non-member states.14 
In total, 34 states contributed to this mission, a very international effort led 
by the EU. Yet the participation of non-member states introduced some 
challenges in terms of financial and legal arrangements that were solved in 
an ad hoc way, such as negotiating agreements on an individual basis with 
each contributing state. In the case of the EUPM, there was enough time to 
undertake these negotiations, but in other cases, time for preparations may 
have to be drastically reduced if the viability of the EU’s crisis 
management operations is not to be endangered. 
3.3  The legacy from the International Police Task Force 
The EU expressed its readiness to take over from the UN police mission, 
the IPTF, in early 2002.15 The IPTF, which had been working on the reform 
of the police structures in the country for seven years (1996–2002), was an 
executive police mission with police officers in the field to support the 
implementation of the rule of law in BiH. One of its main tasks was to 
carry out a “certification process” with the objective of creating an 
                                                      
13 See M. Merlingen and R. Ostrauskaite, “ESDP Police Missions: Meaning, Context 
and Operational Challenges”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2005, 
p. 9. In a way, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism set up by the Commission aims at 
solving this problem in the area of communitarian policies, but in the case of the 
Council, the possibility to resort to emergency reserves is very limited. This 
concern was raised in the final report of the Working Group on Defence of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe, but such a start-up mechanism to provide 
cash or material has not yet been established.  
14 The non-member states participating in the mission were Bulgaria, Canada, 
Iceland, Norway, Romania, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. The 10 new 
member states had the status of non-member state contributors until May 2004.  
15 Problems in obtaining approval for the extension of the IPTF’s mandate, because 
of opposition from the US, led the EU to launch a temporary mission to replace the 
IPTF in June–July 2002. At the end, however, agreement at the UNSC was 
achieved and a resolution extending the IPTF’s mandate until the end of 2002 was 
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independent and legitimate police force under the rule of law.16 In spite of 
the problems encountered, the IPTF improved the standards of the police 
forces in BiH, introduced public oversight mechanisms, streamlined the 
Bosnian police forces and played a role in setting up the State Border 
Service (SBS) and the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA). 
The EUPM was conceived as a mission of a different nature. 
Allegedly, once the certification process had been finalised, what was 
needed in BiH was not an executive mission, but a mission to monitor and 
advise the process of reform of the Bosnian police forces, placing the 
emphasis on institution-building and sustainability, and bringing the 
country closer to its prospect of joining the EU. From the outset, the EUPM 
sought to detach itself from the IPTF’s legacy,17 w h i c h  p r o v e d  t o  b e  
difficult. First, the certification process had not been completed, and that 
caused some troubles for the EUPM.18 Second, the EUPM did not establish 
new programmes, but took over most of the IPTF ones. According to some 
EU officials, this was owing to the fact that the IPTF had not completed its 
mandate. As stated by one EU official, “the start-line of EUPM [was] 
questionable.…You could say that they [the IPTF] had not completed all 
their tasks, but that’s not what appeared in the official documents.”19  
Third, most of the EUPM’s personnel in the first rotation (police 
officers and civilian experts) had been previously employed by the IPTF. 
The head of mission had also been the former IPTF head of mission. This 
arrangement was meant to facilitate the transition from the IPTF to the 
                                                      
16 With the certification process, the IPTF submitted Bosnian police forces to a 
process of screening in order to check for valid credentials and training, war 
crimes convictions, human rights violations and domestic legal crimes, among 
others. Those who did not meet the IPTF standards were removed from their 
posts. For an evaluation of the certification process and the minority police 
recruitment carried out by the IPTF, see G. Collantes Celador, “Police Reform: 
Peacebuilding Through ‘Democratic Policing’?”, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 12, 
No. 3, 2005, pp. 364–76.  
17 Derived from interviews with EUPM officials.  
18 Ibid.; several appeal cases by police officers who were de-certified are yet to be 
resolved in the Bosnian courts and the Bosnian government has requested that the 
UN reviews the process. 
19 Derived from an interview with an EU official in Brussels, 2005.  POLICE MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA | 53 
 
EUPM, by taking advantage of the IPTF’s experience. In practice, it was 
difficult to change the officials’ mindset from one day to another.20 During 
the first year and a half of the EUPM’s mandate, there was some confusion 
regarding what was supposed to be the role of the EUPM on the ground 
and an outstanding tendency to conceive police operations in an executive 
way. Commenting on the lessons learnt for future missions, one EUPM 
official affirmed: “I would be more careful in planning and understanding 
what the mission is about. Because [in] the first 18 months it was not really 
going anywhere. After that, the focus of the mission changed and it was 
better, but still it was not as focused as it should [have been].”21 Evaluating 
the EUPM’s effectiveness, another EUPM official stated, “I will give it just 
a five; the mark could have been higher if we had realised from the 
beginning that we were just a programmatic mission; that we were not an 
executive mission like the UN-IPTF”.22 This problem of focus was not 
sorted out until the summer of 2004 when a conference in Neum (BiH) was 
held. From then on, the EUPM started to adjust its organisational structure 
to a more programmatic management approach based on monitoring, 
mentoring and inspecting, and it introduced a benchmarking system.23  
Some national representatives to the Committee for the Civilian 
Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) also complained that the UN did 
not provide all the necessary information for the deployment of the EUPM. 
Had the UN done so, the transition from the IPTF would have been 
smoother and the EUPM’s mandate better suited to the circumstances on 
the ground.24 The EU will have to bear in mind these problems when 
planning future missions such as the EU’s rule of law operation in Kosovo. 
                                                      
20 According to Osland, these arrangements also made it difficult for the public to 
distinguish between the missions of the UN and those of the EU. She suggests that 
one possibility to have avoided these problems would have been “to establish a 
special transition team, under the umbrella of neither the UN nor the EU (see K. 
Osland, “The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, International 
Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2004, p. 553).  
21 Derived from an interview with an EUPM official in Sarajevo, 2005.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid.  
24 Derived from interviews in Brussels, 2005–06.  54 | EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS 
 
3.4  The challenge of coherence 
In the case of BiH, coherent external action has been difficult to achieve not 
only because of the EU’s fragmented presence on the ground, but also 
because different actors arrived at different times. Thus, the EC Monitoring 
Mission (later the EU Monitoring Mission or EUMM) was dispatched in 
July 1991 to observe the cease-fire in Slovenia and then deployed to other 
countries in the region, including BiH, to monitor human rights and other 
security-related issues. For its part, the Commission had maintained 
various activities in the country since the beginning of the war in 1992 with 
the provision of humanitarian aid and, subsequently, technical assistance 
to the country in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association 
Process (SAP). Later the ESDP instruments (the EUPM and EUFOR) 
provided some flesh to the EU’s engagement in the country. At the same 
time, Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative in BiH, was also 
appointed the EU Special Representative (EUSR). Thus, over the years the 
presence of the EU in the country has increased, reflecting both the 
commitment of the EU to the membership prospects of BiH, and the 
development of the EU as a crisis management actor. It has also created 
enormous challenges in terms of coherence, however. 
The 2002 Joint Action25 established a clear chain of command in order 
to ensure internal coherence of the EUPM: the Political and Security 
Committee exercises the political control and strategic direction of the 
mission, advised by CIVCOM. In the field, the police commissioner/head 
of mission is in command of the mission and reports to the high 
representative for CFSP through the EUSR.26 The EUSR plays a central role 
in the coordination among the different EU bodies in the country. The 
main task of the EUSR is to promote overall EU political coordination in 
BiH, as well as to maintain an overview of the whole range of initiatives in 
                                                      
25 See Council of the European Union (2002), op. cit. 
26 The first Police Commander/Head of Mission was Sven Frederiksen. Kevin 
Carty was designated Police Commissioner after the sudden death of Frederiksen 
in February 2004. From January 2006, the Head of Mission of the new EUPM is 
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the field of the rule of law.27 In particular, the EUSR is in charge of assuring 
the coherence of the ESDP activities (the EUPM and EUFOR): the EUSR is 
in the chain of command of the EUPM and can offer political advice to the 
EUFOR regarding organised crime, indictees of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia or the six-month review of the EUFOR. 
The EUSR should also facilitate coordination between Brussels and 
Sarajevo, something that is not always easy given the 
compartmentalisation of the Council Secretariat into several directorates-
general.28 
On the other hand, according to several EUPM officials, poor internal 
coordination and communication in Sarajevo affected the mission, 
particularly during the last year and a half of the mandate. These problems 
were identified at top levels of the mission, meaning that the higher levels 
did not communicate adequately with the lower levels and sometimes the 
lower levels were confronted by conflicting orders. An EUPM official 
described the internal coordination in these terms: “[I]t is appalling, 
dreadful.…It is far too hierarchical, far too military, very old fashion. And 
m o s t  o f  t h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  p e r s onalities, or the personality to be 
clearer.”29 “Problems with the leadership of the mission” and “problems 
with personalities” were repeatedly raised by EUPM officials.30 According 
to some EUPM officials, the Head of Mission, Kevin Carty did not listen to 
lower levels, did not communicate with them and undertook independent 
initiatives without consulting them. To be sure, these frictions were related 
to “personalities” or “personality” rather than to the organisational design 
                                                      
27 See Council of the European Union, Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004 
on the mandate of the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and repealing Council Joint Action 2002/211/CFSP, OJ L 252, 
28.07.2004(a). 
28 The EUSRs are managed by each respective geographical desk; in the case of 
BiH, this is Directorate-General (DG) VI (Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia). DG VI is also in charge of the EUMM. For its part, the EUPM is the 
responsibility of DG IX (Civilian Crisis Management and Coordination). Finally, 
the politico-military aspects of the EUFOR operation are dealt with by DG VIII 
(defence aspects), supported by the EU Military Staff (EUMS). 
29 Derived from an interview with an EUPM official in Sarajevo, 2005. 
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of the mission. Problems of leadership not only affected the overall 
effectiveness of the mission, but also had another consequence: the loss of 
credibility and influence among the local authorities who realised that 
there was no clear policy line coming from the EUPM headquarters. For 
example, one official mentioned how internal complications damaged the 
EUPM’s strategy concerning the SIPA project.31 Even though these issues 
were commonly known in BiH, they were never singled out in the mission 
reviews as a problem affecting implementation.32 
As regards coherence with the Commission’s activities, the EUPM 
aimed at supporting the rule of law dimension of the EU’s policies in the 
country together with the Community projects in this area managed by the 
Commission and financed through the budget for the CARDS programme 
(Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and 
Stabilisation). According to the 2002 Joint Action, “the EUPM, supported 
by the Community’s institution-building programmes under the CARDS 
Regulation, should contribute to the overall peace implementation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as to the achievements of the Union’s 
overall policy in the region, notably the Stabilisation and Association 
Process”.33 To ensure institutional coherence, the Joint Action stated the 
need for coordination arrangements in Brussels and Sarajevo and noted 
“the intention of the Commission to direct its action towards achieving the 
objectives of this Joint Action, where appropriate, by relevant Community 
measures”.34  
Coordination between EUPM and Commission projects was 
facilitated by an informal Joint Coordination Group, which met to discuss 
current and planned activities in the field of policing. Moreover, a small 
CARDS team was co-located at the EUPM headquarters. Commission 
efforts in this area were supported by the CARDS programme, which 
                                                      
31 Ibid. 
32 For some interviewees, better mechanisms for the evaluation of the internal 
coordination of the mission needed to be established. As an EUPM official put it: 
“instead of Brussels coming down and checking financial stuff, why do they not 
come and assess the quality of the people running the mission? Because then, 
maybe we would have a well organised, well run mission” (ibid).  
33 Refer to Council of the European Union (2002), op. cit. 
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budgeted €5 million per year for police-related projects during the period 
2003–05. Some of these projects included the improvement of the 
communication networks of the police stations, twinning programmes and 
the supply of equipment for other law enforcement agencies (the SBS, SIPA 
and Ministry of Security).  
Although horizontal coordination with the Commission worked 
fairly well, some difficulties are worthy of consideration. The lack of 
appropriate funding procedures caused some troubles for the EUPM, 
which had to apply for CARDS funding to enable it to launch new projects 
or seek funding through the member states’ embassies.35 Other problems 
were of a structural/institutional nature. As mentioned by Anika Hansen, 
police missions can be considered a cross-pillar instrument, but they are 
conceived from a different perspective according to which pillar is 
involved. For pillar I (Community actions), they are a long-term tool to 
support development projects. For pillar II (CFSP), police missions are seen 
as a short-term instrument of security. For pillar III (justice and home 
affairs), police missions are a preventive instrument to fight against 
organised crime and secure EU borders.36 Police operations like the EUPM 
are designed by the Council structures to tackle the urgent needs of the 
police forces, whereas the Commission designs its own long-term 
institution-building projects, which do not always follow the same logic as 
those of the Council.37 Therefore, the main challenge relates to the 
coordination between the first and second pillars, and particularly, 
between the Council Secretariat and the Commission.38  
In this specific case, EUPM officials complained that there was not 
always full cooperation for harmonising the projects launched by the 
Commission with those of the EUPM. For instance, there were problems 
                                                      
35 Derived from an interview with an EUPM official in Sarajevo, 2005.  
36 See A. Hansen, “Security and Defence: The EU Police Mission in Bosnia-
Herzegovina”, in W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen and B. White (eds), Contemporary 
European Foreign Policy, London: Sage Publications, 2004, p. 181. 
37 Yet it is increasingly difficult to distinguish the rationale behind the 
Commission’s and the Council’s projects in the area of policing and the rule of 
law, with the Council gradually expanding its area of activity.  
38 See C. Gourlay, “European Union Procedures and Resources for Crisis 
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owing to the duplication of advisers (one co-located police officer coming 
from the EUPM and one adviser from the Commission’s twinning projects) 
for some Bosnian institutions:39 
In many of the projects there was one EUPM officer, for example, in 
organised crime at the Ministry of Security, and the Commission 
would bring another police expert…they [the Commission] had the 
money and we had to work with them. But it was terrible. And it was 
also badly perceived by the locals, they could not understand what 
was going on.40  
Coordination with the EU military operation, EUFOR Althea, was an 
even more distressing exercise. Apart from the obvious challenges of 
planning and running a mission of 7,000 troops, the deployment of this 
force involved a new test for the EU: the need for enhanced coordination 
between the military and the civilian elements of the ESDP. In theory, the 
mandates of the two missions did not clash. The role of the EUPM was to 
monitor, mentor and inspect at the medium and senior levels, assisting in 
the building of the capacities of the Bosnian police forces. EUFOR Althea 
was, and still is, to provide a safe and secure environment, and to 
implement other aspects of Annexes 1.A and 2 of the Dayton Agreement. 
Whereas the EUPM’s mandate aimed at the long-term capacity-building of 
the police forces, the EUFOR focuses on the short term (deterrence). The 
former had a non-executive mandate (monitor, mentor and inspect); the 
latter an executive one, i.e. with enforcement tools to be used if 
appropriate. In spite of the different mandates and approaches, in practice, 
during the first year of EUFOR’s mandate, there were some tensions 
between the two missions. The implementation of these operations has 
shown that there are still some grey areas between the mandates of the 
EUPM and EUFOR, especially regarding the fight against organised crime. 
                                                      
39 The EUPM and the Commission are not the only actors involved in police 
reform activities in BiH. Several organisations have projects on police 
restructuring, border management, counter-terrorism and organised crime such as 
the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (supported 
by the US government) or the initiative of the Council of Europe. The member 
states also have bilateral projects in the field of police reform (among others, the 
UK, Spain and Germany).  
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The existence of a paramilitary police force under the chain of command of 
EUFOR only exacerbated these tensions.41 
During its first three years of mandate, the EUPM supported 
institution-building projects as the most effective way to tackle organised 
crime. It provided expert advice and monitored the creation and 
strengthening of various institutions (the Ministry of Security, SIPA, SBS 
and Interpol) to increase the local capacity for this task. The role of the 
EUFOR in the fight against organised crime was rather different. Even 
though the EUFOR’s mandate identified the fight against organised crime 
as only one of its supporting tasks, the former EUFOR Commander, 
General David Leakey, expressed his personal commitment to tackling this 
issue.42 From December 2004, several operations were launched by the 
EUFOR to support local law enforcement agencies to combat illegal 
activities such as weapons and drug smuggling, human trafficking and 
illegal logging. The EUFOR’s assertive approach generated some criticism 
amongst EUPM officials. According to them, the EUFOR’s operations had 
gone beyond their mandate, and by participating actively in operations 
against organised crime, the EUFOR was actually doing the locals’ job.  
The tension between these two operations showed the EU’s difficulty 
in designing a comprehensive civilian and military approach to crisis 
management. Nevertheless, in the last months of the EUPM’s mandate, an 
effort was made to improve coordination on the ground as the different 
actors realised the need for better arrangements.43 Thus, at the end of 2005, 
the representatives of the EUPM, EUFOR and the EUSR agreed on seven 
principles for coordination and on general guidelines for increasing 
                                                      
41 An Integrated Police Unit with executive powers was created as part of the 
EUFOR. The Unit was deployed but not without problems, since some member 
states did not agree with a police mission being placed under a military command. 
It has often been used to support EUFOR operations in the fight against organised 
crime. 
42 Derived from interviews held in Brussels and Sarajevo, 2005–06. 
43 This effort could also be seen as part of the ‘exit strategy’ of EUFOR to reduce its 
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cooperation44 (Box 3.1). According to the related documents, the main 
coordinating role falls under the responsibility of the EUSR, who will chair 
a new body, the Crime Strategy Working Group. The seven principles also 
foresee the development of a joint action plan that will set the goals and 
define the tasks for each of the EU organisations. The EUPM will be taking 
the lead in the policing aspects of the ESDP, supporting efforts in tackling 
organised crime. The EUPM will assist the local authorities by mentoring 
and monitoring the planning of these operations, while the EUFOR will 
provide the operational capacities for them, all under the political 
coordination of the EUSR. These activities should aim at supporting the 
work of the BiH authorities in the fight against organised crime, in an 
effort to promote local ownership. 
 
Box 3.1 Seven principles for coordination between the EUPM, EUFOR and 
               the EUSR 
1.  The EUPM, EUFOR and the EUSR/Office of the High Representative will 
strengthen their complementing and coordinating roles in the fight against 
organised crime. 
2.  The EUSR will take responsibility for this coordination and will chair the 
Crime Strategy Working Group.  
3.  The relevant EU players will observe the general guidelines for increasing 
cooperation. 
4.  The EUPM will play a more proactive role and take the lead in coordinating 
the policing aspects of ESDP in BiH. 
5.  The EUFOR will coordinate and align its future anti-organised crime 
operations with the EUPM. 
6.  A task force will be set up to develop a joint action plan delineating the 
tasks, goals and benchmarks for the relevant EU instruments. 
7.  This joint action plan will align with and support the efforts of the BiH 
authorities. 
Source: EUPM, EUFOR and EUSR (2005). 
                                                      
44 See EU Police Mission (EUPM), EU Military Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(EUFOR) and EU Special Representative (EUSR), Guidelines for Increasing Co-
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This agreement has since been developed into operational guidelines 
(adopted on 11 May 2006) that specify the new ‘adjusted roles’ of the 
(extended) EUPM and EUFOR in supporting Bosnian law enforcement 
agencies in fighting organised crime and corruption. The EUFOR will only 
support Bosnian police forces when the capacity does not exist within any 
Bosnian police force or when it exists, but local police lack confidence, and 
this support will always have to be endorsed by the EUPM. The 
implementation of these guidelines should lead the EUFOR progressively 
to reduce its role in the fight against organised crime (but without leaving 
a vacuum) and to transfer these tasks to the Bosnian police forces.45 
In sum, the problems of coherence affecting the initial EUPM exercise 
mainly stemmed from factors such as the EU’s fragmented presence in the 
country, the lack of an overall strategy, frictions in inter-pillar coordination 
and in some specific cases, among personalities. In the next section, the 
effectiveness of the EUPM is analysed. It is argued that effectiveness was 
also hampered by difficulties connected with the recent development of the 
EU’s crisis management capabilities and lack of resources, but external 
factors (relating to the local context) are also pointed out to explain the 
failure of the EUPM to fulfil its first mandate.  
3.5  Effectiveness of the EUPM 
A realistic task? The EUPM operated as the leading project in the field of 
police reform, as part of the programme of rule of law reform launched by 
the high representative in BiH, with the aim of creating independent, 
professional and sustainable police forces.46  
The goal of the EUPM was “to establish sustainable policing 
arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and 
international practice”.47 The EUPM had strategic objectives in four areas: 
                                                      
45 Derived from interviews in Sarajevo, 2006.  
46 To implement its mandate, the EUPM co-located police officers in around 30 
monitoring units at the medium and senior levels, supported by two mobile 
inspection teams operating around the country. EUPM officers were deployed at 
the levels of the state, the entities, the Brcko District, the cantons of the Federation 
and the Public Security Centres in the Republika Srpska. 
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1)  the development of police independence and accountability,  
2)  the fight against organised crime and corruption,  
3)  the financial viability and sustainability of the police forces, and  
4)  the enhancement of institutions and capacity-building.  
These objectives were pursued through programmes on seven themes: 
1)  Crime police 
2)  Criminal justice 
3)  Internal affairs  
4)  Police administration 
5)  Public order and security 
6)  SBS 
7)  SIPA48  
The role of the EUPM in the country became even more important 
following the feasibility study of the Commission, which identified police 
reform as one of the requirements for BiH to initiate negotiations on the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement.49 The EUPM, together with the 
high representative/EUSR, advised and participated in the negotiations on 
the police restructuring. 
The EUPM had the mission of educating, instructing, assisting, 
monitoring and advising local police. That is, the EUPM pursued a long-
term, institutional reform programme aimed at producing a change in the 
police structures.50 It was not just about providing a quick relief to a crisis 
                                                      
48 The new EUPM launched in January 2006 has different objectives as well as a 
different organisation (see section 3.6).  
49 The police reform is guided by three criteria: the creation of an independent, 
sustainable police force (to ensure that all budgetary competencies are vested at 
the state level), the elimination of overt political interference and the principle that 
police reform can only proceed on the basis of the geographical/functional regions 
that have been drawn up to ensure maximum efficiency in the fight against crime 
and to reduce political interference. After a series of failed attempts, the Republika 
Srpska Assembly finally accepted the agreement on police restructuring on 5 
October 2005. As of February 2007, however, there was still no political agreement 
on the implementation of this reform. 
50 Refer to Merlingen & Ostrauskaite (2005), op. cit., p. 8. POLICE MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA | 63 
 
situation, but strengthening institutions, capacity-building and the 
sustainability of the Bosnian police forces. The need for a long-term 
approach was acknowledged by EUPM officials, as were the difficulties of 
adopting this approach: “[I]t is very easy to create structures and 
institutions, but you also have to change the mindset and that takes time. 
The more you go on to the substance and the cultures, the more it takes 
time.”51 Commenting on EUPM objectives, some officials pointed to the 
fact that the mandate was too broad: “[B]ringing the Bosnian police 
standards to the European ones in three years was unrealistic.”52 
Nevertheless, one can identify several successes achieved during the 
period 2003–05. 
There was some progress regarding institution- and capacity-
building with the establishment of a Ministry of Security at the state level, 
and the strengthening of the SIPA and other state-level agencies (the SBS 
and Interpol). The EUPM helped with the drafting and implementation of 
the respective laws and the recruitment of personnel, and provided 
financial advice and other expert assistance on police matters.  
The EUPM also managed to create at least an understanding of the 
need for intelligence in fighting crime and a culture of exchanging 
intelligence among law enforcement agencies. There were also some 
successes in trying to improve cooperation in the field among institutions 
at the state and entity (Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska) levels, and 
even at the regional level. This was a very important step in order to 
improve the fight against organised crime and corruption, although there 
is more to be done in this respect. The EUPM also tried to strengthen local 
ownership of the reforms with the establishment of a Police Steering Board 
at the level of the police commissioner/director of police, where reform 
projects were discussed and agreed (with the support of several working 
groups). At the lower levels of the police hierarchy, the EUPM advised on 
the creation of Project Implementation Boards, which were created 
throughout BiH to develop projects at the local level.  
EUPM thematic programmes aimed at, inter alia, improving the 
operational capacities and effectiveness of the local police forces. The 
programmes focused on goals: 
                                                      
51 Derived from an interview with an EUPM official in Sarajevo, 2005.  
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•  restructuring the crime police departments;  
•  increasing the cooperation between the police and the rule of law 
agencies;  
•  improving capabilities in the area of crime prevention, crime 
reporting, witness protection and investigation;  
•  strengthening the control of the external borders;  
•  enhancing the accountability of the police; and  
•  providing training to improve the administrative and management 
capacities of the BiH police.  
Training was also provided to improve the skills of the local police in terms 
of police budgets (salary scales, inventories and payrolls, budget planning 
and rationalisation of the use of police equipment) to help the local police 
achieve financial viability and sustainability. Some progress was attained 
in this respect, but most of these projects were hampered by the lack of 
resources and structural impediments. For example, in the case of financial 
sustainability, the EUPM projects only offered a patchy solution to a 
problem that required an overall reorganisation of the Bosnian police 
forces, as was suggested by the Police Restructuring Commission.53 An 
International Crisis Group report54 gave a gloomy picture of the EUPM’s 
performance, arguing that criminal activity had increased in the last years 
and that the functioning of the Bosnian police forces had not improved in 
spite of the implementation of EUPM programmes.  
Contextualising the EUPM’s activities. In dealing with the reform of 
the Bosnian police forces, the EUPM encountered several problems arising 
from the difficult local circumstances in which the mission had to operate. 
According to Osland (2004), “the EU may learn some hard lessons 
regarding resources, mandate etc. connected to the institutional 
establishment of the EUPM. Nevertheless, it is the legacy of the war in BiH 
                                                      
53 Police expenditure amounts to around 10% of the government budgets at the 
cantonal, entity and state levels (see International Crisis Group (ICG), Bosnia’s 
Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU, Europe Report No. 164, ICG, Brussels, 6 
September 2005(b)). The Police Restructuring Commission suggested a reduction 
and reorganisation of the Bosnian police forces in order to reduce this burden and 
rationalise resources.  
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that represents the greatest obstacle to the success of the EUPM.”55 This 
legacy includes organised crime, corruption and hardliner nationalism 
(ibid.). The EUPM’s activities (2003–05) took place in the context of an 
ethnically fragmented country with an unsettled political situation and a 
fragile economy. For example, the economy in BiH was at its worst level 
during the period 2003–05.56 The Ministry of Security’s Report on security in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004 explicitly linked the decline in the economy 
with the worsening of the security situation in the country, explaining 
increases in the number of robberies and in organised crime.57 Moreover, it 
does not come as a surprise that “a high percentage of the population 
would like to leave the country (36%)” (ibid., p. 3). 
Several EUPM officials and national representatives in Brussels have 
also pointed to local circumstances to explain some of the problems 
experienced by the EUPM.58 For instance, the EUPM’s efforts to promote 
an ethnically balanced police force and to integrate minorities did not 
succeed because of the negative response from minorities, who felt 
threatened outside their ethnic areas.59 The lack of financial resources and 
deficiencies in local training also hindered the projects carried out by the 
EUPM. On the other hand, the technical reforms undertaken by the EUPM 
were politicised, stalling the process of reform. For instance, they were 
linked to the police restructuring by both entities (the Federation and 
Republika Srpska) in the working groups of the Police Steering Board. One 
EUPM official affirmed that the restructuring of the police,  
has created a deep unease among the local members in our working 
groups, in particular, among the representatives of the Republika 
Srpska. They have been blocking other reforms encouraged from 
                                                      
55 Refer to Osland (2004), op. cit., p. 553. 
56 See Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Report on security in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in 2004, Sarajevo, April 2005, p. 2. 
57 For instance, “in the field of the crimes against security of people and property, 
there [was] recorded a certain increase as compared with 2003. One of the reasons 
is the actual economic situation in BiH” (ibid., p. 30). This increase was 26.4% in 
the Federation of BiH (no percentage is available for the Republika Srpska). 
58 Derived from interviews in Brussels and Sarajevo, 2005–06.  
59 According to an ICG report (2005b, op. cit., p. 4) ethnic imbalances persist in the 
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EUPM. Linking the police restructuring with other reforms, they have 
intentionally [slowed] down the path of reforms.60  
Finally, the lack of independence of the police at the political level 
and the problems with corruption and organised crime among politicians 
and police officers alike are notable. The low salaries of the Bosnian police 
forces have often been used to explain corruption among police officers 
and the failure to implement reforms. As one EUPM officer put it, “there is 
a broad agreement that we need to reform the police, but [at] the lower 
level, the station commander does not have an interest in European 
integration. [W]hat does it mean to him? He needs to survive now, to get 
money now.”61  
The implementation of the SIPA project can serve as a good example 
of the above-mentioned issues. The EUPM faced some inherent difficulties 
given that when this state-level agency is fully operative, it will pose a 
threat to corrupt politicians and criminals who are often protected by their 
ethnic groups. Thus, from the beginning, the SIPA has suffered from 
obstruction coming from local politicians who have been threatened by the 
creation of this agency. For instance, the first laws did not give SIPA police 
powers of investigation and later reforms prompted by the EUPM were 
approved only under pressure. Regarding minority recruitment, according 
to an EUPM official, “what is unique about SIPA is that it is the first 
institution that will operate over the whole country and that it is multi-
ethnic”.62 Nevertheless, there were challenges in recruiting personnel from 
minority groups and some posts remained vacant even though SIPA 
offered higher salaries than other police agencies.63 In the case of those who 
accepted the job, they usually did not live in the majority area, but 
preferred to travel from their place of origin where they felt safer. Another 
                                                      
60 Derived from an interview with an EUPM official in Sarajevo, 2005.  
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid.  
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constraint was the lack of financial resources and an adequate budget.64 
Despite these problems, there has been some progress – the laws and the 
budget are now in place, and the SIPA has already initiated some 
protection and investigation cases.65 
On the other hand, some of the weaknesses of the EUPM projects can 
be reduced to the fact that they did not take into account the local 
circumstances in which the projects were to be implemented. As Merlingen 
& Ostrauskaite (2005) note, “the challenge of devising reform programmes 
that take account of local circumstances and locally defined needs has so 
far not been taken seriously enough by ESDP police reformers”.66 Not 
being aware of this challenge can hamper the effectiveness of EU police 
missions. For example, even though organised crime constitutes a real 
issue in BiH, its perception as a threat by the local population differs from 
the priority it is given by the EUPM. Ordinary citizens in BiH do not 
consider organised crime as the highest security threat and are rather more 
concerned about low-level criminality – which affects their daily lives. 
Therefore, maybe there should be a more balanced approach between the 
objectives established in Brussels and local needs. These problems could 
also be avoided by a better fact-finding team, to include both civilian and 
police experts who could provide a better understanding of the local 
circumstances and identification of the needs of future programmes and 
projects.67 
In any case, the EU police missions should have in mind a long-term 
strategy aimed at developing a democratic and accountable police force. 
The objective should give more consideration to the needs of civil society, 
promoting a participatory policing style.68 Commenting on the need for 
this long-term perspective and local ownership, one EUPM official stated:  
                                                      
64 This shortcoming has also affected the SBS. Although the report on security in 
BiH by the Ministry of Security (2005, op. cit.) acknowledges the improvement of 
the SBS, it also affirms that the Bosnian borders are still not covered in an 
appropriate manner. More personnel and a better communication network is 
required, as well as a strategy on integral border management (ibid., p. 29).  
65 Derived from an interview with an EUPM official in Sarajevo, 2005.  
66 Refer to Merlingen & Ostrauskaite (2005), op. cit., p. 11. 
67 Derived from an interview with an EUPM official in Sarajevo, 2005.  
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Our focus has been wrong; we should be looking at a more long term 
development of management skills. We should be developing local 
ownership much more than we have. We should be developing 
sustainable improvement, rather than to pick up one or two things. 
Now if you look at our mandate for three years, [it] is ridiculously 
short. You cannot change the police culture in three years. You are 
lucky if you [can] do it in fifteen years.69 
EUPM projects neither fully involved the citizens and non-
governmental organisations nor gave them an active role in the policing of 
their communities.70 This approach undermined the long-term 
effectiveness of the reforms.  
A clearer, stronger mandate? The effectiveness of the mission was 
also complicated by other factors linked to the development of the EU’s 
crisis management capabilities. The inexperience of the EU in crisis 
management and the lack of resources are the main factors underlying 
problems of effectiveness here. The EUPM’s strategy was based on a 
management approach consisting of “monitoring, mentoring and 
inspecting managerial and operational capacities of the BiH police”.71 This 
means that the EUPM had to implement its mandate through advice and 
mentorship, trying to persuade BiH police officers that the identified 
reforms were to be followed. In this way, the EUPM was to ensure that the 
domestic policing structures worked effectively and that European 
standards were met. This emphasis was meant to be compatible with the 
global approach of ownership favoured by the SAP. Obviously, this choice 
also entailed some flaws in terms of effectiveness, as the role of EUPM 
officers was limited to mentoring and monitoring. In other words, there 
were no consequences when the locals did not comply with what had been 
advised by EUPM officials. Even if conditionality from other EU projects 
could and was linked,72 it had a limited impact, as proven by the police 
                                                      
69 Derived from an interview with an EUPM official in Sarajevo, 2005. 
70 Perhaps the only exception here is the establishment of a hotline called “Krimo-
Lovci” [Crime-Catchers], which allowed citizens to make anonymous calls with 
information about possible crimes. 
71 Derived from an interview with an EUPM official in Sarajevo, 2005. 
72 According to an EUPM official, at the Police Steering Board meetings the EUPM 
made clear the links between required reforms and assistance from the EU. 
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reform.73 In any case, given the degree of development of BiH, and the 
passage of 10 years after the Dayton Agreement, it was to be expected that 
the locals would themselves realise the need for reforms and proceed with 
their implementation, supported by the EUPM.  
In contrast to the IPTF, the EUPM was not an executive operation, 
which means that EUPM monitors were not present in the field to 
implement or oversee police operations and they did not have enforcement 
tools. Although the EUPM had also been given the mandate to remove 
non-compliant officers, it was a complex procedure that differed from the 
IPTF’s. With the UN mission, authority to remove individual officers 
rested with the IPTF commissioner. With the EUPM, that authority rested 
with the high representative, who would issue decisions at the 
recommendation of the EUPM commissioner. Yet the practice followed by 
the EUPM was that, initially, cases of non-compliance had to be pursued 
by the appropriate domestic authorities and it was to these authorities that 
cases were to be referred by the EUPM commissioner. Only if the domestic 
disciplinary process was obstructed was the commissioner to refer the case 
to the high representative. The EUPM only resorted to this procedure a 
couple of times, and the high representative was, according to some 
interviewees, very reluctant to remove the police officers as recommended 
by the EUPM.74 
As pointed out by some EUPM officials, this ‘soft’ approach might 
have damaged the effectiveness of the EUPM. Although most of the EUPM 
officials as well as officials in Brussels agreed that an executive mandate 
would have been inappropriate for this specific operation, they argued that 
the EUPM could have been ‘tougher’ in applying its mandate, particularly 
the inspecting component. As one interviewee put it, “the inspect 
component has been utilised only in the last few months and I think that 
has been a real failure.…Had it been [used] from the very beginning we 
would have been able to see more progress.”75 According to this view, the 
                                                      
73 For months, the Bosnian authorities failed to achieve an agreement on police 
reform, in spite of pressures from the EUPM, the Commission and the high 
representative/EUSR. Even after the October agreement, the implementation of 
the reform remains blocked. 
74 Derived from interviews with EUPM officials in Sarajevo, 2005. 
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inspection power and the possibility to remove non-compliant police 
officers would have increased the capability of the EUPM to push through 
reforms.  
On the other hand, EUPM officials voiced problems when trying to 
implement the mandate because it was quite ambiguous. The Joint Action 
stated that the EUPM will “mentor, monitor and inspect”, according to 
“best European and international practice”,76 but without setting any 
guidelines that could help in the implementation of these criteria. As 
articulated by several EUPM officials, it was very difficult to determine on 
the ground what “monitor, mentor and inspect” meant, what “best 
European practice” was and how to develop the programmatic objectives 
into operational projects. It took some time and a lot of discussion during 
the first months of the running of the operation to clarify these issues, and 
this limited the effectiveness of the mission. For example, in the case of 
“European standards”, given the difficulty of defining common standards 
among the contributing countries, the problem was resolved by assigning 
particular programmes to different countries. 
In sum, a clearer mandate would have saved money and time, along 
with increasing the effectiveness of the EUPM. To avoid these problems in 
future operations, it would be desirable to develop generic concepts and 
modalities for the programme management of EU police missions. Some 
interviewees also mentioned the need for a better benchmarking system. In 
the words of a national representative to CIVCOM, 
What we have to make sure is that we have a proper benchmarking 
system that can ensure that we are on the right track, that gives us 
some very concrete and clearly defined tasks.…For example, if we 
want to reform SIPA, how do we do [it]? Because if not, we end up in a 
situation like the EUPM [wherein] we don’t really know if they have 
made a difference.77  
The EUPM did have a benchmarking system – one that was 
established a year and a half after the operation started. According to this 
evaluation system, around 70–75% of the EUPM’s programme objectives 
                                                      
76 Refer to Council of the European Union (2002), op. cit. 
77 Derived from an interview with a national representative to CIVCOM in 
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were achieved.78 Yet, according to officials in Brussels as well as those on 
the ground, this system was not a good one: “[W]hat it does is to measure 
the progress, but it does not tell you about the quality.”79 Thus, the EU 
needs to establish a better benchmarking system, which will help to 
measure effectiveness and enable better decision-making about whether to 
refocus, extend the mandate or end a mission.  
Only a symbolic commitment on the part of the member states? 
Another problem experienced by the EUPM concerned personnel. As 
mentioned in the report on the first 100 days of the mission, there were 
difficulties with national contributions of personnel and their rotation.80 At 
the beginning of the operation, some member states did not provide the 
committed personnel and therefore various positions remained empty for 
some time.81 The frequency of rotation was quite high, which also affected 
the performance of the mission. According to one EUPM official, “You 
need the first two months to start up with the job and the last two months 
are not very productive. So what is left is just eight months where the staff 
is working at 100% of their capabilities.”82 In addition, as pointed out by 
several officials, in a one-to-one mentoring relationship police officers need 
time to build trust, which is not possible during such a short period.83 The 
first contingent of personnel was highly qualified, but later rotations did 
not maintain the same quality of staff.84 Sometimes the officers recruited 
were not the most suitable for a specific position nor did they have 
adequate English language skills, irrespective of the emphasis by the 
                                                      
78 T h i s  d a t a  s t e m s  f r o m  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 5 ;  i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  a n  E U P M  o f f i c i a l  i n  
Sarajevo, 2005.  
79 For example, one EUPM official mentioned that the SBS dogs’ project was 
almost implemented, except for the fact that they did not have dogs (ibid). 
80 See Council of the European Union, A Review of the first 100 days of the EU Police 
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), 11760/03, Council Secretariat, Brussels, 
23.07.2003(b), pp. 7–8. 
81 Derived from an interview with an EUPM official in Sarajevo, 2005. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
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EUPM headquarters on the need for specialist and highly qualified police 
officers and the development of specific job descriptions.85  
Problems related to the low quality of police forces are not unique to 
EU police operations. The UN police operations had experienced these 
complications and the EU was aware of them.86 Other EU police missions 
have suffered similar hindrances owing to the fact that there is no common 
pool or roster of human resources from which the required personnel can 
be selected. It is a decision in the hands of the member states, which do not 
always take into account the requirements of the job position, making it 
more a question of filling the quotas.87 Moreover, member states prefer to 
keep the best experts at home. This is particularly the case with police 
officers with specialised skills such as forensics, narcotics or witness 
protection. As stated by one EUPM official, 
We don’t need more human resources, but better qualified, highly 
specialized people, and that is the main problem. For example, you 
need expertise on witness protection, and you don’t get these people 
from the member states, because they are already accommodated at 
home, and they don’t let them go.88  
Furthermore, training and recruitment has mainly been undertaken at 
the national level, without establishing any mechanism to harmonise 
procedures and guarantee interoperability of the personnel deployed on the 
ground, which is a common weakness of EU civilian crisis-management 
operations. There have already been some exercises to try to identify the 
available personnel from each member state, and some training and 
formation courses have been held at the EU level. Still, this pool of trained 
personnel has not been systematically used because, so far, there has not 
been a link between the training courses and deployment, nor a mechanism to 
                                                      
85 Refer to Hansen (2004), op. cit., p. 179. 
86 See Council of the European Union, Presidency Report to the Göteborg European 
Council on European Security and Defence Policy, June 2001. 
87 According to an EUPM official interviewed in Sarajevo in 2005, “there is not a 
good procedure to select people…I do not blame this or that country, they do not 
know what will be the role of the person they have to select, they do not know 
what kind of skill they have to select for, so they cannot select the right person for 
the job”.  
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ensure that those trained are also willing and able to take part in EU 
operations,89 which constitutes a waste of resources and skills.  
EUPM officials also agreed that this kind of mission (management at 
medium and senior levels) required more civilian experts or police experts 
with higher qualifications and experience in the management of projects.90 
The main constituent of such a mission should be comprised of civilian 
management experts, whereas police officers would only offer technical 
assistance on the ground. Some officials have also recommended that 
police officers should be senior experts if co-location is the modality 
employed. Even though young experts could have the same knowledge, in 
this one-to-one relationship, experience is more important.91 Local police 
officers would not like to be “taught” by a younger person. The monitor 
and mentorship mandate is better carried out by senior staff.92  
These problems demonstrate the difficulties in providing highly 
experienced and qualified personnel, given that police officers are a limited 
resource at home. Without a real commitment on the part of the member 
states, the EU police missions will always suffer from these shortfalls. In 
sum, as shown in this section, while the effectiveness of the EUPM mission 
was affected by external/local factors that impinged on the projected 
reforms, the recent development of the EU’s crisis management capabilities 
could also explain some of the shortcomings in relation to the mandate and 
personnel. 
                                                      
89 See International Security Information Service (ISIS), Developing Civilian Crisis 
Management Capabilities, European Security Review No. 20, ISIS Europe, Brussels, 
December 2003. 
90 Derived from an interview with an EUSR official in Sarajevo, 2005.  
91 Ibid.  
92 In the same vein, Merlingen & Ostrauskaite (2005, op. cit.) acknowledged that 
co-location has worked better in the case of the EUPM than in the case of the IPTF 
because Bosnian police officers tend to appreciate more the mentorship from their 
Western counterparts than from some of the non-Western police officers who 
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3.6  Learning by doing 
The EUPM’s mandate ended on 31 December 2005. The Council then 
decided to extend the mission for two more years. The subsequent mission 
launched in January 2006 is more limited regarding its personnel93 and 
objectives: it focuses on assisting police reform, combating organised crime 
and supporting the capacity-building of the SIPA and SBS, which seems a 
more realistic mandate.94 The new EUPM mission has a stronger, more 
proactive role in the fight against organised crime, assisting the local 
authorities in planning and conducting organised crime investigations, 
following from the seven principles agreed among the EUPM, EUFOR and 
the EUSR (see above). The new Head of Mission, Vincenzo Coppola, 
former Head of the Police Unit in the Council Secretariat and former Chief 
of Staff of the Multinational Specialised Unit in SFOR,95 understands the 
complexities of both the political and the operational sides of the matter.96  
With this new mission, the EU has tried to overcome some of the 
pitfalls of the previous one. For example, it has strengthened the inspecting 
component. Hence, one of the new strategic priorities is to monitor and 
assess the accountability of the local police, by looking at the operations 
carried out by Bosnian police forces, but also the conduct of individual 
police officers. Two mobile inspection teams have been created to carry out 
this task. On the other hand, this mission also tries to respond to criticisms 
that pointed to the lack of an integrated approach in the previous EUPM, 
neglecting the importance of the rule of law dimension in the fight against 
                                                      
93 The new EUPM is staffed with 173 police officers and 28 international civilians 
(see “Weekly establishment of EUPM personnel by countries”, retrieved from 
www.eupm.org on 05-09-06). 
94 See Council of the European Union, Joint Action 2005/824/CFSP of 24 
November 2005 on the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH), OJ L 307, 25.11.2005(a). Regarding those EUPM programmes 
that were not finalised in December 2005, they are to be carried out by the local 
authorities and monitored by EUPM. A Joint Programme Development and 
Coordination Department began to operate in February 2006. 
95 The Multinational Specialised Unit was the paramilitary police force established 
within SFOR, which was mainly composed of carabinieri.  
96 Derived from interviews in Brussels, 2006. See also “The Sheriff: Vincenzo 
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criminality. Even though the new EUPM is still a police mission, it also 
includes some rule of law experts, who should support the mandate of the 
EUPM in this field. Thus, a Criminal Justice Interface Unit has been set up 
to address problems regarding cooperation between the police and the 
prosecutorial authorities. In the same vein, the EUSR has been reinforced 
with a police/military adviser, a police reform adviser, an adviser on 
prosecutorial matters, a border expert, and a fraud and special finance 
adviser.97 Some restructuring and transfer of the EUPM’s press and public 
information functions to the EUSR have taken place, in order to facilitate 
coordination and to reinforce the EUSR’s structures; yet, there has not been 
a full merging of the political and press departments as early EUPM 
reports had recommended.98  
The lessons gathered from this mission have also helped to enhance 
the EU’s crisis management procedures. As far as the planning phase is 
concerned, some recent developments such as the initiative of an EU 
concept for comprehensive planning99 and the creation of the Civ–Mil Cell 
within the Council Secretariat are meant to improve the situation. Still, 
some officials have suggested that further changes are required,100 and 
plans for the restructuring of the civilian crisis management structures 
within the Council Secretariat are currently being discussed to implement 
the post-Hampton Court agenda. 101   
To speed up the planning phase, the EU has developed the 
“framework participation agreements” and the “model participation 
agreements” for the inclusion of officers from non-EU member states.102 
The former is an agreement with a five-year duration, which would be 
                                                      
97 Derived from interviews in Brussels and Sarajevo, 2006.  
98 Ibid. 
99 See the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), Council 
Conclusions of the 2691st Council Meeting, Brussels, 21-22 November 2005.  
100 Derived from an interview with an EUPM official, 2006.  
101  See Council of the European Union, Letter of the Secretary General/High 
Representative to the Presidency and the Members of European Council, S416/05, 
Brussels, 14 December 2005(b).  
102 See House of Commons, Tenth Report of the Select Committee on European 
Scrutiny, Section 9, 03.03.2004(a); see also House of Commons, Seventeenth Report of 
the Select Committee on European Scrutiny, Section 8, 07.05.2004(b). 76 | EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS 
 
used in the instances of states that usually participate in ESDP operations, 
such as Norway, Iceland, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey or Canada, to fix the 
terms of their contributions. The latter are meant to facilitate case-by-case 
negotiations with states that might join EU missions only occasionally. The 
framework agreement establishes the arrangements regarding the chain of 
command and financial aspects, clarifying the conditions under which the 
non-member state would contribute to the operational budget or to common 
costs. These agreements should help speed up the EU’s response time in 
launching crisis management operations. They will also help to reinforce the 
transparency of the budgetary procedures and to avoid the ad hoc methods 
that dominated the process in the past.103  
The lack of qualified and experienced personnel has also been 
identified as one of the main limitations during the implementation of the 
EUPM. This shortfall is surprising if one recalls what the 2001 Göteborg 
European Council affirmed in its conclusions: the need for “agreed standards 
for selection, training and equipment of officials”.104 A roster at the EU level 
could enhance the quality of the personnel in ESDP operations, allowing 
experienced persons to participate in later missions. In this respect, there 
have been some recent developments that can improve the current situation. 
The Council has approved a new standard training concept that has the 
potential to increase interoperability among civilian officials from different 
member states.105 From this training concept, an EU Training Programme in 
the field of ESDP has recently been developed.106  
                                                      
103 Another aspect of contributions by non-member states remains problematic, 
however, relating to the fact that these states have a voice but not a vote 
concerning the decisions adopted. They can participate in a consultative body (the 
Committee of Contributors), but not in the Political and Security Committee 
meetings. This situation creates problems of accountability (see ICG, EU Crisis 
Response Capability Revisited, Europe Report No. 160, ICG, Brussels, 17 January 
2005(a), p. 33).  
104 Refer to Council of the European Union (2001), op. cit. 
105 Refer to ICG (2005a), op. cit., p. 31. 
106 For more on the EU Training Programme see the website of the Council of the 
European Union (retrieved from http://www.consilium.eu.int/ 
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3.7  Conclusions 
To a certain extent some of the pitfalls of this mission were owing to the 
fact that it was the EU’s first police mission, so the EU had to “learn by 
doing” the tasks of planning and implementing this kind of exercise.107 The 
‘first mission’ factor also introduced a degree of pressure on the 
operationalisation of the mission because from the planning to the 
implementation stage, “it had to be a success”.108 Problems with the 
planning, coordination and an ambiguous mandate can be explained in 
this way. The EU is still very much in the process of building its civilian 
crisis-management capabilities.  
In the case of the EUPM, there was a long lead-time to prepare the 
mission, but the EU will not always have so much time. Thus, the EU 
needs to streamline its structures and speed up its crisis management 
procedures to be able to respond in an effective manner to international 
crises. To overcome fragmentation at the decision-making level as well as 
on the ground, a holistic approach to crisis management is also required. 
As far as shortfalls in personnel and finance are concerned, the main 
difficulty in this respect has been the lack of strong commitment from the 
member states to provide the necessary resources to the EU civilian crisis-
management operations – although it is worth noting that these hindrances 
have also been experienced by other organisations such as the UN and 
OSCE. 
Other issues highlighted by EUPM officials were linked to the local 
context in which the mission had to operate. Challenges related to the 
fragmentation of the Bosnian police forces, ethnic tensions, corruption and 
a fragile economy affected the implementation of the mandate. 
Nevertheless, the EUPM operated in the same context as the IPTF had 
before it and better consideration should have been given to these issues 
when designing the EUPM, especially given that the first EUPM head of 
mission was the former IPTF commander.  
                                                      
107 Derived from an interview with an EUPM official in Sarajevo, 2005.  
108 “There is a kind of inevitability that the mission will be a success. Brussels will 
declare the mission as a success whatever happens because it is politically 
necessary for them to be a success. So everything we write, everything we do is 
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On the other hand, the planning and implementation of the EUPM 
provided the EU with a number of lessons that can be used for the 
improvement of its crisis management capabilities. Some of them have 
already been taken on board, such as the need for a more integrated 
approach in police missions, including rule of law components, enhanced 
coordination mechanisms with the EUSR’s structures and a better 
benchmarking system. Other lessons remain to be learnt, however, such as 
the need for better planning and management structures at the decision-
making level, clearer mandates and more inter-pillar coordination.  
Finally, when it comes to the build-up of the EU’s crisis management 
activities, ad hoc methods still prevail in the EU’s practices. Moreover, the 
EU has appeared unable to learn from other international organisations 
such as the UN and OSCE. For instance, although the Brahimi report (2001) 
identified some aspects to consider for future civilian crisis-management 
operations including the need for highly qualified personnel, integrated 
rule of law teams and efficient procurement systems, the EUPM, launched 
two years later, still suffered from all these problems.109 To some extent, 
this stems from the fact that the EU does not dispose of a 
developed/centralised lessons-learned system to process all the 
information gathered during the running of a mission. Some officials have 
pointed to the need for establishing mechanisms to compile the lessons 
learned from the planning and implementation of police operations to 
make them available for later exercises, along with a proper system 
enabling the exchange of the lessons learned between civilian and military 
missions. So far, however, the workload of the Council Secretariat and 
CIVCOM makes it impossible to take stock of previous missions and other 
international organisations’ experiences. As one EU official put it: “The 
papers are there, the lessons are available, but no one bothers to read them, 
because they are rushing from one mission to the next.”110 In sum, a better 
system for integrating the lessons learned is required if the EU wants to 
improve its still ‘fresh’ policing capabilities in order to play a distinctive 
role in crisis management. 
                                                      
109 See United Nations, Letters dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to 
the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, 
UN doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000. 
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4.  POLICE MISSION IN MACEDONIA 
ISABELLE IOANNIDES
∗ 
Abstract. The ‘lessons learned’ by the European Union in crisis management 
largely result from the EU’s considerable experience in the Western Balkans, which 
has helped it to develop its capabilities, institutions and instruments in the 
European Commission and the Council General Secretariat. A full range of civilian 
and military crisis-management tools, as well as development and humanitarian 
assistance, have been put into practice in support of the reconstruction of the 
Western Balkans, where the EU is now the lead international actor. This chapter 
concentrates on the implementation of EU efforts towards police reform in 
Macedonia, where the EU supports the peace process and seeks to bring the 
country closer to the EU. It provides an assessment of coherence at the operational 
level between intergovernmental and Community instruments, as well as 
cooperation between EU operations and other international actors active on the 
ground. It argues that while Commission projects for police reform and the 
Council’s EU Police Mission Proxima have brought some results, the biggest 
challenges hindering progress are ineffective EU cross-pillar and international 
coordination and the EU’s limited ability to learn from its experience in this field. 
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4.1  Introduction 
The EU claims to have drawn significant lessons from its lengthy Balkan 
experience in crisis management, as noted in the European security 
strategy. These in turn have helped the Union to develop a full range of 
civilian and military crisis-management capabilities, institutions and 
instruments in the European Commission and the Council General 
Secretariat. Along with development and humanitarian assistance, crisis 
management tools have been put into practice in support of the 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) in the Western Balkans, where 
the EU is now the lead international actor. The EU has been engaged in the 
management of crises and the reconstruction of the Western Balkans for 
more than a decade, and is the single largest donor to the region. Specific 
actions taken by the EU demonstrate that its wider strategy on the Western 
Balkans is to bring the countries of the region into the Union. These actions 
include the SAP, subsequent declarations (especially pledges made at the 
Thessaloniki summit in June 2003), the move of the Western Balkans 
portfolio from the Directorate-General for External Relations to the 
Directorate-General for Enlargement with the Barroso Commission, the 
opening of accession negotiations with Croatia and the granting of 
candidate country status to Macedonia. 
In the case of Macedonia, the expression of the EU’s continuing 
commitment to support the peace process in the country and to bring it 
closer to the Union is translated into the presence of both European 
Commission instruments and Council capabilities in reforming the 
Macedonian institutions. The Macedonian case is heralded by EU officials 
as its big success story in the Balkans and as having provided a useful 
testing ground for future efforts in crisis management, with police reform 
in the country being a particular area from which the EU holds that it has 
learned important lessons. For this reason, this chapter concentrates on EU 
efforts in police reform in Macedonia, where the EU has established a 
‘dual-track’ approach. In this context, the European Commission is 
responsible for the long-term police reform in the country, while the 
Council tackles ‘urgent needs’ in support of the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement that was signed at the end of the 2001 conflict. 
This chapter questions the success of the EU’s learning process. What 
are the lessons the EU has gathered from its use of the dual-track approach 
in reforming the Macedonian police? Has the EU been able to draw the 
right lessons? To answer these questions, the chapter sets out to assess the POLICE MISSION IN MACEDONIA | 83 
 
effectiveness of the implementation of the EU’s dual-track approach in 
Macedonia in police reform. It focuses on coherence at the operational level 
between intergovernmental and Community instruments as well as 
cooperation between the EU operations and other international actors 
active on the ground. The chapter argues that although the Commission’s 
projects in police reform and the Council’s police mission Proxima have 
had some positive results, the biggest obstacles hindering progress in EU 
efforts in police reform are ineffective EU cross-pillar and international 
coordination, as well as the EU’s limited ability to learn from its experience 
in the field. 
4.2  The EU’s dual-track approach 
EU peacebuilding efforts in Macedonia involve the co-existence and inter-
linking of short-term Council missions with long-term European 
Commission activities. Council efforts are undertaken within the 
framework of the EU-brokered Ohrid Framework Agreement signed on 13 
August 2001, which brought an end to several months of clashes in the 
northwest of the country between the Macedonian security forces 
(primarily composed of ethnic Macedonians) and the ethnic Albanian 
militia. The compromise between these two largest communities in 
Macedonia encompasses two important goals. On the one hand, the 
Framework Agreement has committed the signatories to introducing a 
number of constitutional amendments, legislative modifications and 
structural reforms designed to end inter-ethnic tensions and restore a stable 
political environment. On the other hand, it has explicitly paved the way 
for “the development of closer and more integrated relations [with] the 
Euro-Atlantic community”.1 In particular, Arts. 5.2 and 5.3 of Annex C of 
the Framework Agreement have established clear objectives and 
benchmarks, addressing the issue of inequitable representation of 
minorities in the police and the provision of technical assistance for 
structural changes in the public security institutions. Besides setting the 
framework for domestic reforms, the Framework Agreement has also 
provided the international community with a mandate to organise 
international assistance. Specifically, the OSCE, the EU and the United 
                                                      
1 The English version of the Ohrid Framework Agreement is available at 
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States are explicitly named as actors in the reform of the Macedonian police 
force. An EU special representative (EUSR) has been appointed to help 
ensure, inter alia, “the coherence of the EU external action” and “co-
ordination of the international community’s efforts”.2 
Reforms in Macedonia also encompass a long-term perspective in the 
context of European Commission activities. These are carried out under the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), emanating from the SAP, 
which the country signed on 9 April 2001.3 It should be remembered that 
along with conferring on Macedonia the status of a potential EU candidate, 
the SAA also incorporates the provisions agreed upon in the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement. Consequently, assistance has concentrated on the 
needs related to the overall implementation of the Framework Agreement, 
in order to favour the gradual integration of the country into EU structures. 
The stated objective of the SAA in justice and home affairs (JHA) is to help 
Macedonia develop institutions that function effectively at national and 
regional levels. Specifically, the EU seeks to assist Macedonia improve 
internal security by developing a capable, depoliticised, decentralised, 
community-based, multi-ethnic police service that is responsive to citizens’ 
needs, accountable to the rule of law and transparent. It also endeavours to 
support regional security by developing a functioning border control 
                                                      
2 See Council of the European Union, Joint Action 2002/963/CFSP of 10 December 
2002 amending and extending the mandate of the Special Representative of the 
E u r o p e a n  U n i o n  i n  t h e  f o r m e r  Y u g o s l a v  R e p u b l i c  o f  M a c e d o n i a ,  O J  L  3 3 4 / 7 ,  
11.12.2002, pp. 7–8. This post, created within the Policy Unit, allowed the EU’s high 
representative for the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) to be 
permanently represented in Skopje when he could not be there. See C. Piana, “The 
EU’s Decision-Making Process in the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The 
Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, European Foreign Affairs 
Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2002, pp. 209–26; see also U. Schneckener, Developing and 
Applying EU Crisis Management: Test Case Macedonia, ECMI Working Paper No. 14, 
European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg, January 2003 (retrieved from 
http://www.ecmi.de/doc/download/working_paper_14.pdf). 
3 The SAA focuses on the respect of international peace and stability, the 
development of better neighbourly relations, democratic principles and human 
rights, minority rights, international law principles and the rule of law, and 
includes provisions on cooperation in a wide range of fields, such as justice and 
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service and strengthening its ability to fight organised crime (illegal 
migration and the trafficking of humans, drugs and cars), processes already 
set in motion before the crisis. The reform process was further strengthened 
in June 2004 by the Council decision on the principles, priorities and 
conditions contained in the European Partnership for Macedonia, which 
identified short- and medium-term priorities for the country’s preparation 
for further integration with the Union. It was subsequently reinforced in 
December 2005 by the Council decision to grant candidate status to the 
country.4  
Hence, a complex framework was established for the implementation 
of EU assistance in Macedonia. On the one hand, the long-term perspective 
embodied in the SAP and the European Partnership is funded under the 
Community Assistance, Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation 
(CARDS) Regulation (EC No. 2666/2000) of the European Commission and 
is largely managed by the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) in 
Skopje. On the other hand, parallel short-term activities are ensured 
through the Council instruments supporting the Framework Agreement. 
By contributing to the full implementation of the Framework Agreement, 
the EUSR also supports the SAP, and therefore indirectly facilitates 
Macedonia’s progress towards European integration. This arrangement is 
how a dual-track approach was set up in Macedonia whereby Community 
and intergovernmental instruments are used in parallel.  
4.3  Assessing inter-pillar coherence 
The dual-track approach is also pursued in EU efforts to reform the 
Macedonian police. It entails the European Commission assisting long-term 
structural changes in the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the police in 
support of the country’s institutional development, in line with the SAP. 
Meanwhile, short-term crisis-management missions under the auspices of 
the European security and defence policy (ESDP), such as the now-
completed EU Police Mission (EUPOL) Proxima, tackle ‘urgent needs’ in 
support of the Framework Agreement. 
                                                      
4 In September 2004, a National Strategy for European Integration and draft Action 
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Coordinating the long-term perspective. The European Commission 
first became active in JHA reforms in Macedonia in 2000 through the 
provision of technical assistance to the Police Academy, equipment to the 
judicial sector and support to the police and customs administration under 
the EU’s PHARE programme. Its extended presence in the country and the 
region had provided the Commission with the necessary first-hand 
experience and knowledge to tackle reforms confidently.5 But it was only 
after the signature of the Framework Agreement in support of both the 
peace process and the implementation of the SAA that EU engagement in 
police reform in Macedonia substantially increased. 
Immediately after the 2001 crisis and until the beginning of 2002, the 
Commission made the first ever use of its Rapid Reaction Mechanism 
(RRM), providing €2 million to launch programmes on police reform, in 
addition to funds disbursed under the CARDS Emergency Assistance 
Programme.6 One of the most important initiatives funded under this 
scheme was the European Commission’s Justice and Home Affairs Mission 
to Macedonia (ECJHAT), which ran for 18 months beginning in March 2002 
and whose broad stated objective was to provide support to the 
Macedonian authorities in the development of reform strategies for the 
police and judicial sectors. In practice, this meant that experts from EU 
member states were seconded to the Macedonian MoI to assist in the 
development of key strategic documents for police reform and to set the 
direction of the current police reform activities. A direct consequence of 
these efforts was the formal adoption by the Macedonian government of 
the National Police Reform Strategy in February 2004, which was largely 
                                                      
5 During the pre-conflict period, the European Community had contributed to 
Macedonia a European Community Monitoring Mission and assistance under the 
Critical Aid Programme, PHARE and OBNOVA, as well as humanitarian 
assistance from ECHO to address the needs arising from the influx of more than 
300,000 refugees from Kosovo. See H.J. Hansen (ed.), The Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia: A Future with Europe, Directorate-General for External Relations, 
European Commission, Brussels, March 1999. 
6 See European Commission, Rapid Reaction Mechanism End of Programme Report, 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management 
Unit, Brussels, June 2004(b) (retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
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based on ECJHAT recommendations.7 The National Police Reform Action 
Plan, which followed in January 2004, identified the legislative and 
organisational measures needed in the police service for the 
implementation of the strategy and defined the MoI relationship with other 
relevant services and the public at large.8 The European Commission’s 
Police Reform Project (ECPRP), which took over from ECJHAT, consisted 
of a resident member-state advisory team deployed from June 2004 to 
September 2005 in the Macedonian MoI to guide the implementation of the 
police reform process in the MoI and its partner institutions (i.e. the Police 
Academy).9 Today, member-state advisory support for the implementation 
of the National Police Reform Strategy is carried out through a small-scale 
member-state twinning project, which was deployed in October 2005.10 
                                                      
7 This legislative framework still requires development, amendments where 
necessary, the adoption of new acts where appropriate and their implementation 
and consolidation thereafter. It is the development of these laws, bylaws, 
derivative regulations and operational procedures (e.g. rulebooks) that forms the 
basis of the irreversibility of the police reform process, which also ensures its 
independence from the political environment. 
8 The new structure of the MoI’s Directorate for Public Security comprises three 
pillars: Territorial Police Services (eight regional units), a Police Border Service 
(four regional units) and Central Police Services. Furthermore, some small 
advisory sectors are specified to advise the director and his cabinet on particular 
issues. The guiding principles of the reform process include decentralised and 
devolved management responsibility, task-oriented functions, transparency and 
public accountability, and separation of the executive from political functions. In 
addition, new ‘common function’ departments have been created under the 
reformed Central Police Services, e.g. the Departments for Specialised Units; 
Organised Crime, Forensic Science and IT & Telecommunications. 
9 This effort includes advisory support for the implementation of the Police Reform 
Strategy and the derivative Action Plan as well as the development of a national 
integrated border management strategy. See European Agency for Reconstruction 
(EAR), Modification to the Action Programme 2004 for the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, EAR, Skopje, 19 October, 2004(a), p. 1; see also EAR, Draft Action 
Programme 2004 for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, EAR, Skopje, 2004(b), 
p. 22; and also EAR, Annex: Annual Action Programme for 2005 for Community 
Assistance to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, EAR, Skopje, 2005. 
10 The twinning programme was exported to the CARDS programme, taking into 
account the experience of the EU accession countries and the methodology used in 
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Although considerable progress was achieved in reforming the 
legislative framework, the ECJHAT project raised a number of 
administrative complications, which were not resolved in subsequent 
Commission projects. First, European Commission efforts adopted the 
model of a ‘framework member state’, meaning that although the 
Commission’s expert teams deployed in Macedonia consisted of police 
experts from different member states, the project was tendered to one EU 
member state. In the case of the ECJHAT, for example, the project was 
implemented by the Direction Générale de la Gendarmerie Nationale 
(France). This set-up proved to be problematic. It was difficult for the 
implementing partner to provide logistical support and to mobilise 
expertise from other member states in a timely manner. This complication 
is why the launch of the ECJHAT project was delayed by several months. 
Despite these difficulties, the Commission used the same model for the 
ECPRP that followed, which was also funded by CARDS national 
assistance but was implemented by the Federal State of Brandenburg, and 
which also faced the same delays.  
Second, while CARDS financing was supposed to ensure a seamless 
follow-up to the RRM programme, the six-month limit on the duration of 
programmes allowed under the RRM Regulation (EC No. 381/2001), 
proved to be an arbitrary constraint on the design of police reform, which is 
by its nature a medium- to long-term challenge.11 The decision to open a 
permanent office of the EAR in Skopje in December 2001 was seen as a way 
of resolving this problem. It was based on the logic of bringing the 
programmes under a single, well-resourced, field-based presence to 
reinforce coherence among the different Community funding 
instruments.12 Accordingly, the EAR was responsible for the 
                                                                                                                                       
the PHARE programme, albeit in an adapted form to reflect the different levels of 
association of SAP countries with the EU. It supports and finances the secondment 
o f  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  f r o m  E U  m e m b e r  s t a t e s  t o  w o r k  a s  a d v i s e r s  t o  b e n e f i c i a r y  
institutions for a period of at least 12 months to help with the implementation of 
institution-building programmes. 
11 See European Commission, Rapid Reaction Mechanism End of Programme Report 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management 
Unit, Brussels, November 2003, p. 11. 
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implementation of the RRM programme and is now in charge of the follow-
up projects financed under CARDS. Yet, as numerous international officials 
based in Macedonia unofficially admit, the presence of the EAR has led to 
confusion over who designs and monitors Commission programmes, hence 
creating a power struggle between the European Commission Delegation 
in Skopje and the EAR. The Delegation has been particularly concerned 
about keeping political control over some of the more sensitive elements of 
the programmes (especially the police reform activities). 
The EAR was also supposed to be better equipped to deal with the 
huge backlog of funding that it had inherited from the Commission and 
which had been pending disbursement since the late 1990s. The good 
reputation that the EAR had developed through its reconstruction work in 
Serbia and Kosovo resulted in Brussels thinking that it would be able to 
ensure that monies were paid out at a faster pace.13 This issue was 
particularly important in September–October 2001, in the post-Ohrid 
environment, when the Commission decided that it would disburse an 
extra €26.5 million to Macedonia – first through the RRM and then through 
the CARDS programme. As MoI officials maintain, however, much-needed 
funds for national and regional initiatives in police reform are still 
disbursed with great delay, which results in poorly equipped police and 
obstructs the development of the MoI.14 Such initiatives include, among 
others, the CARDS funding to upgrade the Blace border crossing with 
Kosovo, the development of migration and asylum programmes, and 
supervision of the construction of a reception centre for asylum seekers in 
Dracevo. In addition are the efforts towards institutional capacity-building 
                                                      
13 The Commission had been slow in delivering aid and there was a huge backlog 
of €140 million from the PHARE programmes of 1997–2000 and the CARDS 
programme of 2001. 
14 By the end of 2003, the EAR had only disbursed approximately 49% of the €210.2 
million backlog committed by the Commission, which it had inherited when it was 
set up in January 2002. This amount was a substantially lower percentage 
compared with the disbursements made by the EAR in Kosovo, Montenegro and 
Serbia. See the Development Researcher’s Network Consortium, Evaluation of the 
Implementation of Council Regulation 2667/2000 on the European Agency for 
Reconstruction, Synthesis Report, Volume II, Part A and B – Historical Perspective and 
Summary of the Agency’s Functioning in Line with the Regulation, Rome and Brussels, 
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of the customs administration, the supply of communications equipment 
and the rehabilitation of the national Interpol office to help create a basis 
for regional cooperation.  
Slow Commission procedures and the lack of streamlined European 
Community policy instruments have also affected the pace of regional 
police reform. In order for the EU and the national authorities of countries 
in the Western Balkans to initiate a comprehensive reform programme for 
JHA institutions, as part of the CARDS regional programme15 the 
Commission undertook detailed evaluations of the current state of JHA 
sectors in the entire region in June 2002. Prior to JHA reforms being set in 
motion, the Army Border Brigade was responsible for border policing 
operations. In May 2004, the Police Border Service began a phased transfer 
of responsibility for border management from the Ministry of Defence to 
the MoI, scheduled for completion by December 2005. Although the 
National Strategy for Integrated Border Management (drafted with the 
assistance of CARDS funds and EU member-state experts) was adopted in 
December 2003, its practical implementation is lagging behind schedule. 
Beyond the cumbersome, bureaucratic Commission procedures, this delay 
has also been owing to the failure of the Macedonian government to adopt 
the Integrated Border Management Action Plan in a timely manner and to 
finalise the related Framework Law for Integrated Border Management.16 
An added complexity is the fact that EU assistance for a sector affecting 
regional policing, that of customs administration (as provided by the 
Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office to Macedonia or CAFAO-MAK), has 
not been delegated to the EAR, but rather is implemented centrally from 
Brussels through the EuropeAid Cooperation Office.  
Tackling short-term security concerns. EUPOL Proxima – named as 
such to suggest its proximity to the citizens – was launched by the Council 
on 15 December 2003 initially for a year and then extended for another year 
to 14 December 2005. It followed on from the EU’s first military mission, 
Operation Concordia, which had taken over from NATO to maintain a 
visible military presence and to support stability and confidence-building 
                                                      
15 Projects under this heading are primarily on asylum, immigration, visas, 
organised crime, money laundering and combating the drugs trade. 
16 See EAR (2005), op. cit.; see also European Commission, Guidelines for Integrated 
Border Management in the Western Balkans, final version, Brussels, 2004(d). POLICE MISSION IN MACEDONIA | 91 
 
in areas of potential ethnic tension, hence allowing the implementation of 
the Framework Agreement.17 Nonetheless, NATO and the EU were 
mindful of preventing Macedonia’s chronic dependency on foreign security 
forces. Moreover, EU assessments of security developments had concluded 
that an international military presence was no longer necessary, but that 
further steps were needed before the rule of law could be considered fully 
established in the former crisis areas.18 Despite European Community 
contributions to Macedonia through the RRM and CARDS programmes,19 
the political and security situation in Macedonia remained fragile. The 
proliferation of arms in private possession exacerbated security fears. 
Meanwhile, the new government coalition of the SDSM (Social Democratic 
Union) and the DUI (Democratic Union for Integration) was weak. In 
addition, territories in the ethnic Albanian-dominated areas remained 
beyond the control of law enforcement, with incidents such as the 
kidnapping of a police officer compromising public confidence in the 
police.20 Human rights organisations proclaimed that the Macedonian 
police remained largely unreformed, relying on outmoded tactics, 
                                                      
17 See Council of the European Union, Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP of 27 January 
2003 on the European Union military operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, OJ L 34/26, 11.02.2003(d).  
18 EU efforts in police reform are also supported by an EU Monitoring Mission, 
consisting of unarmed civilian observers, who monitor political and security 
developments, borders and inter-ethnic issues. Their reports are complemented by 
the SAP documents of the European Commission. See, for example, European 
Commission,  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Stabilisation and Association 
Report 2004, COM(2004) 204 final, Brussels, 30.03.2004(a). 
19 EU funding (including CARDS 2006) of approximately €14 million was invested 
in direct support of police reform, with a further €27 million invested in related 
actions. The figures presented exclude centrally managed support for the Customs 
Administration (the CAFAO-MAK project). 
20 See A. Matveeva et al., Macedonia: Guns, Policing and Ethnic Division, Saferworld 
and Bonn International Centre for Conversion, London and Bonn, 2003; and 
International Crisis Group (ICG), Macedonia: No Room for Complacency, Europe 
Report No. 149, ICG, Skopje and Brussels, 23 October 2003; see also B. Vankovska, 
Current Perspectives on Macedonia Part IV: Problems and Prospects of Security Sector 
Reform: Conflict Prevention and/or Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Macedonia, Heinrich 
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including ill-treatment and torture, which fuelled public mistrust while 
undercutting police effectiveness. At the same time, the Macedonian 
government wanted Concordia out, primarily because it considered the 
presence of any international peacekeeping force stigmatising. Eager to 
boost its chances for NATO and EU membership, it would only accept an 
EU police assistance mission and the existing OSCE mission. It was equally 
important to address the concerns of ethnic Albanians, who still favoured a 
visible security presence in the country: a uniformed police mission also 
met their expectations.21 
EUPOL Proxima was the second police mission falling under the 
ESDP, but unlike the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
which took over from the UN International Police Task Force, it was the 
first EU police mission to start from scratch, that is, from concept to a fully 
operational mission.22 The deployment of EUPOL Proxima, at the 
Macedonian authorities’ request, was preceded by a joint European 
Commission–Council General Secretariat fact-finding mission to assess the 
Macedonian police structures and understand the needs of the country. In 
an effort to learn from past missions and liaise with existing actors on the 
ground, the mission incorporated officers from the EUPM, informally 
consulted with Concordia, and sought the advice of the OSCE and bilateral 
actors. It was the first time a joint Commission–Council Secretariat fact-
finding mission had been carried out and constituted an important lesson 
for the EU.23 This approach was used again in 2004 when the EU planned 
                                                      
21 Ethnic Albanians had been unhappy with NATO’s decision to terminate 
Operation Allied Harmony and see ‘trustworthy’ forces being replaced by EU 
forces. NATO’s good reputation with the ethnic Albanians rested on the fact that it 
had already established relations with the UÇK (Albanian National Liberation 
Army) and had won their confidence. In addition, NATO had accumulated many 
years of experience in managing peace support operations in the Balkans and had 
benefited from a significant presence in Macedonia in the form of the Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) Rear. 
22 See B. D’Hooge, Speech given at the Medal Parade Ceremony, 12th October, 
EUPOL Proxima, Skopje, 2004, p. 1. 
23 In the past, joint fact-finding missions were conducted with the UN, for example 
in 2004 when investigating the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation in 
Burundi, or earlier in 2003 when planning the set-up of the EUPM in Bosnia–
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its Rule of Law Mission in Georgia (EUJUST Themis) and when assessing 
the possibility of sending a monitoring mission to the Ukrainian–Moldovan 
border (including the Transnistrian segment). The lesson was similarly 
applied in 2004 when the EU explored the possibilities of EU civilian crisis-
management activities for Iraq, and when considering an EU response in 
the field of security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo.24  
In line with the objectives of the Framework Agreement and the SAP, 
the mission aimed at promoting the gradual stabilisation of the country. 
Unlike the Commission, which acted at a strategic level through small 
teams co-located in the MoI, Proxima deployed approximately 200 EU 
police officers and civilian experts in the Macedonian MoI and in police 
stations at central, regional, sub-regional and local levels in the former 
crisis areas, where a majority of ethnic Albanians live. Their objective was 
to mentor, monitor and advise middle- and senior-management police 
officers. Their role thus meant that Proxima was more visible to the 
Macedonian public – it had a human face. Proxima personnel worked at an 
operational level, helping to improve police performance and internal 
communication in the MoI through the transfer of skills, and assisted the 
implementation of the National Police Strategy and the National Strategy 
for Integrated Border Management, both of which had been adopted by the 
Macedonian government.  
The short two-month planning period, however, did not allow the 
development of a well-defined mission statement. Proxima’s broad 
mandate covered support for the Macedonian authorities to consolidate 
law and order, including the fight against organised crime; to undertake 
the practical implementation of the reform of the MoI, police and border 
police; to build confidence with local populations; and to enhance 
cooperation with neighbouring countries.25 The mandate was translated 
into 28 programmes, a very ambitious load to handle during a one-year 
                                                                                                                                       
Herzegovina. Similar initiatives have been suggested to determine how the EU 
might support an expanded presence of the African Union in Darfur. 
24 See EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), EU Security and Defence: Core 
Documents 2004, Volume V, EUISS, Paris, February 2005. 
25 See Council of the European Union, Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 29 
September on the European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (EUPOL ‘Proxima’), OJ L 249, 01.10.2003(c), p. 66. 94 | EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS 
 
mission. These enveloped all the functions of the uniformed police, the 
criminal police, the Department for State Security and Counter-Intelligence, 
and internal control. In addition, a team of EU border police officers was 
deployed at the border crossing points and the international airports of 
Skopje and Ohrid to support the strengthening of regional cooperation.26 In 
line with Proxima’s mandate to work “within a broader rule of law 
perspective”, law enforcement monitors assisted the development of 
cooperation among all bodies in the criminal justice system (the police, the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office, investigative officers and the courts). To 
enhance public confidence in the police, they supported Proxima Internal 
Control co-locators in the investigation of police misconduct complaints 
and monitored the investigation carried out by the newly established 
Internal Control and Professional Standards Unit in the MoI and the 
conditions and treatment of detainees in police stations.27 
Proxima’s short planning phase also highlighted that force generation 
and procurement are not easier for the EU than for the UN or the OSCE: 
force generation for EU missions happens in an ad hoc manner across the 
member states and often leads to delays and shortfalls. In addition, it 
underscored yet again that the EU has no mechanisms for the rapid 
delivery of ESDP police resources. Indeed, Proxima had to cope with the 
fact that some of its field offices had not received computers or other 
essential office equipment three months after the launch of the mission. The 
lack of swift action has to do with the EU’s structural legacy, which 
institutionalises consultation, deliberation and negotiations at multiple 
levels and across institutions. The European Commission’s current rules for 
procurement are a particular problem, which apply to ESDP civilian crisis-
management missions.28 Furthermore, the inflexibility in recruitment in the 
                                                      
26 See T. Flessenkemper, Proxima Presentation Brochure 2004, EUPOL Proxima, 
Council of the European Union, Brussels, May 2004, p. 10. 
27 See Council of the European Union, EUPOL Proxima, “Internal Control/Law 
Enforcement Monitoring Programme”, Factsheet, EUPOL Proxima, Brussels, June 
2004(a); see also Flessenkemper (2004), op. cit., p. 14. 
28 Little progress has been made in reforming these cumbersome and inflexible 
procedures. Proposals to learn from the UN and the OSCE by creating start-up kits 
consisting of pre-stocked items needed for mission launches and start-up funds 
that can be rapidly released to pay for essential procurements on the ground have 
not yet been implemented. See M. Merlingen and R. Ostrauskaite, “ESDP Police 
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member states led to a high turnover rate, meaning that precious relations 
built with the local police in this ‘consultancy-like’ mission had to be re-
built from scratch. As a Proxima police officer explained, personal 
relationships created with local staff in the Macedonian MoI are the only 
way to receive reliable information.29 Proxima, set up at the Macedonian 
government’s request, faced a different set of problems from executive 
policing missions, such as in Kosovo, where member states have more 
experience. EU police officers with a professional background sometimes 
felt frustrated that they could not prevent an operation from failing because 
the absence of an executive mandate constrained them from intervening or 
offering advice during the conduct of the operation.30  
In response to the results of the mid-term review (June 2004), the 
mission (during the extension of its mandate) was adjusted to focus more 
on urgent operational needs, where EU police officers could have “a 
significant impact”.31 The number of staff and programmes was reduced to 
cover public peace and order, organised crime and border police. Yet the 
main changes were in the organisation and structure of Proxima to modify 
the way it engaged in the areas in which it was active. To a great extent, the 
actual issues that the mission dealt with were the same – apart from the 
programme on traffic police, which had ended. During the first year of its 
existence, however, Proxima had been unable to tackle the more 
demanding facets of its mandate, namely organised crime. This was mainly 
attributable the fact that the mission worked only during office hours, that 
is, Monday to Friday from 9 am to 5 pm, while such activities 
predominately take place at night. Indeed, Proxima police officers 
recognised that the teams deployed at regional, sub-regional and local 
                                                                                                                                       
Missions: Meaning, Context and Operational Challenges”, European Foreign Affairs 
Review, Vol. 10, 2005, p. 225. 
29 Derived from interviews with a Proxima police officer, in Skopje, June 2004. 
30 Derived from interviews with Proxima police officers, in Tetovo and Kumanovo, 
June–July 2004. 
31 See J. Scholz, Speech given at the European Affairs Commission of Parliament on 
31 January, EUPOL Proxima, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 31 January 
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levels should have operated on a 24/7 basis.32 Simultaneously, Proxima 
expanded its geographical coverage to a countrywide deployment, 
although retaining a greater presence in the former crisis area. Thus, while 
Council missions proved to be more receptive to change and more 
adaptable than Commission exercises, adjustments were made primarily on 
the form of the mission rather than on the substance.  
In order to fulfil the programmes’ objectives, result-based activities 
tied to a specific timeframe were developed and were monitored on a 
weekly basis. This benchmarking system, created by Proxima’s team in the 
Analysis Cell during the extension of Proxima’s mandate, was not founded 
on the benchmarking mechanism used by the EUPM in Bosnia–
Herzegovina, which had been highly criticised. Unlike the first year of 
Proxima’s mandate when activities in the field offices were organised on an 
ad hoc basis in agreement with the chiefs of police in the local police 
stations, this newly established system resulted in extending the mission to 
tackle very specific projects, which had been endorsed ex ante at a strategic 
level by the MoI. The benchmarking document, approved by the MoI prior 
to launching the extension of the mission, constituted a political tool that 
ensured the implementation of reforms. Consequently, it was essential in 
dealing with resistance to change on the part of the local police, especially 
among the older generation, who were a great impediment to Proxima’s 
work. It also contributed to the evaluation of the mission, although it is a 
mechanism whose benefits are limited to assessing whether an activity is 
achieved, and is not able to verify the quality attained. According to certain 
circles in the Council General Secretariat, Proxima’s experience with 
benchmarking – setting clear project aims, milestones and a timeframe for 
what needs to be achieved – could feed into the development of a generic 
benchmarking model and a formal channel for the improved internal 
exchange of information in future crisis-management missions.33 
EU inter-institutional coherence: A persistent puzzle. The complex 
post-conflict environment in which EU activities in support of the 
continuing police reform process in Macedonia have been launched have 
                                                      
32 Derived from interviews with Proxima police officers, in Tetovo and Skopje, June 
2004. 
33 Derived from interviews with officials of the Council General Secretariat in 
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provided the Commission’s projects and Proxima with challenges and 
opportunities. They faced the challenge of having to find out where and 
how they best complement each other, as well as how to coordinate their 
efforts successfully. In doing so, during its mission Proxima had the 
opportunity to draw upon the Commission’s experience and presence. 
A very elaborate set-up sought to ensure that the coordination of EU 
efforts in police reform in Macedonia would be effective. Political 
coordination among the EU institutions took place at weekly informal 
meetings, led by the EUSR, bringing together the EU presidency and the 
heads of the Commission Delegation, the EAR, the now-terminated 
Proxima and the EU Monitoring Mission office in Skopje. When issues 
related to police reform were discussed, the ECJHAT (later ECPRP) 
coordinator was also invited. In this way, contacts with the Macedonian 
government relating to EU police efforts were synchronised and agreed 
upon by all the EU actors concerned.34 At an operational level, the EUSR 
was mandated with providing local political guidance to the police head of 
mission, while the head of mission/police commissioner led Proxima and 
assumed its day-to-day management. In addition, to ensure coherence in 
the EU approach, the EUSR’s political adviser provided the Proxima head 
of mission with advice on political affairs in Macedonia and assisted in 
defining the mission’s strategic approach.35 A common media strategy and 
a shared press office for the EUSR and Proxima aimed at presenting a 
single political face to the Macedonian public.36 
Despite this comprehensive organisation, EU inter-institutional 
coordination on the ground suffered greatly because of competition among 
the EU missions. This situation led to an acrimonious relationship among 
the different parties. A recent evaluation of the EAR posits that the Agency 
model is experiencing difficulties in Macedonia because of an “unclear 
interpretation of the division of roles and difficult coordination between the 
Agency, on the one hand, and the Commission and the Delegation on the 
                                                      
34 See Council of the European Union, Coordination Aspects of Proxima, 
13532/1/03 REV 1, COSDP 590, Brussels, 16.10.2003(b), p. 3. 
35 Refer to T. Flessenkemper (2004), op. cit., p. 7. 
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other hand”.37 The transfer of institution-building projects from the 
European Commission Delegation to the EAR, including the ECJHAT 
project (thereby taking away from the Delegation’s responsibilities), is a 
point of contention. It not only resulted in the reduction of the number of 
staff in the Delegation, but it inevitably meant a decrease in its influence. 
The same evaluation argues that the situation was made even more 
complex through the EUSR’s presence. In fact, it was well known in 
Brussels and among international actors in Skopje that in the period 2001–
05 the head of the European Commission Delegation and the EUSR did not 
speak to each other.38 It was not until 1 November 2005 that these two 
positions were combined with a double-hatting arrangement. Although in 
principle the rivalry is in Brussels, it trickles down to the field. The 
European Commission fears that it will lose its competencies in external 
relations to the emergence of a reinforced Council General Secretariat, 
which is trying to find its place in the institutional game.39 Beyond doubt, 
the Council sets the ideational tone and regards the Commission as 
primarily a technical partner. The difficulties faced by the European 
Commission in recruiting police officers for its missions, stemming from 
the fact that member states prefer seconding their police officers to Council 
police missions over which they have control, adds fuel to the fire.40 It also 
points to unease about the way the Commission recruits experts, that is, 
outsourcing the task to third parties, since it is felt that the process 
somehow slips out of control and close surveillance.  
In practice, the rivalry within the Commission and between the 
Commission and the Council led to the European Community’s advisory 
support for police reform – the ECJHAT and ECPRP – being launched late 
                                                      
37 See Development Researcher’s Network Consortium, Evaluation of the 
Implementation of Council Regulation 2667/2000 on the European Agency for 
Reconstruction, Synthesis Report, Volume I – Part C, Main Evaluation Report, Rome 
and Brussels, June 2004(a), p. 57. 
38 The permanent Delegation of the European Commission in Skopje was opened 
in February 2000. 
39 Refer to Piana (2002), op. cit., p. 221. 
40 Derived from interviews with personnel from the Directorate-General for 
External Relations, European Commission and the Council General Secretariat in 
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and the substantive work of Proxima being delayed. In particular, the 
follow-up on the ECJHAT project only effectively took off in Skopje almost 
six months into Proxima’s mission. Former Head of Mission Bart 
D’Hooge’s statement on the six-month review of the mission, “the first 
three months of Proxima were the build-up phase…the assessment phase, 
where we did in-depth assessments of the MoI, both at the field and central 
level”, highlights the consequences of poor coordination in the dual-track 
approach.41 Evaluations of the state of the police institutions in Macedonia 
had been conducted by many actors and on many occasions. For example, 
the work of the ECJHAT constituted in many ways a detailed assessment of 
the police and the MoI in Macedonia, in addition of course to the 
evaluations conducted under the CARDS regional programme. 
4.4  Evaluating ‘effective multilateralism’ 
As is commonplace in peace-support operations, the EU’s presence in 
Macedonia exists alongside that of other international organisations and 
bilateral actors (Table 4.1). Both the Council and the Commission recognise 
the significance of an effective relationship of interdependence with other 
international actors in the field based on sound coordination to ensure 
coherence in police reform efforts. As the EUPOL Proxima’s mandate 
stipulated, the success of both the initial mandate and its extension 
depended to a large degree on its ability to work “in strong partnership 
with the relevant authorities, in full coordination and complementarity 
with Community institution-building as well as OSCE and bilateral 
programmes”.42 Similarly, the CARDS JHA strategy emphasised that it 
would “be implemented through the transfer of expertise, knowledge and 
professional working practices from member states to the partner 
                                                      
41 See Council of the European Union, EUPOL Proxima, Press Statement by the 
Proxima Head of Mission on the Six-Month Review, EUPOL Proxima, Skopje, 4 
August 2004(b). 
42 See Council of the European Union, Joint Action 2004/789/CFSP of 22 
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former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA), OJ L 348, Vol. 47, 
22.11.2004, pp. 40–44; see also Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP (Council of the 
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countries, working closely [with] other international bodies, to ensure 
streamlined and effective regional co-operation”.43 
Table 4.1 Major international efforts in police transformation in Macedonia 
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An overcrowded international scene. International actors, namely the 
OSCE (since 1992) and the UN (1993–99), had been present in Macedonia 
since the country’s independence in 1992 to monitor the borders and 
policing activities on the border with Kosovo. The actual reform of the 
police, however, began in 2000 through a law-enforcement development 
                                                      
43 See European Commission, “EU Justice and Home Affairs Policy and the 
Western Balkans”, Paper prepared for the “Second Regional Conference for South 
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programme of the US International Criminal Investigative Training 
Assistance Programme (ICITAP), which included technical assistance and 
‘train the trainers’ programmes. The ICITAP also carried out the initial 
training of mostly ethnic Albanian police cadets after the signature of the 
Framework Agreement to meet the equitable representation quota for 
minorities in the police forces. Once these efforts were taken over by the 
OSCE, ICITAP helped to establish the police Professional Standards Unit in 
the MoI. The ICITAP is currently involved in training efforts aimed at 
community policing and MoI officials on measures for tackling organised 
crime.  
Immediately following the signature of the Framework Agreement, 
the OSCE moved beyond police monitoring to engage in the restructuring 
of the Macedonian police force. In August 2001, it established a Police 
Development Unit in the OSCE Spillover Mission in Skopje (with the 
contribution of the EU Police Unit in Brussels and the US administration), 
which trained police cadets taking over from the ICITAP and until 2002 
concentrated on the redeployment of the police to the former crisis areas.44 
In many ways, these initial steps in police reform were mechanical, 
with the international community intending to meet quantified goals 
within a specific timeframe.45 A l t h o u g h  d e a d l i n e s  a g r e e d  u p o n  i n  t h e  
Framework Agreement regarding training police cadets and redeploying 
the police in the former crisis areas were met, which is commendable, they 
were met with serious shortcomings: first, in the quality of the training 
                                                      
44 There were also a number of small-scale initiatives in police training 
implemented during 2001, including the “Stability Pact Regional Police Training 
Initiative” implemented by Norway, Finland and Germany, and the Norwegian 
initiative “Training of local police units and local communities in the field of crisis 
management”. 
45 During the first three police training courses held in 2002, 526 students were 
trained, of which 439 were men and 87 were women. In terms of ethnicity, 63% 
were Albanians, 19% were Macedonians, 6% were Roma and 7% Turks. The fourth 
police-training course launched in February 2003 at the Police Academy in 
Idrizovo included 309 students, of which nearly 69% were ethnic Albanian, while 
16% were ethnic Macedonian. See Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), “Chapter 7: Facts and Figures”, in Police Development Unit Annual 
Report 2002, OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, 2002(c), pp. 80–82. 102 | EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS 
 
provided; and second, in the degree of redeployment of the police.46 
Specifically, when the training of local police was transferred from the 
ICITAP to the OSCE to make certain that ‘European standards’ in policing 
were met, much of the training had to be repeated, condensed (from nine to 
six months) and rushed. There were also problems with the training of the 
border police (consisting of former military personnel): although they only 
received border police training, they were able to move to other divisions 
of the police service.47 In addition, the recruitment process for cadets was 
politicised with ethnic Albanian parties succeeding in pushing forward 
their candidates under the watchful eye of the international community.  
Once the Macedonian police had redeployed to the former crisis areas 
(in the northern and western parts of the country), the OSCE consolidated 
its activities to focus on community-based policing and training. 
Accordingly, it has facilitated the creation of Community Advisory Groups 
in the former crisis areas (initially with funding from the Dutch embassy in 
Skopje), which regularly bring together the local police and community 
actors to discuss matters related to day-to-day safety. It has also supported 
the creation of local capacity in the Police Academy, through ‘train the 
trainers’ courses and provides specialised and advanced training for police 
officers (with cadets’ training having since been transferred to local 
trainers). In addition, the OSCE has financed numerous information and 
awareness campaigns on human trafficking, the office of the Ombudsman 
and confidence-building campaigns between the police and the different 
minority groups in Macedonia and has organised Community Policing 
Open Days.48 
                                                      
46 The police did not redeploy in all the former crisis areas. Rather, police cars 
would wait 200–400 metres outside the villages in the Tetovo area so that the 
villagers had to go and place their complaint. This setting was neither conducive to 
the promotion of inter-ethnic relations in the village, nor to the creation of a 
constructive relationship between the villagers and the police officers. Derived 
from a confidential interview with an international police officer, in Skopje, 22 June 
2004. 
47 Ibid. 
48 See the OSCE project reports of 2004 and 2005 – OSCE Spotlight on Projects, OSCE 
Spillover Mission to Skopje, Nos. 1-4, 2004(a-c) and 2005(d). POLICE MISSION IN MACEDONIA | 103 
 
Some EU member states have participated in police efforts in 
Macedonia on a bilateral basis, albeit on a limited budget and at an 
operational level, in parallel with EU-level involvement in this field. France 
has supported the organisational and operational development of the 
Police Special Tasks Unit and provided training for uniformed police, riot 
control and criminal investigation. The UK has provided intelligence-
related training to the Human Trafficking and People Smuggling Unit of 
the MoI. The UK has also been assisting the development of a criminal 
intelligence capability and a Rapid Deployment Unit, and has offered 
training in community policing.49 The Dutch government has provided 
funding for awareness campaigns on community policing and has 
supported the strategic development of the Police Academy, as well as 
targeted training for senior police officers. Finally, Italy has heavily 
invested in border policing. These efforts have been regarded as 
complementing the European Community’s work taking place at the 
strategic level and as providing a particular added expertise. Yet several 
Proxima police officers interviewed in the course of this study questioned 
the necessity of the programmes. This tension has also been acknowledged 
in Brussels in Commission communications calling for better coordination 
and increased exchange of information between EU efforts and EU 
member-state activities, “not just on assistance already being provided by 
member states but also on what is being planned in order to avoid 
duplication”.50 
The proliferation of actors involved in the reform of national 
Macedonian police forces has been mirrored at the regional level. Since the 
late 1990s, Macedonia has benefited from funding and training on 
combating organised crime (including the fight against human trafficking 
and the drug trade along with issues associated with visas, immigration 
and asylum) and on police cooperation, which has been made available at a 
regional level to all the countries of the Western Balkans. A whole host of 
programmes have been financed and implemented by the Council of 
                                                      
49 Non-EU member states have also been active in this area, notably Norway, 
which contributed to regional police activities (police training and funds for the 
border police). 
50 See, for example, European Commission, European Security Strategy: Fight against 
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Europe51 and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, to develop a 
‘shared strategy’ for growth, stability and inter-ethnic harmony in the 
Western Balkans, and to link security interests and promote regional 
integration. Specifically, regional police efforts have endeavoured to 
harmonise police institutions in the region and ensure that policies, laws 
and practices in policing develop in a parallel way in all the countries of the 
region. These objectives have increasingly become a political priority for 
the EU. European Community programmes are complemented by regional 
networking and the exchange of information, aimed at defining common 
standards and at building effective regional coordination in areas such as 
the issuing of visas, border controls and police cooperation.52 Naturally, 
regional programmes entail a great deal of EU cooperation with other 
international actors, for example with the Council of Europe, whereby the 
two organisations increasingly develop and implement regional strategies 
against serious forms of crime based on European best practices in 
policing.53  
                                                      
51 Octopus II is a joint programme of the European Commission and the Council of 
Europe against corruption and organised crime in states in transition. The first 
phase of Octopus II (1996–98) analysed problems related to organised crime and 
corruption, as well as the measures taken by governments, resulting in a first set of 
recommendations for each country. It included seminars and study visits during 
which participants from programme countries formulated recommendations to 
improve the policies, legislation, institutions, standards and practices in their 
respective countries. It was followed by a second phase of Octopus II, which had a 
lifespan of two years (February 1999 to December 2000). In 2001, regional 
programmes, such as the Council of Europe’s Programme against Corruption and 
Organised Crime in South Eastern Europe (PACO) sought to make the channels of 
police and judicial cooperation more efficient. That same year, the PACO 
Networking project was launched to further this aim.  
52 These activities complement other Community projects in the broader area of the 
fight against organised crime, in particular the interventions related to police 
reform (funded under the CARDS programme for 2001–04). 
53 Together they undertake the following activities: provide tools for dealing with 
and developing national strategies on economic and organised crime; deliver 
training against human trafficking, smuggling and illegal migration; harmonise 
legislation; organise study visits to assist the development of special crime 
investigative means and intelligence in line with human rights standards; assist the 
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In an effort to build local capacity and prepare the ground for their 
exit, international donors have also financed local non-governmental 
organisations for the purpose of training the police and civil servants in 
human rights and minority issues, providing legal advice to citizens on 
police misconduct, monitoring the respect of human rights and lobbying 
the Macedonian government on legislative issues. Thus, besides targeting 
government structures, support has been directed at the development of 
grassroots efforts and an active civil society, albeit to a limited degree. These 
programmes have either fallen under the rule of law projects of the OSCE 
or the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights managed by 
the European Commission Delegation (now the EU Mission). 
Working in a multilateral environment.  Beyond the framework 
provided for managing EU inter-institutional coordination, regular 
meetings of the heads of the main international actors in Macedonia – the 
so-called ‘principals’ – are chaired by the EUSR and aim at ensuring overall 
political coordination within the international community. In addition, a 
formal mechanism for coordination in the field of police, the Police Experts 
Group, was created. Chaired by the police adviser of the EUSR, it regularly 
brought together the EUPOL head of mission and the ECJHAT/ECPRP 
coordinator, the European Commission Delegation, the EAR, EU member 
states, the OSCE, ICITAP and other international actors actively engaged in 
supporting the transformation of the Macedonian police. To promote a 
broader approach to the rule of law, international actors involved in 
supporting the judicial and the penal systems were also associated with 
this group.54 Interestingly enough, these meetings only included 
international actors involved in the national police reform efforts and not 
regional ones. 
International actors who participated in the Police Experts Group 
agree that the forum was inefficient in coordinating efforts, because of the 
formality of the event, which led actors to defend their mandates. EUPOL 
Proxima’s presence and mandate was constantly questioned by other 
international actors because the mission was the last one to arrive in an 
already very crowded scene with competing international mandates. This 
                                                                                                                                       
development of witness protection programmes; and strengthen capacities for 
cooperation in criminal matters. 
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suspicion was further aggravated by Proxima’s weak exit strategy: the 
decision to terminate the mission in December 2005 was largely 
predetermined for political reasons, namely the Macedonian government’s 
perception that the presence of a crisis management mission in the country 
could jeopardise Macedonia’s chances of a positive avis from the European 
Commission on its prospects for EU membership.55 The post of police 
adviser was not renewed beyond July 2004, but coordination of 
international police efforts was instead moved to the European 
Commission Delegation/EU Mission, where an expert on JHA issues was 
to be recruited. This development perhaps points to the Council’s tacit 
acceptance that police reform is a long-term process and thus it must be led 
by the Commission. It is nevertheless a clear indication that Macedonia is 
moving away from stabilisation and towards integration. Similar problems 
to those that the ECJHAT project met led to delays in recruiting a JHA 
expert in the EU Mission; hence, until recently police coordination occurred 
on an ad hoc basis. 
What one notes about the coordination of police reform efforts is that 
informal contacts and bilateral meetings help build vital relationships of 
trust among the different actors and therefore override the weight of formal 
channels. As international actors admit, however, maintaining such 
contacts is time-consuming, especially given the high turnover in the 
international community in Macedonia. Proxima heralded its 
benchmarking plan as a possible solution, since it was the outcome of 
consultation with all the relevant international actors and required the 
approval of the MoI. Proxima officials explained that, as a result, active 
coordination became less important.56 
The quest of international donors to justify their mandates has 
translated into a lack of exchange of information on the efforts underway, 
                                                      
55 On 1 April 2004, the SAA between the European Union and Macedonia entered 
into force, the first among such agreements with the countries of the region. This 
step also gave Macedonia the green light for submitting its application for 
membership. The country provided its answers to the Commission’s questionnaire 
(in February 2005) and received the Commission’s positive avis on the granting of 
candidate country status (in December 2005). 
56 Derived from an interview with an official of the Analysis Cell of EUPOL 
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which has led to programmes and initiatives being duplicated. This 
consequence has been particularly true for regional programmes in police 
cooperation and integrated border management, including projects to deal 
with organised crime, the drug trade, human trafficking, immigration and 
asylum. In addition, regional initiatives seem to be self-contained and do 
not build on other international efforts. The Council of Europe, for 
example, carried out numerous ‘end of programme’ evaluations in the 
1990s pointing out the shortcomings of the MoI, which were identified yet 
again by Proxima and the European Commission’s projects.57 These ‘turf 
wars’ have also led to a lot of time being lost and resources being wasted, 
while much-needed training in other areas has not been undertaken. 
Proxima law enforcement officers explained that there has been much 
overlap in the monitoring of the legal process with the OSCE, but that no 
one is providing training to the armed court guards.58 
Tension between the OSCE and Proxima was inevitable, given that 
both missions were ‘hands on’, visible among the Macedonian population 
and to a large extent dependent on Macedonian perceptions of their work. 
The increasing sidelining of the OSCE to the benefit of EU missions, owing 
to the growing importance of EU membership prospects for Macedonia for 
encouraging the reform process, constituted a headache for the OSCE. 
OSCE police officers, who unlike personnel involved in Proxima and the 
Commission projects, have been present in Macedonia for years and have a 
better sense of reality on the ground. The OSCE police officers felt that they 
had been marginalised by EU efforts and that the numerous EU operations 
and activities had not tried to benefit from their understanding of the local 
context and challenges. Proxima’s involvement in community policing 
                                                      
57 See for example, Council of Europe, First Evaluation Round, Evaluation Report on 
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Greco Eval I Rep (2002) 7E final, 
adopted by GRECO at its 12th Plenary Meeting held in Strasbourg on 9–13 
December, Directorate-General I – Legal Affairs, Department of Crime Problems, 
Strasbourg, December 2002; see also Council of Europe, First Evaluation Round, 
Compliance Report on “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Greco RC-I (2004) 
15E, adopted by GRECO at its 21st Plenary Meeting held in Strasbourg on 29 
November–2 December, Directorate-General I – Legal Affairs, Department of 
Crime Problems, Strasbourg, December 2004. 
58 Derived from an interview with a Proxima law enforcement officer, in 
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efforts was a constant subject of contention in discussions with OSCE police 
officers.59 O n e  o f  t h e  r e a s o n s  t h e  E U  p o l i c e  m i s s i o n  h a d  l a u n c h e d  a  
programme on community policing and supported the Community 
Advisory Groups, originally an OSCE programme, was the EU’s 
expectations that the OSCE’s exit was due at the end of 2004. Yet what 
actually happened was that Proxima left Macedonia, handing over its work 
on community policing back to the OSCE, rather than the other way 
around. In addition, Proxima’s broad mandate increased the risk of the 
mission being perceived as overstepping into other organisations’ 
competencies. Such power struggles have been the norm among actors 
with operational mandates on police reform. Relations between the EU 
member-state activities and Proxima were also stressed, with Proxima 
police officers complaining about the duplication of efforts and the lack of 
transparency in bilateral exercises, and labelling these efforts as 
“superfluous”.60 
Difficulties in international coordination hindering the effectiveness 
of police reform were also present between the OSCE, on the one hand, and 
the EAR and the European Commission Delegation on the other. The police 
reform process had initially been led by the OSCE, but was moved to the 
European Commission with the launch of the ECJHAT project. In order to 
enhance cooperation between the two teams, a Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed between the Commission and the OSCE in 
February 2002, which effectively meant that the ECJHAT and the OSCE 
would be working together on the long-term structural reform of the police 
in Macedonia.61 In practice, two EU experts were seconded to the OSCE 
mission in Skopje and a small European Community financial contribution 
was made to the OSCE. Still, as the Commission evaluation report of the 
RRM acknowledges, 
While this collaboration was judged satisfactory by EAR monitors 
during the six months of financing under the RRM, it has 
                                                      
59 Derived from interviews with OSCE police officers in Skopje, Kumanovo and 
Tetovo, in the summers of 2004 and 2005. 
60 Derived from interviews with EUPOL Proxima police officers in Skopje, June-
July 2004. 
61 See OSCE, “Chapter 4: Police Reform Programs”, in Police Development Unit 
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subsequently proved difficult to build upon this initial co-operation. 
The inherent difficulties in co-ordinating policy-inputs from different 
international actors have on occasion weakened the effectiveness of 
efforts to make progress in the reforms, and have provided some 
measure of political cover to the Ministry of the Interior in delaying 
important decisions.62 
The biggest challenge today in activities on police transformation in 
Macedonia, as MoI officials recognise, is linking national and regional 
initiatives. The proliferation of actors and programmes involved in the 
projects, training and the production of manuals on the fight against 
human trafficking as well as on visa, asylum and migration issues co-exist 
but are not necessarily connected to the police reforms underway at the 
national level. These initiatives, which are not usually based on needs 
assessment studies, not only involve the MoI, but also the ministries of 
justice, foreign affairs, health and science, to name a few.63 In the case of 
Proxima, while international donors expected that the mission’s activities 
would be limited to ‘on-the-job training’, Proxima also organised country-
wide workshops for police officers working at border crossing points, 
providing them with training on the detection of forged travel documents. 
The mission was also involved in workshops for Macedonian police officers 
on laws related to organised crime and training on working methods in 
accordance with European standards. Moreover, Proxima increasingly 
worked in the fight against organised crime, resulting in the publication of 
two handbooks for forensic police inspectors in the field. As a result, some 
international donors perceived the mission as going beyond capacity-
building (an ESDP prerogative) and moving closer towards institution-
building (a Commission competency). Such fears further compromised 
cooperation among international actors in Macedonia. 
Ultimately, a great responsibility for ensuring that overlap does not 
happen and that the police work is carried out effectively rests in the hands 
of the Macedonian MoI and national authorities. This view seems to be the 
EU official line on coordination. After all, an Aid Coordination Unit was 
created in the Secretariat for European Integration, and, as a part of the 
                                                      
62 See European Commission (2003), op. cit., p. 11. 
63 For example, nine different ministries are involved in National Strategy for 
Integrated Border Management and six ministries in the fight against human 
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national system for the coordination of foreign assistance, it supports the 
national aid coordinator. In addition, the MoI established the Police Reform 
Working Group and the Strategic Steering Group in April 2002. At first, the 
Police Reform Working Group comprised 10 full-time police and ministry 
officials seconded from their normal service functions, and was (and 
remains) the primary driving force behind the police reform process. To 
coincide with the deployment of the member-state twinning project in 
October 2005, the Police Reform Working Group was restructured and 
boosted to 15 permanent members. Under the guidance of the Strategic 
Steering Group (currently chaired by the minister), the Police Reform 
Working Group has institutional ownership of and responsibility for the 
overall direction and implementation of the police reform. Yet, the low 
absorption capacity of the MoI, which is often overwhelmed with technical 
assistance offered by various donors, is a big constraint to programme 
planning and implementation in Macedonia. Such constraints also reduce 
the propensity for local ownership and the sustainability of projects.64 The 
MoI admits that at the beginning of the reform process it was unsuccessful 
in coordinating international efforts, but has since created a matrix of all 
the donors present in Macedonia, the benefits of each mission and a 
timeframe of the aid granted, therefore prioritising partners.65  
Some scholars, however, most notably David Chandler,66 argue that 
desolate post-conflict states are in a poor position to resist international 
mechanisms of regulation, which come replete with carrots of international 
aid, trade privileges, debt forgiveness and/or integration into international 
organisations in return for external support for governance reforms and 
institutional capacity-building. In view of such arrangements, the 
‘negotiation power’ of the Macedonian authorities is seriously constrained: 
given their wish to integrate into the EU, the Macedonian authorities know 
they must play the game, ‘obey’ the international community and keep 
doors open by accepting funding for overlapping activities. ‘Conditionality’ 
                                                      
64 See EAR (2005), op. cit., p. 25. 
65 Derived from an interview with an official of the Ministry of Interior, in Skopje, 
June 2005. 
66 See D. Chandler, “International State-Building: Beyond Conditionality, Beyond 
Sovereignty”, Paper prepared for the “Guest Seminar”, Royal Institute for 
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thus compromises to a certain extent Macedonian sovereignty. Rather, the 
leverage that the Macedonian government uses to advance its positions is 
to play the different international actors against each other in an effort to 
extract from them the maximum amount of funds. In addition, since the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement explicitly mandates that coordination of 
international activities by the international community be managed under 
the leadership of the EUSR, it is fair to say that the EU has its own share of 
responsibility in the coordination of police reform activities in Macedonia.  
4.5  Perceptions of EU police reform activities 
The “maximum transparency and information-sharing” between the 
European Commission and Council “in order to ensure that they are 
mutually reinforcing and achieve the greatest possible joint impact and 
effectiveness” as promised in Council declarations was not achieved in the 
eyes of the Macedonians.67 On the contrary, what became transparent to 
both the Macedonian political elite and the population is that EU inter-
institutional relations are strained.68 The ‘turf wars’ that seemed to be 
fought between the EUSR and the European Commission Delegation 
generated some confusion in the eyes of the Macedonian authorities as to 
who was in charge. The perceived divergence in goals and contradictions 
of purpose between the European Commission and the Council have not 
only been detrimental to the EU’s image, but have also compromised EU 
police reform efforts. Proxima police officers privately confessed that such 
infighting creates a motivation problem within the local police forces as 
well as a lack of confidence in the reforms.69  
The Council decision to pre-empt the (incompletely ratified) 
European Constitution and to replace, as of 1 November 2005, the head of 
the European Commission Delegation and the EUSR with a single ‘double-
hatted’ EU representative who can liaise with both institutions in Brussels 
                                                      
67 See Council of the European Union (2003b), op. cit., p. 3. 
68 See for example the Macedonian daily newspaper, Utrinski Vesnik, 1 April 2005. 
69 Derived from interviews with Proxima police officers, in Skopje, June 2004. 112 | EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS 
 
could put an end to the confusion.70 While in the EU Mission in Macedonia 
coordination on a day-to-day basis appears to have improved and the EU 
infighting on the ground to have decreased, the Brussels turf war seems to 
persist with continued bickering between the Commission and the Council. 
Admittedly, this may be related to the fact that the merger of the two roles 
is still a ‘work in progress’, which has been surrounded by much 
controversy and has met the resistance of numerous EU member states. 
Although it is treated as a prototype, the precise form and arrangements 
regarding the double-hatting of the various EUSRs/heads of European 
Commission Delegations remain undecided. Word in the Commission is 
that the double-hatting will involve a head of the European Commission 
Delegation taking up in parallel the role of an EUSR, while the Council 
Secretariat tends to prefer a sharing of the double-hatted role between the 
two pillars. Thus, the double-hatting would interchangeably fall under the 
authority of either the Commission or the Council.71 Although it is unclear 
whether the results of recent Macedonian polls are linked to the ability of 
the EU to speak with one voice, it is worth noting that they reveal the 
“positive perceptions and expectations of the [Macedonian] public towards 
the EU. These results demonstrate that the citizens of [Macedonia] have a 
strong wish for a European future and are willing to actively support 
policies that in their view will contribute to the realisation of this goal.”72  
The dual-track approach in the EU’s police efforts, with Proxima 
having operationally supported the Commission’s long-term police reform, 
created much confusion as to ‘what’ each mission was really about. EUPOL 
Proxima’s stated aim of helping the Macedonian national police meet 
European standards and Secretary General/High Representative Javier 
Solana’s characterisation of the mission as a milestone on the path leading 
                                                      
70 The new joint EUSR/head of the Commission Delegation will continue to report 
to, and be instructed by, the Council on CFSP matters but will be responsible to the 
Commission for areas of Community competence. See Council of the European 
Union, Joint Action 2005/724/CFSP of 17 October 2005 appointing the European 
Union Special Representative in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
repealing Joint Action 2005/589/CFSP, OJ L 272/26, 18.10.2005(a). 
71 Derived from informal discussions with officials from the European Commission 
and Council General Secretariat in Brussels, September 2006. 
72 See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Early Warning Report FYR 
Macedonia, UNDP, Skopje, June 2006, p. 5. POLICE MISSION IN MACEDONIA | 113 
 
Macedonia to “integration with, and eventually into, the EU”73 led the 
political elite and the wider population to perceive Proxima as a 
‘Europeanising’ mission.74 The dual-track approach has therefore put into 
question the notion of ‘crisis management’ and its implementation by the 
Council as a rapid reaction to a crisis situation. Indeed, it is questionable 
whether the ‘urgent needs’ that Proxima identified and tackled could have 
been fulfilled in the short-term. The discussions underway in the European 
Commission and the Council General Secretariat about how to develop 
crisis management capabilities need to be brought together to ensure a 
common understanding of the concept and a more integrated EU approach 
when engaging in future crises. 
The visibility of the Proxima police officers among the population, 
especially during the first year when the traffic police programme was 
active, played to the mission’s advantage. A nationwide survey carried out 
by the Institute for Democracy, Solidarity and Civil Society in May 2004 
found that 55.3% of Macedonians had a positive opinion of the mission’s 
work, ahead of the EAR and the European Commission Delegation. Yet a 
more detailed survey by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), which differentiated among respondents according to their ethnic 
background, found that while 57.5% of ethnic Albanians had a positive 
attitude towards Proxima, there was a higher degree of distrust (44%) 
among ethnic Macedonians.75 Public perception of Proxima as a 
Europeanising mission also helped the mission’s image, as recent polls 
have demonstrated,76 but raised local expectations very high. Expected 
                                                      
73 See Council of the European Union, EUPOL Proxima, Remarks by Javier Solana 
at the ceremony marking the end of the EU-led Operation Concordia (and the 
launch of the EU Police Mission Proxima in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia), Skopje, 15 December, Press Release, S0256/03, Brussels, 15.12.2003, p. 
D. 
74 See I. Yusufi, “Europeanizing the Western Balkans through Military and Police 
Missions: The Cases of Concordia and Proxima in Macedonia”, European Balkan 
Observer, Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2004, pp. 8–12. 
75 See UNDP, Early Warning Report FYR Macedonia – November 2004, UNDP, Skopje, 
November 2004, p. 37. 
76 The UNDP’s 2005 Early Warning Report (UNDP, Skopje, June 2005, p. 16) 
illustrated that Macedonian support for EUPOL Proxima exceeded support for the 
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results included a change in the mentality of the police, an impossible task 
to accomplish in the short timeframe of Proxima’s two-year mandate. The 
public’s lack of understanding of the mission’s objectives stemmed from 
the fact that Proxima, unlike EAR reconstruction projects, did not produce 
tangible results and therefore did not attract the attention of the media. The 
only visible result of police reform to the average Macedonian is the 
increase of the quota of ethnic Albanians in the police service, which is an 
OSCE accomplishment. The Macedonian media concentrated on reporting 
specific events concerning Proxima rather than explaining the process of 
police reform. 
Interestingly enough, surveys conducted by local research centres 
and international organisations do not explicitly mention the Commission’s 
police reform projects. This lack of recognition is perhaps because of the 
small size of the Commission’s police reform team and the fact that it is 
deployed centrally within the MoI and therefore has no direct contact with 
the Macedonian population. While some of the blame rests with the media 
for not covering the work of the ECJHAT or ECPRP, it is important to note 
that local researchers have repeatedly complained of the reluctance of the 
European Commission Delegation and the Commission’s police reform 
teams to meet with them.77  
4.6  Prospects for the future 
Macedonia has made substantial progress since the 2001 conflict and the 
security situation in the country has mostly remained stable over the last 
two years.78 Some incidents, however, such as the events in the village of 
Kondovo near Skopje, which for a few months was under the control of an 
armed group of ethnic Albanians who are still at large, are a sign of the 
inefficiency of law enforcement agencies and the level of corruption in 
public institutions. In addition, some of the population – primarily ethnic 
Albanians – are still afraid of the police and some citizens rely on the 
                                                      
77 Derived from interviews with a number of local non-governmental organisations 
and research centres based in Skopje, June 2004. 
78 The removal of the Integrated Police Unit deployed in the initial mandate of 
EUPOL Proxima for the protection of mission members demonstrates the increased 
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possession of a weapon.79 In fact, according to recent polls, “the security 
situation has not improved…when it comes to the territory of the country 
as a whole and to situations where [Macedonian citizens] are outside of 
their own communities; instead it has worsened”.80 The Commission’s avis 
emphasises that Macedonia needs to “make additional efforts in particular 
in the fields of…police reform, judiciary reform and the fight against 
corruption”.81 Specifically, there is a need for more devolution of decision-
making to the regional and local police stations, a transparent and 
exclusively merit-based career system, improved levels of efficiency and 
effectiveness in policing and public safety operations, and an increased 
level of transparency in decision-making and operations.  
The influence that (uncertainty over) the final status of Kosovo and 
the pending demarcation of the border with Kosovo can have on 
Macedonia’s stability should not be underestimated. The full 
implementation of the Framework Agreement has nevertheless turned 
attention away from security; rather, it is the political stability of 
Macedonia that is at stake. Unemployment (and the increasing fear of 
losing one’s job), poverty and corruption are the most pressing problems 
for the population (far more important than inter-ethnic relations are) and 
could, in the long run, have a negative effect on Macedonia’s stability.82 In 
fact, according to the latest UNDP Early Warning Report (June 2006), 80% of 
the uniformed personnel (army and police) are directly affected by 
unemployment and consider it the biggest challenge in Macedonia today. 
Proxima police officers have suggested that the perpetual economic 
stagnation encourages corruption, including among the border police. The 
lack of suitable equipment (cars, torchlights and communication apparatus) 
                                                      
79 See UNDP (2005), op. cit., p. 44. 
80 See UNDP (2006), op. cit., p. 48. 
81 See European Commission, Communication on the Commission’s Opinion on 
the Application from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for Membership 
of the European Union, COM(2005) 562, Brussels, 09.11.2005(a), pp. 6–7. 
82 That being said, ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians live quite separately, 
hold deep prejudices against each other, and few of the initiatives to bring the 
communities to live together have had positive results. See Foundation for Open 
Society Institute in Macedonia (FOSIM), Organised Crime – Macedonia, FOSIM, 
Skopje, April 2005, p. 12; see also UNDP (2006), op. cit., pp. 5, 23, 27. 116 | EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS 
 
further hinders the work of the police.83 It is not surprising then that 
criminal activities, including human trafficking and the trade in drugs, 
munitions and contraband materials are widespread.84  
In October 2005, at the request of the Macedonian government, the 
European Commission launched a two-year twinning project on police 
reform, which, as with previous European Commission advisory missions, 
involves a member-state team being co-located within the MoI, with 
implementation undertaken by one EU member state. This latest 
programme summons the end of the ‘post-conflict phase’ in Macedonia and 
a shift towards EU integration. It was drafted taking into consideration the 
recommendations of preceding European Commission advisory missions 
(the ECJHAT and ECPRP) and the monitoring findings of EUPOL Proxima. 
To ensure continuity and that changes are sustainable the twinning project 
includes three police advisers from the ECPRP mission.85 The stated aim of 
the project is to “establish and consolidate an effective and publicly 
accountable police service…that respects human rights and the rule of law 
and operates according to international standards and practices”.86 In 
practice, the team helps to improve technical and institutional capabilities, 
along with operational ones related to the fight against organised crime, the 
development of rulebooks, and operating procedures and standards.  
The twinning programme on police reform is deployed only within 
the MoI. Yet, the Council has been concerned about possible instability 
resulting from the opening of Kosovo status negotiations and is seeking to 
ensure that police reforms are sustainable and that the fragile progress that 
Macedonia has achieved in the past four years is consolidated. Thus, the 
Council has felt that a continued EU presence in the rural areas and outside 
Skopje is necessary. The logic here has been that Council activities at an 
operational level would once again complement the Commission’s 
twinning programme on police reform deployed within the MoI. At the 
                                                      
83 Derived from interviews with EUPOL Proxima police officers, in Tetovo and 
Kumanovo, May–June 2004. 
84 See EAR (2005), op. cit., p. 6. 
85 Derived from an interview with a member of the ECPRP, in Skopje, June 2005. 
86 See European Commission, Advisory Support to Police Reform – FYR 04.04/03.01, 
CARDS 2004, CARDS Twinning Project Fiche, final version, Brussels, 14.03.2005(b), 
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same time though, as the country moves closer to the EU, the Council has 
recognised that assistance in police reform should be pursued primarily 
through Community activities and programmes. For this reason, the 
European Commission launched a project focusing on the implementation 
of reform at the field level and capacity-building within the MoI in April 
2006. Nevertheless, to bridge the time gap (a six-month period) between the 
end of Proxima and the commencement of the Commission field-level 
project, the Council decided to replace Proxima with an EU Police 
Advisory Team (EUPAT) from 15 December 2005 to 14 June 2006.87 The 
presence of a Council mission coupled with the perceived need for 
continued external support and mediation among the different ethnic 
groups, including on security issues, meant that the function of an EUSR 
was still necessary. This situation would explain the current double-hatting 
of a single EU representative in Macedonia, which member states are quick 
to qualify as “an exceptional measure [that] does not set a model for the 
appointment of future EUSRs”.88 But member states have been considering 
using this model in Bosnia–Herzegovina and Kosovo, where there is a 
similar congruence of Commission and Council responsibilities. 
The Macedonian government welcomed EUPAT “under certain 
conditions” that ensured that its EU membership prospects were not 
compromised. It insisted that EUPAT be presented as a reform-oriented 
effort rather than a stabilisation-oriented one, that it not be defined as “a 
mission” and that it be clearly linked with the possible CARDS-funded 
projects.89  EUPAT was similar to Proxima in its goals, mission and 
organisation. It was much smaller than Proxima (comprising 140 
international police officers), with 30 EU experts who monitored and 
mentored the Macedonian police in the fields of border management, 
                                                      
87 See Council of the European Union, Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP of 24 
November 2005 on the establishment of an EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), OJ L 307/61, 25.11.2005(b). 
88 See House of Commons, European Union Special Representative in Macedonia, 
Nineteenth Report, Select Committee on European Scrutiny, London, 2 March 
2006.  
89 Other conditions included EUPAT having a clear mandate with a defined end-
date; that EUPAT not be presented as a follow-up to Proxima, but as a transitional 
measure before a possible CARDS-funded project was in place; and that 
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public order and peace (particularly cooperation between the police and 
the judiciary, professional standardisation and internal control), and the 
fight against corruption and organised crime. The new element of EUPAT 
was the creation of a ‘consultation mechanism’ that was designed to 
improve Proxima’s benchmarking system. According to this new 
mechanism, EUPAT submitted a report on a monthly basis to the 
Macedonian government on the progress accomplished in its activities, the 
progress made in the reforms by the Macedonian authorities and the 
shortcomings in the Macedonian police (through monitoring performance, 
corruption and organised crime). This system aimed at creating a certain 
degree of openness and transparency between the two parties – the EU and 
the Macedonian government – but could also act as leverage over the 
Macedonian authorities.90 Indeed, the reciprocity created by the 
consultation mechanism entailed that the Macedonian side honoured its 
promises and made certain that reforms were actually carried out and not 
simply endorsed through legislation or in political declarations. Hence, this 
mechanism helped deal with the absence of an executive mandate, a 
recurring problem for Proxima, since it made certain that the government 
of Macedonia implemented reforms. 
4.7  Conclusions 
I t  i s  t o o  s o o n  t o  s a y  w h a t  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  E U  e f f o r t s  h a s  b e e n  o n  p o l i c e  
transformation in Macedonia. It is notable, however, that opinion polls by 
international organisations show an increasing trust in the police on the 
part of the Macedonian population, although the confidence of ethnic 
Albanians in the police is still well below that of ethnic Macedonians, at 
less than 50%.91 Macedonia should be treated with cautious optimism. The 
main concern is that reforms in the police have been implemented because 
of the international presence in the country. It is unknown to what extent 
these reforms are sustainable in the long run, whether they go beyond 
being accommodated institutionally or within a legal framework, and 
whether they are internalised in the everyday work of the MoI and the 
                                                      
90 Derived from interviews with an official in the Council General Secretariat in 
Brussels on 14 December 2005. 
91 Compare the UNDP’s Early Warning Report FYR Macedonia, No. 1 (UNDP, 
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police. Considering the role of the Macedonian police in the 2001 conflict, 
the unstable regional context and the weaknesses in the rule of law in the 
country, international monitoring of the Macedonian police is still needed 
in the short to medium term. 
The EU heralds the success of its intervention in Macedonia and 
argues that important lessons can be drawn for future ESDP police 
operations. In this regard, Proxima Head of Mission Jürgen Scholz asserted 
that the mission “will set the standards for future EU police missions”.92 
Useful lessons that arise from EUPOL Proxima’s experience for future 
crisis-management operations include the handing over of a mission (from 
Operation Concordia to Proxima), mission planning and set-up, the need 
for carrying out joint Commission–Council fact-finding initiatives and the 
use of benchmarking for evaluating progress and performance. Proxima 
has also highlighted the benefits of ESDP civilian operations: EU police 
advisers are in the field alongside local police and have a real sense of the 
situation. It has also become clear that missions can be set up faster by the 
Council than the Commission and that it is easier for the Council to find the 
necessary resources, although the increasing threat of terrorism in Europe 
will undoubtedly affect both the Council’s capacity for police force 
generation and the quality of police officers sent to ESDP missions.93  
The dual-track approach in police reform has also pointed to a 
recurring question, however: that of ‘how’, which goes beyond the question 
of ‘how much’; in other words it focuses on how EU resources are used 
effectively and not simply how much capacity is available. This model has 
revealed that serious problems remain unresolved when it comes to EU 
inter-institutional and wider multilateral coordination of police efforts. The 
complex environment that characterises post-conflict societies requires 
missions to have tight mandates, to consult each other and to be 
                                                      
92 See J. Scholz,  Welcome speech given at the Induction Training held on 24 
January, EUPOL Proxima, Council of the European Union, Skopje, January 2005(b), 
p. 1. 
93 Indeed, as noted by Merlingen & Ostrauskaite (2005, op. cit., p. 227), EUPOL 
Proxima (just like the EUPM) experienced problems maintaining the high quality 
of their staff as rotations proceeded. See also the presentation by M.M. Leinonen, 
“Lessons Learned from ESDP Operations”, at the Public Hearing, Committee on 
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transparent. If the vocabulary of the Council’s crisis management 
operations is to include ‘rapid reaction’ to a crisis, then future police 
missions must concentrate on ‘urgent needs’ and have a clearer exit 
strategy, which can be revised taking into account the realities on the 
ground. A common EU definition of ‘crisis management’ is imperative for a 
functioning dual-track approach by the EU. The success of this approach 
entails a clear division of labour between pillars I and II in Brussels – lack 
of clarity at that level easily trickles down to the field, as the dual-track 
experience in Macedonia has demonstrated. An effective partnership 
within the EU, especially in a context such as the Western Balkans in which 
the EU is the lead organisation, would also enhance multilateral 
cooperation. In addition, a more proactive and cohesive EU communication 
strategy would help the EU to sell itself to actors on the ground and explain 
its benefits to the population, whose support is the cornerstone of any 
sustainable policy. 
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5.  CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MISSIONS 
IN THE WESTERN BALKANS 
EVA GROSS
∗ 
Abstract: The EU has made great strides in the development of its European 
security and defence policy (ESDP) and its regional presence in the Western 
Balkans as a security actor. Yet the success of its police and military crisis 
management to date has been hampered by problems of a steep institutional 
learning curve over the design and implementation of missions and the decision-
making structures in Brussels. This chapter analyses the design of the existing 
missions and asks whether they are appropriate and relevant for their effective 
implementation and for meeting their declared goals in the field. It shows that 
missions have suffered from difficulties in their design, problems in attracting 
appropriate personnel and issues of inter- and intra-pillar coordination, and 
therefore coherence. Efforts have been made to rectify some of these problems, but 
more needs to be done for ESDP crisis management missions to become truly 
effective. The stakes for the ESDP in the Western Balkans, particularly with a view 
to the impending rule of law mission in Kosovo, remain high. 
5.1  Introduction 
Since the initiation of the European security and defence policy (ESDP) in 
1999, the EU’s conflict prevention and crisis response capacities have 
undergone significant operational and institutional developments, and 
have added further tools to meet the EU’s political objectives in conflict 
prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction. ESDP is 
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meant to provide the EU with the means to respond to global and regional 
security threats, and to enable the EU to better realise the goals it set for 
itself in the 2003 European security strategy. To date, the EU has 
undertaken no fewer than 18 ESDP operations, some of them underway, of 
varying nature and range.1 The military operations in particular constitute 
important test cases for the EU’s crisis management capabilities in carrying 
out operations at the high end of the spectrum of the Petersberg tasks.2  
Although the geographic reach and ambition of the EU and its 
ev olving ESDP is global rather tha n confined to a particular region, the 
Western Balkans hold a special place in European security because much of 
the impetus to create the ESDP came from the conflicts in former 
Yugoslavia during the 1990s and the EU’s inability to formulate an 
appropriate response.3 The majority of ESDP operations have been 
undertaken in the Balkans, and much of the operational and institutional 
learning has taken place there. The stakes for ESDP remain high and the 
application of the lessons learnt from the operational experience of the 
existing missions is recognised as important in order to make further 
missions more effective and coherent. The Operational Programme of the 
Council prepared by the Austrian and Finnish presidencies in 2006 
highlighted improving the coherent and complementary functioning of 
military and civilian means. It singled out the need for the EU’s military 
exercise (EU Force or EUFOR Operation Althea) in Bosnia and 
                                                      
1 See appendix I to this chapter. For a complete list of current and completed ESDP 
operations, see the Council of the European Union’s website, ESDP Operations 
(retrieved from http://ue.eu.int/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g). 
2 The Petersberg tasks were defined by the Western European Union in 1992 and 
incorporated into the TEU (Title V, Art. 17) by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. 
They lay the framework for three kinds of missions: humanitarian and rescue, 
peacekeeping and those involving combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking. 
3 For detailed analyses of EU and member state involvement in the Yugoslav 
conflicts see J. Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the 
Yugoslav War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997; see also S. Lucarelli, 
Europe and the break-up of Yugoslavia: A political failure in search of a scholarly 
explanation, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000; and also A. Danchev and 
T. Halverson (eds), International perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict, Basingstoke: 
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Herzegovina (BiH) to take account of “both the wider EU presence in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the expected evolution of the international 
community’s involvement”.4 It also stated that with regard to civilian crisis 
management, the Council will “need to decide on transition and follow-up 
for those civilian operations which will come to an end”. These aspects 
should be part of the challenge of ‘Europeanising’ the Balkans with a view 
to eventual EU membership for the countries in the region,5 which involves 
policy instruments beyond the ESDP and spans the range of political and 
economic instruments in the EU’s toolbox.6  
5.2  ESDP operations in the Western Balkans 
Despite, or because of, the inadequate showing of the EU’s policies in the 
Balkans throughout the 1990s there is widespread agreement that policies 
towards the region present “an opportunity…a test of our commitment to 
the region, to a wider Europe, and to a mature common foreign and 
security policy”.7 Furthermore, the Balkans are also mentioned as a priority 
area in the European security strategy.8 Owing to the number and density 
                                                      
4 See Council of the European Union, Operational Programme of the Council for 
2006 submitted by the incoming Austrian and Finnish presidencies, 16065/05, 
Brussels, 22.12.2005(e). 
5 The 2003 EU–Western Balkans summit in Thessaloniki affirmed the prospects of 
integration and eventual EU membership for the countries in the Western Balkans. 
See the Declaration of the EU–Western Balkans Summit (Thessaloniki, 21 June 
2003), available on the website of the Council of the European Union, 10229/03 
(Press 163), (http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/ 
76291.pdf). Whereas Macedonia was granted candidate status in December 2005, 
BiH had negotiations with the EU on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement in 
January 2006. 
6 On this point see for instance, J. Batt, “Introduction: The stabilisation/integration 
dilemma”, in The Western Balkans: Moving on, EU Institute for Security Studies, 
Chaillot Paper No. 70, Paris, October 2004. 
7 See J. Solana, “The Development of the CFSP and the Role of the High 
Representative”, Speech given at the Institute of European Affairs in Dublin on 30 
March 2000. 
8 For the full text, see Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better 
World, European Security Strategy, presented by Javier Solana, Brussels, 
12.12.2003(b) (retrieved from http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf).  CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MISSIONS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS | 129 
 
of missions in the Balkans, it is also considered a test ground for the new 
capabilities under the ESDP.  
To date there have been five ESDP missions in BiH and Macedonia, 
of which three (one military, two civilian) have been completed. Three 
sequential missions have taken place in Macedonia. Operation Concordia 
(a takeover mission from NATO‘s Operation Allied Harmony) was the first 
ever ESDP military mission, which was followed by the EU Police Mission 
(EUPOL) Proxima, which in turn led to an EU Police Advisory Team 
(EUPAT) that was concluded in June 2006. On the other hand, BiH is 
hosting two concurrent missions. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) launched 
in 2003 was joined by a military operation, EUFOR Althea, at the end of 
2004. Both missions are takeover missions: Operation Althea took over 
from NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in BiH and the EUPM took over 
from the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF) (see Box 5.1).  
 
Box 5.1 ESDP operations in the Western Balkans  
Macedonia 
1) Operation Concordia  
First ever ESDP military operation, to contribute to the stabilisation of 
Macedonia 
Number of troops: 350  
Duration: 31 March to 15 December 2003 
Cost: €6.2 million 
Lead component: France 
2) EUPOL Proxima 
Police mission to monitor, mentor and advise the country’s police  
Number of personnel: 200 
Duration: 15 December 2003 to 15 December 2005 
Cost: €15 million per year  
3) EUPAT 
Police experts to monitor and mentor Macedonian police 
Number of personnel: 30 
Duration: 15 December 2005 to 15 June 2006 
Cost: €1.5 million 
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Box 5.1, cont. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
4) EUPM I 
Police mission to advise on police restructuring; to monitor, mentor and 
inspect police capacity 
Number of personnel: 531 
Duration: 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2005 
Cost: €38 million per year  
Lead components: UK, France, Germany and Italy 
EUPM II 
Refocused mandate to support the police reform process 
Number of personnel: 198 
Duration: 1 January 2006 to December 2007 
Cost: €9 million per year 
Lead components: UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain 
5) EUFOR Operation Althea 
Military operation to provide deterrence and to contribute to a safe 
environment 
Number of personnel: 7,000 
Duration: Launched 2 December 2004  
Cost: €71.7 million 
Lead components: UK and Germany, with major contributions from France, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Spain 
Sources: Council of the European Union and EU Institute for Security Studies. 
 
The engagement of the ESDP in the Western Balkans has been 
substantial and the operations themselves closely followed by observers. 
Although the speedy institutional development of the ESDP has been 
generally and positively acknowledged,9 the design and implementation of 
                                                      
9 See J. Howorth, “From Security to Defence: The Evolution of CFSP”, in C. Hill 
and M. Smith (eds), International Relations and the European Union, Oxford: Oxford 
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these particular missions have been frequently criticised.10 The list of the 
missions’ alleged shortcomings and inconsistencies is indeed lengthy. First, 
it has been argued that these missions have not been ‘crisis management’ 
missions in the traditional sense. BiH and Macedonia had been largely 
pacified by a sustained international presence, and in this sense were no 
more than a training ground for ESDP instruments. The reform projects 
undertaken by the police missions in BiH and Macedonia have been 
carrying out long-term institution-building rather than short-term crisis 
management tasks.11 In addition, the delivery of police aid has not taken 
place in the expected logical sequence, in which ESDP crisis management 
tools are to be used first, followed by long-term Commission tools. In the 
case of Macedonia, for instance, the Commission had deployed a team of 
experts through its Rapid Reaction Mechanism, to develop a reform 
strategy for the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the police well before the 
Proxima mission was launched.12 This example reflects the challenges of 
coherence among the different EU agencies and between the first 
(Community) and the second (intergovernmental) pillar. 
                                                      
10 For a particularly damning – and therefore controversial – analysis, see 
International Crisis Group (ICG), Bosnia’s Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU, 
Europe Report No. 164, ICG, Brussels, 6 September 2005(a). At the same time, it 
ought to be born in mind that the EUPM was the first ESDP mission, and the 
planning mistakes made reflect the absence of prior experience in planning and 
designing missions on the part of the EU, and the still-developing institutional 
structures in the Council Secretariat. 
11 See D. Orsini, “Future of ESDP: Lessons from Bosnia”, European Security Review, 
No. 29, June 2006. Yet a number of the member states’ officials interviewed 
highlighted that the advantage of an ESDP operation lies in the fact that it carries 
with it political pressure, as “politicians talk to politicians rather than managers 
[the Commission] talking to politicians” (derived from an interview with a 
member state official, April 2006). 
12 Other aims of the programme included improving cooperation among law 
enforcement bodies in the country and developing a strategy to tackle organised 
crime as well as one for integrated border management. These tasks were 
undertaken within the ‘framework nation’ model and implemented under a French 
lead. See European Commission, Rapid Reaction Mechanism End of Programme Report 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management 
Unit, Brussels, November 2003 (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ 
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This experience in turn raises the question of where the disconnection 
lies between the aspirations of the ESDP on the one hand and the perceived 
insufficiencies of the actual operations on the other. Why, given the 
substantial investments of member states and the EU in the Western 
Balkans and the often-stated commitments to the region’s security, do the 
ESDP missions appear to have fallen short of their declared goals? The 
detailed account of the individual missions that follows aims at answering 
these questions. 
5.3  Macedonia 
The EU’s intervention in Macedonia has had a number of positive aspects. 
It has had a strong symbolic character for EU crisis management and has 
been a ‘first’ in several respects:  
•  The mediation of the 2001 crisis constituted the first time the EU 
made use of crisis management tools under the common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP) and eventually the ESDP.13 
•  It was the first time for NATO and the EU to work together on a 
practical level.14 
•  It was the first time an EU military operation (Concordia) was 
suggested and eventually realised under the new CFSP/ESDP 
framework.  
•  Operation Concordia was also the first ESDP military mission to put 
into practice the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreements.  
The presence of international organisations – the UN, OSCE, NATO 
and ultimately, the EU – in Macedonia dates back to 1992, shortly after the 
country declared its independence in November 1991. The end of the UN 
Preventive Deployment Force mandate in 1998, coupled with NATO’s 
apparent lack of interest in internal Macedonian stability, created a window 
for ethnic Albanian extremists to radicalise their political agenda. Stability 
began to unravel as members of the Albanian National Liberation Army 
                                                      
13 See C. Piana, “The EU’s Decision-Making Process in the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy: The Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, 
European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2002, pp. 209–26. 
14 See J. Eldridge, “Playing at Peace: Western Politics, Diplomacy and the 
Stabilisation of Macedonia”, European Security, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 46–90, 2002. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MISSIONS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS | 133 
 
(NLA), many infiltrating from Kosovo, staged several attacks along the ill-
defined Kosovo–Macedonian border during 2000, increasingly doing so 
from January 2001. The EU intervened early in the crisis, successfully 
employing economic as well as political incentives in the resolution of the 
conflict, culminating with the Ohrid Framework Agreement signed on 8 
August 2001.  
After the launch of NATO’s Operation Essential Harvest, the EU soon 
expressed an interest in an ESDP mis s i o n  t o  t a k e  o v e r  f r o m  N A T O ,  
reflecting the convergence of views among member states that the EU 
should assume a military role in the stabilisation of the Western Balkans.15 
At the Barcelona summit in March 2002, the European Council announced 
its willingness to take over NATO’s operation in Macedonia, although the 
dispute between Greece and Turkey over EU access to NATO assets led to 
delays.16 After the EU and NATO reached the Berlin Plus agreements, 
giving the EU access to NATO assets for crisis management, EU foreign 
ministers formally approved the first EU military mission in Macedonia. 
The EU had been present on the ground before the launch of Operation 
Concordia through the office of the EU special representative (EUSR),17 the 
European Commission Delegation and a number of missions in the field. 
                                                      
15 Derived from an interview with an EU official in Brussels, June 2005. As for the 
exact timing, interest in an ESDP mission arose during the Swedish presidency in 
the first half of 2001 and therefore during the crisis itself (derived from an 
interview with member state official, September 2006). 
16 See A. Missiroli, “EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management: No Turkish 
Delight for ESDP”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 9–26, 2002. 
17 The post of EUSR was established in June 2001, and was initially held by the 
former French Minister of Defence, Francois Léotard, who was replaced in October 
2001 by Alain Leroy, another Frenchman. There have been four EUSRs to FYROM 
since then: Alexis Brouhns (from 30 September 2002); Søren Jessen-Petersen (from 
26 January 2004), Michael Salin (from 12 July 2004) and Erwan Fouéré (from 17 
October 2005) (see Council of the European Union, Joint Action 2006/49/CFSP of 
30 January 2006 appointing the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, OJ L 26, 31.01.2006). Erwan Fouéré, the former Head of the 
Commission Delegation in Skopje, is ‘double-hatted’ as the EUSR and the Head of 
Delegation in an effort to improve the coordination of instruments and coherence 
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These included the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) and various long-term 
projects carried out by the Commission to aid police reform. 
Concordia’s launch was helped by improving political conditions on 
the ground, particularly the outcome of the September 2002 elections, 
which brought the Albanian party, the Democratic Union for Integration 
(DUI), into the government, and the EU’s increasing engagement through 
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in 2001, which later in 2005 
culminated in the granting of EU candidate status to Macedonia.18 The 
application for EU membership submitted by Macedonia on 22 March 2004 
and the granting of EU accession status to the country in December 2005 
contributes to internal stability, as the prospect of EU integration secures 
the commitment and the motivation by local politicians to pursue reform 
policies and efforts for the peaceful coexistence of the main ethnic groups. 
Military mission – Operation Concordia. Concordia was launched 
on 31 March 200319 and it completed its mission on 15 December 2003. Its 
mandate was to ensure the follow-on to NATO’s Operation Allied 
Harmony and to contribute further to a stable, secure environment and to 
allow the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework 
Agreement. Concordia made use of NATO assets based on the Berlin Plus 
agreements. France initially acted as the ‘framework nation’ of the 357-
strong force from EU member states and non-member countries until 
EUFOR Concordia took over the responsibilities at Force Headquarters 
level as of 1 October 2003.20 With Concordia, the EU assumed the tactical–
operational part of Allied Harmony, while NATO kept an advisory role. 
General Rainer Feist (German) assumed the task of EU Operational 
Commander while the first EU Force Commander, Major General Pierre 
Maral (French), was replaced by General Luis Nelson Ferreira dos Santos  
 
                                                      
18 See ICG, EU Crisis Response Capabilities Revisited, Background Report, ICG, 
Brussels, 17 January 2005(b). 
19 See Council of the European Union, Decision 7537/03 relating to the launch of 
the EU Military Operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Brussels, 18.03.2005(b). 
20 See also G. Grevi, D. Lynch and A. Missiroli, ESDP Operations, EU Institute for 
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(Portuguese) in September 2003. Operation Concordia in Macedonia had 
the same operational mandate as Allied Harmony and in essence was a 
practice mission for ESDP.  
By and large, Concordia had a positive impact on local conditions 
and constituted a test of the EU’s ability to undertake a military mission 
and to develop operating procedures. This was important also with a view 
t o  t h e  E U ’ s  s u b s e q u e n t  t a k e o v e r  o f  N A T O ’ s  S F O R  i n  B i H .  C o n c o r d i a ’ s  
presence enabled the Macedonian government to concentrate on reforms 
and demonstrated international/EU support for the political process and 
legitimate institutions in the country. In terms of improving the social and 
economic situation of the country, civil–military cooperation projects in the 
former crisis areas helped the operation establish relationships with the 
local population and raised the EU’s profile as a security actor.21 This aspect 
was particularly important in light of concerns that the local, particularly 
Albanian, population had preferred to have NATO soldiers remain.22  
There were some operational difficulties in implementing 
Concordia’s mandate. These included problems with information sharing, a 
cumbersome reporting chain, a NATO–EU division of labour that sent 
different messages to the host government and disagreements over what 
border management required – with NATO advocating military and the 
EU civilian instruments.23 As for the chain of command, there arose a 
controversy over the role of NATO’s regional headquarters, AFSOUTH. 
Some member states suggested that its role had not been agreed in the 
original joint action and “amounted to a manipulation of the EU chain of 
command”,24 whereas others did not take issue with this. There were no 
                                                      
21 See the article, “Concordia Soldiers Improve Relationship with Community”, 
EUFOR Concordia News, 15 September 2003 (retrieved 05.05.2006 from 
http://www.delmkd.cec.eu.int/en/Concordia/news2003-09-15.htm). 
22 See I. Yusufi, “Europeanizing the Western Balkans through Military and Police 
Missions: The Cases of Concordia and Proxima in Macedonia”, European Balkan 
Observer, Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2004, p. 8. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See G. Quille, ESDP takes over from NATO: Operation ALTHEA, coherent, effective 
and democratically accountable?, ISIS European Security Review No. 24, ISIS Europe, 
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violent incidents on the ground,25 although as a member state official 
stated, “it was pure luck that nothing serious happened”.26  
Mindful of the continued reliance on the EU/NATO security 
presence in Macedonia, an EU assessment of security developments in 
Macedonia concluded that an international military presence was no longer 
needed, but that further measures were necessary to establish the rule of 
law in the former crisis areas. Remaining security problems included the 
proliferation of arms, a weak coalition government, territories in ethnic 
Albanian-dominated areas beyond the control of law enforcement and lack 
of trust in the police among the public. Nevertheless, the Macedonian 
government preferred not to have a heavy-handed military presence in the 
country, which might jeopardise its applications for NATO/EU 
membership, although ethnic Albanians supported a continued security 
presence. These factors led to the creation of EUPOL Proxima, the second 
ESDP police mission after the EUPM in BiH. 
Police mission – EUPOL Proxima. The Proxima  mission was 
launched on 15 December 2003 following an invitation by Macedonia’s 
Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski to Secretary General/High 
Representative Javier Solana, and was completed on 14 December 2005. It 
consisted of around 200 police officers. Its aim was to support the 
consolidation of law and order, with an emphasis on monitoring and 
mentoring. It focused on several sensitive areas: the fight against organised 
crime, the comprehensive reform of the MoI, including the police; the 
creation of a border police, as a part of the wider EU effort to promote 
integrated border management; confidence-building among the local 
population in the local police; and enhanced cooperation with 
neighbouring states in the field of policing.27 
Proxima’s police experts were co-located at senior levels of 
management in over 20 locations in northwest Macedonia, where fighting 
had taken place in the first half of 2001. An imprecise mission statement 
and the ambitious number of projects coupled with a short planning phase 
                                                      
25 Ibid. 
26 Derived from an interview in Brussels, October 2005. 
27 See Council of the European Union, Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 29 
September on the European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic 
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meant that Proxima was at first inefficient because of delays in the build-up 
phase, the slow delivery of police resources (which included personnel as 
well as equipment) and management deficiencies. Recruitment, a recurring 
constraint in the EU’s civilian crisis-management operations, came to haunt 
Proxima as well, and the provision of personnel by the contributing 
member states saw delays and shortfalls. Moreover, the mission got off to a 
slow start as the first three months constituted a build-up and assessment 
phase rather than the launch of projects. These shortcomings illustrate the 
problems of coordination with other EU actors present in Macedonia, since 
the Commission had been assisting structural changes at the MoI prior to 
the launch of Proxima. Indeed, inter-institutional cooperation between the 
first and second pillars was contentious, with the divergence of goals 
between the Commission and the Council. This friction has compromised 
the impact and effectiveness of EU programmes in general – an issue that 
g o e s  b e y o n d  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  E S D P  o p eration. Specifically in Macedonia, 
however, the Council decision to double-hat, as of 1 November 2005, the 
head of the European Commission Delegation and the EUSR as one EU 
representative, who liaises with both institutions in Brussels, has gone 
some way to alleviate this confusion. 
These inefficiencies led to a mid-term review to revise the operational 
mandate. Co-location was expanded. The work schedule was streamlined 
to 5 programmes and 28 projects, increasing the emphasis on organised 
crime while downgrading the focus on ethnic conflict and policing. In 
addition, a benchmarking system replaced the ad hoc basis on which 
activities had been organised in the first year of Proxima’s mandate. The 
benchmarking document, which had been endorsed by the MoI prior to the 
extension of the mission, also provided a political tool to aid the 
implementation of reforms.28 When Proxima was extended for a second 
year, the mission additionally covered a wider geographical area. The 
number of Proxima officers was reduced to 140, in part on account of 
difficulties in recruitment by the member states, and in part on account of 
political pressure from the Macedonian government for the EU to reduce 
its security presence in the country. This change also reflected the tensions 
                                                      
28 See I. Ioannides, “EU Police Mission Proxima: Testing the ‘European’ Approach 
to Building Peace”, in A. Nowak (ed.), Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way, 
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between the political objective to limit the duration of the mission and a 
situation on the ground that, in the view of some member states, would 
have benefited from a longer ESDP presence.29 
In terms of the mission’s aim of improving the policing environment, 
there were some achievements. Ethnic Albanian representation was 
boosted, officers were trained and multi-ethnic controls were deployed. 
The MoI assumed full responsibility for the border police, having 
established a Police Academy and an Organised Crime Unit along with a 
Rescue Directorate. It also organised community-based outreach 
mechanisms to encourage citizen engagement. On the management side, it 
produced strategic and action plans, drafted the Law on Police and an 
operational plan for assisting regional police chiefs, and set up an internal 
Professional Standards Unit (PSU).30 On the downside, internal oversight 
and the functioning of the two units within the MoI that are supposed to 
deal with it – the Organised Crime Unit and the PSU – as well as attempts 
to address institutional dysfunction have been modest.31 And, organised 
crime remains a problem that Proxima has not been able to fix. 
EU Police Advisory Team. EUPAT began on 15 December 2005 and 
had a specified duration of six months. Its aim was to support the 
development of an efficient and professional police service based on 
European standards of policing and to monitor and mentor the country’s 
police on priority issues in the fields of border policing, public peace and 
order, public accountability, and the fight against corruption and organised 
crime.32 About 30 police advisers were to give attention to the overall 
implementation of police reform in the field, police–judiciary cooperation 
 
                                                      
29 Derived from an interview with a member state official, April 2006. 
Approximately one-third of EU member states were in favour of continuing the 
ESDP operation. 
30 See ICG, Macedonia: Wobbling toward Europe, Europe Briefing No. 41, ICG, Skopje 
and Brussels, 12 January 2006. 
31 Ibid. 
32 See Council of the European Union, Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP of 24 
November 2005 on the establishment of an EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in 
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and professional standards/internal control. The exercise was essentially a 
bridging operation, awaiting the launch of a Commission police reform 
project.  
5.4  Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Given the legacies of the war in Bosnia the mid-1990s, BiH remains a major 
political focus for the EU. The Dayton Agreement of 1995 recognised the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the Republika Srpska (RS) 
as two entities under a tri-partite presidency. The hope was that over time, 
nationalist politics would fade and a more pluralistic party system would 
develop. But, 12 years after Dayton, political life is still led by three 
nationalist parties and there is mistrust between the two entities, which 
hampers the creation of common institutions and multi-ethnic parties.  
International and EU support, particularly in the person of the high 
representative,33 has been crucial to sustain the unity of the state. The 
creation of single state-level structures has been a laborious process, 
however. A common currency and a Central Bank were not established 
until 1998. Reforms of the internal security and judiciary institutions have 
been induced in large part through international pressure. These reforms 
have led to the restructuring of the police and the creation of the Ministry 
of Security, the State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA), the State 
Border Service (SBS), the Intelligence and Security Agency and the State 
Court. The Ministry of Defence was established in 2004. 
Two EU missions have been launched in BiH. These operate 
concurrently and illustrate the complexity of successfully coordinating 
active civilian and military operations within the same institutional 
structure.  
Police mission – EUPM. The EUPM, the first ever ESDP mission, was 
launched on 1 January 2003 “to establish [a] sustainable, professional and 
                                                      
33 Paddy Ashdown had since 2002 also acted as the EU Special Representative. He 
was succeeded by Christian Schwarz-Schilling on 30 January 2006, who was 
appointed EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Council of 
the European Union, Joint Action 2006/49/CFSP of 30 January 2006 appointing the 
European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, OJ L 26, 
31.01.2006).  140 | EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS 
 
multiethnic police service operating under BiH ownership in accordance 
with best European and international practice, and thereby raising current 
BiH police standards”.34 This aim is to be accomplished through 
monitoring, mentoring and inspection activities at the level of mid- to 
senior management. Importantly, like Proxima in Macedonia, the EUPM is 
a non-executive mission and has no armed component.35 Some 531 police 
officers from EU member states and non-member states participate, 
together with about 400 support staff. Strategic priorities of the initial 
EUPM mission (EUPM I) were organised crime, the security of returning 
refugees and the development of police institutions. The mission has since 
been extended until the end of 2007 under a revised mandate (EUPM II).36  
Four primary objectives were identified for EUPM I. These included 
the development of police independence and accountability, the fight 
against organised crime and corruption, the financial viability and 
sustainability of the local police, and institution- and capacity-building.37 
These objectives were pursued through seven main programme areas: 
crime police, criminal justice, internal affairs, police administration, public 
order and security, the SBS and the SIPA. These seven programme areas 
translated into some forty projects. The complexity of BiH’s political 
arrangements made these tasks daunting. The co-location of EUPM police 
officers extended to the levels of state (the BiH Ministry of Security, 
Interpol, SIPA and SBS) and the entities (the MoI, Police Academy, cantonal 
police of the Federation, cantonal police and public security 
centres/stations of the RS and the Brcko district police).38  
                                                      
34 See Council of the European Union, Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP of 11 March 
2002 on the European Police Mission, OJ L 70, 13.3.2002. 
35 In contrast with the UN police mission in Bosnia that had preceded the EUPM, 
the EUPM can refer to the high representative for the removal of non-compliant 
officers – a tool that has rarely been used, however. 
36 See Council of the European Union, Joint Action 2005/824/CFSP of 24 
N o v e m b e r  2 0 0 5  o n  t h e  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n  P o l i c e  M i s s i o n  ( E U P M )  i n  B o s n i a  a n d  
Herzegovina (BiH), OJ L 307, 25.11.2005(d). 
37 See the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), 
PPIO Review 2003: The first year, EUPM, Sarajevo, 2003 (retrieved 06.05.2006 from 
www.eupm.org/Documents/PPIO%20Review%202003.pdf). 
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The political environment was not conducive to comprehensive 
police reform with the RS and Federation police forces “worlds apart”.39 As 
a result, there ensued severe criticism of EUPM I, including assertions that 
its mandate was premature, that a public administration rather than police 
reform would have been called for and that EUPM I had underestimated 
the task in terms of both size and complexity.40  
The first difficulty in drafting the mandate stemmed from the ESDP 
takeover from the UN police mission.41 The EU believed that the UN had 
finished the job, and indeed the UN personnel took their records with 
them, making a break in continuity and the transfer of information.42 The 
mandate focused on assistance to the local police, rather than on 
operations. The view was that an ESDP police mission should not be of an 
executive nature.43 Yet there was no effective policing environment. 
Consequently, a monitoring mandate with a focus on local ownership was 
premature, and the overall goal of this ESDP operation was too optimistic 
to be realistic. The prevailing mood of institutional competition, requiring 
that the ESDP operation be ‘different’ from the earlier UN mission, further 
hampered the definition of an adequate mandate.44  
The operational impact and the implementation of the mandate of 
EUPM I were criticised on several points, including the ill-coordinated 
timing of decision-making processes for the different EU instruments, an 
over-long planning process of eight months along with continued 
procurement and programme development delays well into 2004, and 
insufficient follow-up between Brussels and the headquarters in Sarajevo. 
There were also problems associated with receiving quality personnel in a 
timely manner and an insufficiently proactive stance by the head of mission 
                                                      
39 See Council of the European Union, Office of the High Representative, Speech by 
Senior Deputy High Representative Ambassador Dr Martin Ney given at the 
European Union Presidency Seminar on Security Sector Reform in the Western 
Balkans, 13 February 2006. 
40 See ICG (2005a), op. cit. 
41 Derived from an interview with a member state official in Brussels, April 2006. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 142 | EVALUATING THE EU’S CRISIS MISSIONS IN THE BALKANS 
 
in interpreting the mandate or in driving local police reform.45 
Furthermore, the inspection part of the mandate received emphasis only in 
late 2004 and mission personnel were not always appropriate for the given 
task.46 The Council’s review of the first 100 days of the mission47 
subsequently identified additional operational weaknesses: the lack of 
premises for the SIPA headquarters, problematic communication between 
the EUPM headquarters and personnel in the field, lack of full deployment 
and a disruptive first rotation, and lack of advance planning for a media 
strategy.  
The working relationship between the police and military missions 
has represented another difficulty, with their partially overlapping 
responsibilities. The EUFOR’s robust approach to the fight against 
organised crime undermined the EUPM’s efforts to promote local 
ownership, despite the fact that there was a need for EUFOR to step in to 
compensate for the EUPM’s weak mandate. There were also difficult 
interpersonal relationships between the two mission heads. Although 
regular joint meetings were instituted in 2005, more remains to be done at 
the policy level in Brussels.48  
On the plus side, there are some results. At the beginning of 2003, the 
EUPM and the High Representative/EUSR Paddy Ashdown established 
the SIPA as an important law-enforcement element required to fight 
organised crime across the country. The European Commission’s feasibility 
study of November 2003 required BiH to develop state-level law 
enforcement agencies. SIPA has among its priorities the collection, analysis 
and dissemination of information and intelligence. The Agency has signed 
several important Memoranda of Understanding with other BiH law 
                                                      
45 Ibid. See also S. Penksa, “Beyond Regional Security to International 
Peacebuilding: The Case of the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, Paper presented at the 47th International Studies Association (ISA) 
Annual Convention, San Diego, 22–25 March 2006(a). 
46 For example, no civilian experts were included, and the reform programme was 
not appropriate for young police officers. 
47 See Council of the European Union, A Review of the first 100 days of the EU Police 
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), 11760/03, Council Secretariat, Brussels, 
23.07.2003(a).  
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enforcement agencies on the entity and cantonal levels. The financial 
intelligence department of SIPA has frozen €555,000 in 67 bank accounts. 
The department is investigating cases in which the sums involved total 
around €6.6 million. The war crimes investigation centre of SIPA gathered 
intelligence that led to the arrest of one person indicted by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. There are 63 other cases 
under investigation. Three persons have been arrested for being involved 
in human trafficking and nineteen cases linked to terrorism are being 
investigated.49  
In addition, the revisions made to the mandate of EUPM II reflect a 
number of lessons learned. Improvements in the decision-making 
structure50 and the creation of Civilian Response Teams51 should mean 
improved implementation and planning in the future. The size of the 
mission has been reduced and the mandate has been strengthened.52 The 
EUPM’s leading responsibility in relation to the EUFOR in the fight against 
organised crime has been made clear. While still having a non-executive 
mandate, EUPM II now has planning and inspection powers, which are 
more easily acceptable to BiH leaders while allowing more oversight by 
EUPM II personnel.53 Nevertheless, the problems of recruiting qualified 
personnel and defining European standards of policing persist. Although 
EUPM II is more appropriate than EUPM I, the underlying challenge of 
policy coherence among the individual policy instruments remains. 
Military operation – EUFOR Althea. The takeover by the EU from 
NATO of the stabilisation tasks in BiH was intended to demonstrate that 
the EU could take responsibility for such a mission, and in particular to 
                                                      
49 For further information, see the EUPM website (www.eupm.org). 
50 In the mandate, this refers in particular to having EUPM II take the lead “in the 
coordination of policing aspects of the ESDP efforts in the fight against organised 
crime, without prejudice to the agreed chains of command” (refer to Council of the 
European Union, Joint Action 2005/824/CFSP of 24.11.2005(c), op. cit.).  
51 For more detail, see Council of the European Union, General Secretariat, 
“Civilian Headline Goal 2008”, in Multifunctional Civilian Crisis Management 
Resources in an Integrated Format – CIVILIAN RESPONSE TEAMS, 10462/05, 
Brussels, 23.06.2005. 
52 Refer to Office of the High Representative (2006), op. cit. 
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show the ‘value added’ of an EU approach that could combine civilian and 
military missions.54 When it was announced at the 28–29 June 2004 NATO 
summit in Istanbul that the EUFOR would replace the SFOR by the end of 
the year, it was argued that the motives “had less to do with the real 
security situation in that country than with EU eagerness to bolster its 
credibility as a security actor and US desire to declare at least one of its 
long-term military deployments [was] successfully over”.55 And indeed, 
Javier Solana’s explicitly stated goals for the EUFOR was that it be “new 
and distinct” and “make a difference” while at the same time continuing 
the SFOR’s key military tasks.56 
Operation Althea was launched on 2 December 2004 to fulfil the role 
specified in Annexes 1.A and 2 of the Dayton Agreement and thus to 
contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH by providing deterrence 
and reassurance. The end of the mission is to be decided by the Council. 
The largest mission to have been launched by the EU, it includes 7,000 
troops from EU member states as well as non-member countries.57 Troop 
levels have thus remained the same, with Finland replacing the US troops. 
General John Reid was appointed Operation Commander, and Major 
General David Leakey was appointed EU Force Commander.58 The EU and 
NATO headquarters are co-located. The executive military mandate is 
interpreted as working to i) apply pressure on criminal networks, ii) 
enhance the capacity of and provide direct assistance to the BiH law 
                                                      
54 Derived from an interview with a member state official, June 2005. 
55 See ICG, EUFOR: Changing Bosnia’s Security Arrangements, Europe Briefing No. 
31, ICG, Sarajevo and Brussels, 29 June 2004. 
56 See D. Leakey, “ESDP and Civil/Military Cooperation: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
2005”, in A. Deighton (ed.), Securing Europe? Implementing the European Security 
Strategy, Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik Nr. 77, ETH Zürich, Center for 
Security Studies, Zurich, 2006. 
57 The EU has since decided progressively to reduce the size of EUFOR, eventually 
to retain about 2,500 troops in the country (see the EUFOR website, 
http://www.euforbih.org/index.html). 
58 General Leakey was replaced by Major-General Gian Marco Chiarini on 6 
December 2005. Since December 2006, Rear Admiral Hans-Jochen Witthauer has 
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enforcement services, and iii) change attitudes by demonstrating that 
organised crime networks are not invincible.59  
EUFOR Althea has established credibility for the EU’s ESDP and 
visibility through information campaigns and the collection and 
destruction of weapons.60, 61 There are nonetheless complicated issues of 
coordination and overlap with NATO, which retains a role to assist with 
defence reform. There is also overlap between the EUFOR and EUPM. 
Owing to lagging police reform, military capabilities have to be used to 
support law enforcement authorities. Police operations to tackle organised 
crime would have required an executive mandate, which EUPM has not 
possessed. EUFOR Althea was thus given a role that its commanders have 
considered neither the EUFOR’s job nor its core mission.62  
5.5  Conclusions 
Although both countries had been pacified by the time of the launch of the 
ESDP crisis management missions, there were considerable differences 
affecting the success and implementation of the missions on the ground. 
The operations in Macedonia have benefited from a relatively stable 
political situation, a weak but largely functioning state and a broad 
consensus on the part of the elite over the goal to join the EU, which has 
given the EU political leverage in driving political reform. The situation in 
BiH is more complicated. There, a de facto protectorate situation with 
dysfunctional political institutions has considerably complicated the work 
of the ESDP missions, in addition to the EU’s general image problem on 
account of its inaction during the 1990s. Despite these differences, the 
analysis of the missions to date yields some similarities.  
                                                      
59 Refer to Office of the High Representative (2006), op. cit. 
60 For a list of operations undertaken within the framework of EUFOR Althea, see 
the EUFOR website article “Operation ALTHEA” (retrieved from 
http://www.euforbih.org/history/history.htm).  
61 See Council of the European Union, “ESDP in action: Supporting Bosnia on the 
way to the EU – Interview with Major General David Leakey, Commander of the 
stabilisation force (EUFOR)”, ESDP Newsletter, No. 1, December 2005(a). 
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The missions in Macedonia fulfilled a number of important functions 
in the construction of the ESDP as well as in the lessons learned for the 
future. Operation Concordia established and tested the ESDP military 
structures and established the EU as a security actor in the region.63 
Proxima offered useful lessons in the planning of a mission as well as in 
questions pertaining to the chain of command and overall political 
oversight. The mandate of the Proxima mission showed too much 
ambition, however, and not enough realism over what was possible on the 
ground. The EUPAT exercise illustrated the tensions between the objective 
of local ownership and the pursuit of effective security-sector reform, and 
of coordinating first and second pillar instruments. The fragmented nature 
of the EU’s presence in Macedonia (represented by the head of the ESDP 
mission, the EUSR, the head of the Commission Delegation and the 
European Agency for Reconstruction) led to charges of poor coordination 
among these EU actors.64 But the double-hatting of the EUSR and the 
European Delegation head decided in late 2005 has gone some way in 
rectifying this.  
The Bosnian missions also fulfilled the roles of putting the European 
Union on the map as a regional security actor, and of improving the actual 
policing and security environment. Still, the concurrent police and military 
missions have not been entirely appropriate for the task at hand. The 
mandate of EUPM I was not strong enough for the conditions on the 
ground. Combined with personality problems, this meant that EUPM I was 
not able to carry out the functions for which it was created. EUFOR Althea, 
on the other hand, has been faced with having to fill in for the EUPM’s 
operational weaknesses in fighting organised crime, even if the military is 
not the best instrument for doing so, as recognised by members of the 
EUFOR themselves.65 A strengthened EUPM II mandate as well as 
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familiarise/socialise EU institutions with military procedures and components. 
Derived from an interview with a member state official on 22 May 2006. 
64 See I. Yusufi, “EU Police Missions: From Conflict Management to Institution 
Building in the Western Balkans”, unpublished manuscript, EU Institute for 
Security Studies, Paris, 2005. 
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personality changes within both the EUPM and EUFOR Althea stand to 
improve implementation in the future.66  
Three main shortcomings emerge from this experience in the Western 
Balkans and need to be addressed in order to improve the coherence and 
effectiveness of future missions.  
Recruitment and training of personnel. The police missions in both 
BiH and Macedonia have flagged the need for improving the recruitment 
of appropriate personnel, given shortfalls in national secondments for these 
civilian crisis-management operations. The EU requires experts with 
specialised as well as field expertise for its operations. The establishment of 
Civilian Response Teams, with the initial goal of a cadre of up to 100 
national experts who can be rapidly deployed, represents a first step 
towards addressing the problems of appropriate personnel. But, if the 
number and the range of ESDP operations continue to increase, this cadre 
will have to expand, which may conflict with member states’ priorities for 
their home needs. In addition, planning could be enhanced by bringing 
together experts with field experience from ESDP operations when 
designing future ones, and so add to the availability of expertise, 
institutional memory and the lessons-learned process.67  
Institutional coherence.  The analysis of operations to date has 
highlighted problems of coherence among various EU instruments. At the 
level of personnel, the double-hatting of the EUSR and the head of the 
Commission Delegation has alleviated some coordination problems in 
Macedonia.68 In BiH, the position of High Representative (who is also the 
EUSR in BiH) will be phased out by mid-2008. But, unlike in Macedonia, 
the Commission’s Delegation and the EUSR in BiH will continue to be 
headed by two different officials. At the level of mandates, there has been 
                                                      
66 Derived from an interview with a member state official in Brussels, May 2006. 
67 See S. Penksa, Policing Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003–05: Issues of Mandates and 
Management in ESDP Missions, CEPS Working Document No. 255, CEPS, Brussels, 
2006(b). 
68 The case-by-case decision on ‘double-hatting’ and the appointment of one EUSR 
double-hatted as head of the European Commission Delegation so far illustrates 
the reluctan ce on the part of some member states to “introduce features o f the 
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the problem of military missions having to fill in for the weaknesses of the 
police missions. The revised mandate of the EUPM in BiH has been 
strengthened, however, as has been the EUSR’s coordination role, while 
cooperation between the EUPM and the Commission Delegation has 
worked quite well. Coordination between the two pillars is now pursued 
through monthly meetings with the operational EU actors (the EUFOR, 
EUPM, EUMM, the Commission and presidency). But the organisational 
processes and cultures of the first pillar are not always coordinated with 
those of the second.  
The integration–stabilisation dilemma.  Lastly, the individual 
missions have also exposed tensions between the political goal of fostering 
local ownership and the drive to secure effective security-sector reform. 
Although integration into the EU represents the end-goal for all Western 
Balkan states, this objective should not override the needs of stabilisation to 
the point of mission designs that are inappropriate for the local 
environment. BiH has to become less reliant on direct intervention and 
more focused on assistance for the authorities to undertake reforms 
themselves. Yet the experience with the EUPM illustrates that a more 
robust role of oversight, even if falling short of an executive mandate, 
would have increased the effectiveness of the first mission and pre-empted 
the changes to the mandate made in 2005. Similarly, the switch from 
military to police missions in Macedonia was determined not so much by 
conditions on the ground, as by political considerations relating to 
Macedonia’s quest for EU accession prospects. While there are no easy 
solutions to the integration–stabilisation dilemma, experience to date has 
shown that the EU’s political judgment on this account has not always been 
sufficiently attuned to the local political context in the country in question. 
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Appendix I. Current and completed ESDP missions as of May 2007 
Europe 
    Western Balkans  
Military operation in Macedonia (Operation Concordia), 2003, completed  
Police Mission in Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima), 2003-05, completed  
Police Advisory Team in Macedonia (EUPAT), 2005–06, completed 
Police Mission in BiH (EUPM I), 2003–05, completed  
Military operation in BiH (EUFOR Operation Althea), 2004–  
Police Mission in BiH (EUPM II), 2006–December 07 
Police Mission in Kosovo, 2007– (at the planning stage) 
    Moldova and Ukraine 
Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, 2005–  
    South Caucasus 
Rule of Law Mission in Georgia (EUJUST Themis), 2004–05, completed  
South-East Asia 
Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), 2005–06, completed 
Afghanistan 
Police Mission (EUPOL Afghanistan), 2007– launched on 17 June 
Middle East 
Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), 2006–  
Border Assistance Mission in Rafah, Palestinian Territories (EU BAM   
Rafah), 2005–  
Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX), 2006–  
Africa 
Military operation in DR Congo (EUFOR Operation DR Congo), 2006–  
Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa), 2004–  
Security-sector reform mission in DR Congo (EUSEC DR Congo), 2005–  
Support to AMIS II Darfur, 2006–  
Military operation in DR Congo (Operation Artemis), 2003, completed  
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GLOSSARY 
BiH  Bosnia and Herzegovina 
CAFAO-MAK  Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office to Macedonia  
CARDS   Community Assistance for Reconstruction, 
Development and Stabilisation 
CFSP   Common foreign and security policy  
CIVCOM  Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management 
CMCO   Civil–military coordination 
CMPs   Crisis management procedures  
CRCT   Crisis Response Coordination Teams  
CRTs   Civilian Response Teams 
DFID  Department for International Development (UK) 
EAR  European Agency for Reconstruction 
ECJHT European  Commission  Justice and Home Affairs 
Mission to Macedonia 
ECPRP  European Commission Police Reform Project 
ESDP   European security and defence policy 
EUFOR EU  Force 
EUJUST Themis  EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia 
EUMM  EU Monitoring Mission  
EUPAT  EU Police Advisory Team 
EUPM  EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
EUPOL Proxima  EU Police Mission in Macedonia 
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EUSR  EU special representative 
FYROM   Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
GAERC   General Affairs and External Relations Council 
ICITAP  International Criminal Investigative Training 
Assistance Programme (US) 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
IOM  International Organisation for Migration 
IPTF   International Police Task Force in Bosnia (UN) 
JHA  Justice and home affairs 
KFOR   Kosovo Peace Implementation Force (NATO) 
MoI  Ministry of Interior (Macedonia) 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
OSCE   Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe 
PHARE  Pologne, Hongrie Assistance à la Reconstruction 
Economique (EU programme that has since been 
extended to countries in the Western Balkans) 
Proxima  EU Police Mission in Macedonia (see also EUPOL 
Proxima) 
REFLEX  Task force to tackle human trafficking in South-
Eastern Europe (UK) 
RRM  Rapid Reaction Mechanism 
RS Republika  Srpska 
SAA  Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
SAP  Stabilisation and Association Process 
SBS  State Border Service (Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
SFOR  Stabilisation Force in Bosnia (NATO) 
SIPA  State Investigation and Protection Agency (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina) 
TEU  Treaty on European Union 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
USAID  US Agency for International Development 
WEU  Western European Union 
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